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Central Eurasia

FBIS-SOV-95-045
Wednesday
8 March 1995

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Central Eurasia

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Moscow To Speed Formation of Tripartite Customs Union

LD0703201295 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1642 GMT 7 Mar 95

[From the "Presidential Bulletin" feature]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Deputy Premiers of Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan are to meet in Moscow this Thursday, March 9, to map out measures toward speeding up the formation of a tripartite customs union. The appropriate accord was signed by the prime ministers of these three CIS member-countries early this year.

As a Russian government source has reported to Interfax, a delegation of Russia, led by Deputy Premier Aleksey Bolshakov, intends to offer at the meeting a detailed plan of measures toward setting up a three-sided customs union that would lift mutual trade customs and tariffs. A similar document has been drafted by the Kazakh government. Russian cabinet experts believe that the discussion of the two drafts will make it possible to work out on their basis a single complex of practical steps toward speeding up the creation of a customs union. In keeping with a decision reached by the premiers of the three countries, legal prerequisites for such a union are to be prepared within six months.

Thursday's meeting also intends to discuss requests that have come in through official channels from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to join a tripartite customs union.

Baltic States Defense Ministers Meet in Vilnius

WS0803104495 Riga DIENA in Latvian 28 Feb 95 p 1

[Report by Liga Laizane: "Defense Ministers of the Baltic States Sign Agreement"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Riga, 27 Feb — Today in Vilnius the Defense Ministers of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia—Lin Linkevic, Janis Arveds Trapans, and Enn Tup—signed an agreement on cooperation in the field of defense and military relations.

After signing the agreement, Lithuanian Defense Minister Linkevic stated that the signing of the agreement among the military branches does not mean that Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia have concluded a military union, because such issues are to be tackled by higher-level state leaders.

Latvian Defense Minister Trapans called the meeting a working visit, and the agreement—a beginning of concrete cooperation.

In accordance with the new agreement, the sides have agreed to exchange information, carry out joint military training, create a mutual air space control system, develop activities of the Baltic Battalion, and maintain closer contacts with the UN and NATO.

"Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia have decided to coordinate their state programs within the framework of the 'Partnership for Peace' program. However, our main decision was that we should meet more often," said Linkevic.

The Baltic defense ministers unanimously stated that the possibilities for cooperation have not yet been fully exploited. The Lithuanian minister added that lack of cooperation in the military field could postpone the integration process in the European defense system.

The defense ministers of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia also signed a mutual plan for activities for this year, as well as a letter to NATO, which will be submitted to the Ambassador of Denmark in Lithuania, who is also acting as NATO coordinator.

Pickering Says Russia-U.S. Summit To Be Held in First Half of 1995

LD0603140395 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1203 GMT 6 Mar 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Leonid Vinogradov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Vladivostok March 6 TASS—The Russian-.U.S summit will take place in the first half of 1995, U.S. Ambassador in Russia Thomas Pickering told TASS on Monday at the opening of a U.S. business-centre in the Far Eastern city of Vladivostok.

The ambassador did not specify whether Bill Clinton would arrive in May Russia [as received] to attend the celebrations devoted to the 50th anniversary of the victory in World War Two.

He said only that the U.S. President is currently considering his work schedule for the victory celebrations and it is impossible so far to name the exact date of the summit.

"The exact date will be determined by the Governments of the United States and Russia", Pickering said adding that work is going on in this respect.

Speaking on his impressions of the trip to the Russian Far East the U.S. ambassador said that it resembles the north-western states of his country and that there are good prospects of cooperation between the regions.

The opening of the former closed city of Vladivostok to the world promotes Russian access to Asia and Pacific Rim countries, Pickering stressed.

Farmers' Bodies Agree To Cooperate With U.S. Counterparts

LD0203185395 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1627 GMT 2 Mar 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Konstantin Savvin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow March 2 TASS—Russian and U.S. farmers' organisations on Thursday signed an agreement on business cooperation.

Russia's association of farms and agricultural cooperatives and the U.S. Federation of Farmers' Bureaus have maintained partner ties for two years. The two organisations plan to cooperate in the insurance, and banking spheres, in organising fairs, exchanging information, and funding agricultural projects.

The agreement was signed during the Congress of Russian Farmers here.

Yasin: Russia To Receive $6.3 Billion IMF Credit

LD0403145595 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1358 GMT 4 Mar 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] PARIS, March 4 (Interfax)—The Russian Federation is to receive a $6.3 billion credit from the International Monetary Fund by agreement reached between Russia's Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and the IMF's Managing Director Michel Camdessus during their talks on Friday night, Russia's Economics Minister Yevgeniy Yasin told journalists.

Chernomyrdin is currently in Paris with a two-day official visit.

To quote Yasin, the first part of the credit is to arrive in April. The agreement was also reached that Camdessus will visit Moscow next week "to coordinate details of the crediting scheme.

In the estimate of Russian experts, the talks between the Russian prime minister and the French president and prime minister in the evening March 3 were "constructive in all aspects of he discussed issues."

A source close to French President Francois Mitterand quoted him as saying during the one-on-one talks with Chernomyrdin that "there's no Europe without Russia."

After a meeting with Mayor of Paris and a candidate to the presidential post Jacques Chirac and leading French businessmen, Chernomyrdin will return to Moscow.

Soros Fund Sends $600,000 in Aid to Chechnya Civilians

LD0303113295 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1105 GMT 3 Mar 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Mikhail Karlov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow March 3 TASS—The international Soros fund has allocated 600,000 dollars for medical and humanitarian aid to civilian victims of the Chechnya conflict, ITAR-TASS was told today by international operations department chief Alex Goldfarb.

A convoy with drugs, medical equipment, food and clothing went from Moscow to the village of Sleptsovskaya, Ingushetia.

The convoy of five trucks and five ambulance cars also transports experts of the Russian Institute for Traumatology and Orthopedy (ITO), four specialists of which have gone to Chechnya earlier, and a 12-strong rescue team of the Russian Red Cross Committee (RRCC).

ITO director, associate member of the Russian Academy of Medical Sciences Yuliy Shaposhnikov said in an interview with ITAR-TASS that "the action has meaning only if there is cooperation with rescuers, who will bring the ill and wounded to the medical station set up by the institute". Shaposhnikov added that the ITO, with its vast experience in treatment of wounds, is needed by Chechnya now.

Goldfarb stressed in an interview with ITAR-TASS that all initiatives should come from Russia now, and the ITO, RRCC and the Russian Ministry for Emergency Situations have come with their programmes. The Soros fund appreciated their humanitarian proposals and gave the money. The organisations' proposals are to be implemented within two months. The fund's patron is ready to consider other programmes and finance them if they are useful, Goldfarb said.

It will take the humanitarian convoy three days to get to Ingushetia. The convoy is escorted by bodyguards of Ingushetia's President Ruslan Aushev.

Chechen Events 'Pretext' for EU Not To Sign Agreements

LD0703173895 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1622 GMT 7 Mar 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, March 7 (Interfax)—Russia's Deputy Foreign Minister Nikolay Afanasyevskiy believes that the Chechen events are "a pretext" for postponing the conclusion of an interim agreement on trade and trade-related issues between Russia and the EU.

"Undoubtedly, it is a political move," he told Interfax on Tuesday.

He said "there is every reason to believe that if nothing had happened in Chechnya, some other pretext would have been found not to sign this agreement."

"Judging by all accounts, certain circles are using political slogans for promoting their own commercial interests," said Afanasyevskiy. "Behind the EU decision are reasons having to do with commercial interest and competition," he said.

He is convinced that the European Union's decision will tell on the dialogue which is to begin in Moscow on March 9 between Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev and the foreign ministers of France, Germany and Spain - the current, former and future chairmen of the EU.

"This is going to be a big discussion. We must decide how to build partnership between Russia and the European Union. One should keep in mind, however, that in Corfu, where Russia and the European Union signed an agreement on partnership and cooperation last year, a balance of interests was found and documented," he went on to say.

As to the trade agreement, the course of events will entirely depend on the European Union's position. "The ball is in the European Union's court," said Afanasyevskiy.

Presidential Commission Reports on OSCE Visit to Chechnya

LD0303201395 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1823 GMT 3 Mar 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Liliya Kuznetsova]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow March 3 TASS—The program of a regular Chechen trip of OSCE representatives has been completely fulfilled, chairman of the Presidential Commission for Citizenship Abdulakh Mikitayev told a news conference here today. Mikitayev visited Chechnya together with the OSCE delegation on February 25 through 28.

In the words of Mikitayev, the delegation managed to "study the republican situation and forecast its development" thanks to the possibility to meet soldiers and officers of the federal troops, representatives of the provisional council, refugees and people kept in the Mozdok filtration center.

When meeting local administration in Chechnya, the delegation discussed possibilities of cooperation and OSCE assistance in provision of human rights. The sides discussed a possibility to prepare Chechen elections at the local and republican levels and possible assistance of the OSCE to the process.

Mikitayev said that trip will not be the last one bearing in mind the OSCE heads planning to continue watching Chechen events.

Nuclear Deliveries To Go Ahead Following Agreement

MS0603103195 London THE DAILY TELEGRAPH in English 6 Mar 95 p 29

[Report by Helen Cranford: "Nuclear Safety Gear for Russia"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Brussels—Deliveries of nuclear safety equipment to Russia, which had been blocked by contractors fearful of third-party lawsuits, are to go ahead following a nuclear indemnity agreement, a Nuclear Electric spokesman confirmed yesterday.

His company and others, including Scottish Nuclear, involved in the European Union's safety programme had balked at supplying equipment to the former Soviet Union as long as they risked being sued in the event of a nuclear accident.

The firms had gone ahead with training and scientific studies under the European Union's Tacis programme, but had stopped short of supplying essential equipment until the legal problems had been resolved, said Paul Haig of Nuclear Electric.

"Hopefully the much needed equipment can be delivered within the next few months," he said.

A Commission spokesman said that the memorandum of understanding—which was signed by Hans van den Broek, the commission for Eastern Europe, and Viktor Mikhaylov, the Russian atomic energy minister—"addressed both the liability problem and a number of political issues. It means the 300m pound programme, which had been scheduled for 1991-94, can now go ahead.

"We have defined the rules of the game, including the management and use of project results."

The Commission is also stepping up pressure on the Russian government to work within the Vienna Convention, which provides an internationally recognised nuclear liability framework within which responsibility is exclusively channelled to the operator of installations.

The latest memorandum is of an interim nature. "But the agreement will permit nuclear safety projects to proceed to in-depth phases and result in increased safety improvements," he said.

Negotiations have been difficult. It was not until 1993 that on-site access to sites in Smolensk, Sosnovy Bor, Kola, Kalinin, Balakovo and Beloyarsk was allowed.

Nuclear Material Safety Procedures Shown

MM0703111495 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Mar 95 p 3

[Report by Mikhail Rebrov: "Special-Purpose Technology, or 'Cell' From Which Not a Single Atom Can Escape"]

[FBIS Translated Text]

Emergency at "Facility 116"

Events at "Facility 116" spun almost out of control—something totally out of the ordinary had happened. A warning signal flashed on the security guard's monitor screen: "Radiation in Cabin No. 8." Television monitor screens displayed the site of the incident, the notification system kicked in, and so did diverse shutdown procedures.... This was followed by further inspection of the "culprit" which had triggered the alarm signal, an operational analysis of the incident, and a report to the leadership of the procedures system.

Details about this emergency were released only later. Namely, that it occurred at 1206 hours at a facility containing two nuclear installations and enriched uranium. That 120 people work in an architecturally complex building with confusing passages and a large number of rather narrow rooms. And also that—and this is probably the main point—"Facility 116" is only a tiny segment of a vast scientific research and experimental complex whose power supply was disconnected immediately when the alarm was sounded. This caused no panic, because "Facility 116" and its adjoining "Building 101" (the center where computer data are stored and processed) have their autonomous power supply system.

What actually happened? Someone whom we shall call N. (his name, official duties, and profession are of no importance here), adhering to the rather complex coded access procedure, made his way toward the exit via the control station of Cabin No. 8. Sensitive analyzers immediately kicked in. They took all of half a second to determine a 5-microroentgen excess over and above the normal background radiation. And it all developed from there....

No, this is not an extract from a thriller about theft of nuclear materials and the culprit's apprehension. Everything I have described actually happened at a specific location and on a specific date. It all happened during the last few days of February at Moscow's Kurchatov Institute.

Where Does the Nuclear Trace Lead?

The vicissitudes of human life in the closing years of the 20th century continue to prey on our minds. The expression "drugs mafia" was coined some time ago. Not too long ago to cease being a threat, but long enough ago to yield to a new expression—"nuclear mafia"—with its compulsive craving for the dreadful but attractive fissile materials. Alas, despite the enormous and strictly physical danger, the "nuclear temptation" is only growing. Confirmation of this is provided by the numerous reported incidents of theft of nuclear materials, the smuggling of such materials from one country to another, and their sale on the "black market." Diverse interests are at play here. Some are trying to acquire their own "atom bomb." This mania has gripped states which imagine that access to nuclear weapons will boost their might and strengthen their national security. Others have turned this into big business. Yet others make no secret of their intentions to use nuclear materials for acts of terrorism and blackmail.

Each one of these phenomena is tragic by nature and catastrophically dangerous in terms of its potential consequences. Especially since, in our unstable world, they also acquire political and national overtones. The subject of "Russian radiation" has become especially popular recently, even though the problem of "vanishing" fissile materials has become almost universal. The French authorities, for example, have simply failed to trace the 1.5 kg of plutonium which disappeared some time ago. The United States experienced an incomparably greater loss—one tonne of plutonium. Alarming instances of disappearing radioactive materials have also occurred on the territory of Germany and Britain.

Sober-minded specialists, as well as politicians, believe that boosting the effectiveness of the monitoring and physical safekeeping of nuclear materials and ensuring the safety of existing research and industrial centers constitute a far more important task for the future of the entire world than identifying the origins of smuggled radioactive materials.

"Kalina," "Priznak," "Aral," and Others

As a matter of fact, this was the topic of discussion at the Russian-U.S. conference on the demonstration of the security system at "Facility 116" at the Kurchatov Institute Scientific Center and the Russian-U.S. remote radiation monitoring program. The other side was represented at quite an authoritative level: staffers of the U.S. Department of Energy, the Sandi [as transliterated] and Livermore National Laboratories, the University of California at Berkeley, the Brookhaven Center, the Department for Scientific and Technical Policy.... And so was ours—the Ministry of Atomic Energy, the Ministry of Defense, the Federal Inspectorate for Nuclear and Radiation Safety, the All-Russia Scientific Research Institute for Experimental Physics (Arzamas-16), the All-Russia Scientific Research Institute for Technical Physics (Chelyabinsk- 70), the "Elektron" Machine Tool Production Association, the "Luch" Science and Production Association, and others.

My work at the conference began with being introduced to Nikolay Denisovich Bondarev, director of the Center for the Handling and Safeguarding of Information. This is how he described the situation. The principle of staffers' personal responsibility for the safekeeping of radioactive elements is not always complied with during the "movement" of nuclear materials in the research or technology processes. In the process of stocktaking, due to the lack of instrument monitoring facilities, the strictest of inspections is not always carried out to verify their presence, nor is there any entry and exit monitoring during the transfer process. He then offered to introduce me to the Kurchatov Institute staffers who had developed the system for physical safekeeping of nuclear materials.

I was given an opportunity to hear the views of Academician N. Ponomarev-Stepnoy, vice president of the Kurchatov Institute Russian Scientific Center; Chief Engineer Ye. Melkov; "system" developers A. Rumakin, V. Sukhoruchkin, and A. Rumyantsev; and U.S. specialist Dzh. Runi [as transliterated]. I also saw the devices codenamed "Kalina," "Trassa-1," Priznak,“ ”Aral,“ ”Lena-2,“ ”Radian-M“....I was shown the so-called ”passive“ and ”active“ barriers, bulletproof glass, code locks, the work of the monitoring system for ”unsanctioned access to premises“, and the computer equipment in the ”zone of ballast materials.“ Finally, I actually witnessed the emergency which I described at the beginning of this report. Incidentally, the security system is guaranteed to ”kick in“ when it detects the unauthoritzed movement of just five grams of metal.

Are all nuclear facilities so reliably protected? Alas! This work calls for huge expenditures. The Americans, for example, have spent $7 billion over the last 10 years to improve security in their nuclear complex. As we know, these expenditures are immeasurably smaller in our country. Meanwhile, the problem has become international and we are entitled to expect financial assistance from the West. Especially since our scientific and technical ideas are of value. Of considerable value, at that.

'Foton-10' Space Mission Ends Unsuccessfully

LD0703215395 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 2100 GMT 7 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] A joint Russo-Franco-European space mission has ended unsuccessfully. A number of scientific experiments should have been performed on board the Russian technological satellite Foton-10. Last Saturday [4 March], a transport helicopter that flew into a storm was obliged to jettison the landing module containing the equipment. The Franco-European devices became unusable. As a result, most of the experiments have been lost.

Krasnoyarsk Plant To Ship Aluminum Sections to Europe

MM0203135395 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 1 Mar 95 First Edition p 4

[Report by Aleksey Kleshko: "Tired of Being an Appendage"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Krasnoyarsk—The Krasnoyarsk Metallurgical Plant has concluded a contract for the delivery of 10,000 tonnes of aluminum sections to Europe.

The Netherlands, Britain, and Spain will probably be the first countries to receive not aluminum raw materials from Siberia but processed products.

Commenting on this fact, specialists are stressing that we are ceasing to be a raw materials appendage of Europe.

Chernomyrdin Interviewed on Russian Current Affairs

MS0603132595 London BBC Television Network in English 0815 GMT 5 Mar 95

[Interview with Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin by David Frost in the Russian Embassy in London; from the "Breakfast with Frost"—recorded, date not given; in Russian fading into English translation]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] [Frost] If you had the time over again, would you still invade Chechnya the way the Russian Federation did?

[Chernomyrdin] Chechnya is a very big problem today to Russia, maybe I would formulate it in the following way. We cannot tolerate this tumor any longer. I appreciate the question. What we would have done with the benefit of hindsight of what happened— today I tell you frankly, in earnest, there could have been no other decisions. Today life confirms this. It was impossible to tolerate this any longer. During the three years we tried to solve this bloodlessly, I think we even dragged it out a bit. Today I can say that with that regime, with that leadership, with the [word indistinct] it was impossible to agree.

[Frost] Do you think that Groznyy can ever rise again, and people will ever return to live there, or do you think Groznyy is now a dead city?

[Chernomyrdin] By no means, of course the city will be restored, it will rise, there is no doubt about it. No there is no talk of a ghost city.

[Frost] Tell me, is it possible Prime Minister, that the next time you visit London, you will visit us as the President. Have you definitely decided to run for President in the elections of 1996?

[Chernomyrdin] No, and I haven't even given it any thought. I should say quite frankly, quite bluntly, that's not my vision. I'm in control of events, I know what's happening in Russia. Today, there is no alternative to Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin, there is no alternative under any circumstances. So to me there is no problem, there is no question, I will take part in the elections as a voter.

[Frost] As a voter. Do you think—we have that President Yeltsin has said he will not run again in 1996. Do you think it's possible that you and his other supporters can persuade him to run again in 1996?

[Chernomyrdin] We will do all our best to persuade him. It has to be done, it is necessary. We still have some time in hand, we are talking about 1996, I am convinced that this has to be Yeltsin.

[Frost] We had read in our newspapers that among the possible candidates that, Mikhail Gorbachev had said that he might run for President. Do you think that he would get very much support?

[Chernomyrdin] I read in the press that he made some statements to that effect, not ruling out the possibility of running for President. I think that he has no prospects today, he stands no chance.

[Frost] As you know Prime Minister, there was a great deal of coverage here, a couple of weeks ago, about Mr Michael Foot, the former head of the Labor Party in this country, when it was quoted in the memoirs of Mr Gordiyevskiy [KGB defector] that the KGB considered Michael Foot to be an agent of influence, and he of course has said very angrily no, no, no, no, no. If he wanted, for instance, to inspect his own KGB file, in order to clear his name, is that something that you would agree to?

[Chernomyrdin] I don't think that there should be any obstacles, today this is possible.

[Frost] Do you know if the reports were correct or incorrect?

[Chernomyrdin] No, I don't know.

[Frost] When you met Mr Blair, the current Labor leader, did he raise the matter?

[Chernomyrdin] No.

[Frost] He left it to me. We were talking earlier before we began our conversation about the murder of the TV Journalist, Vladislav Listev, probably by the mafia. What was your reaction to that in human terms and in Government terms?

[Chernomyrdin] First of all, it came totally out of the blue, no one expected this. I'm very, very sad, quite sad. It is quite desperate that this should happen in our country, in Russia, it is such a shame, it is a feeling of shame. We should not let this get out of hand. In essence this is a challenge to reforms, a challenge to democracy, but it's useless.

[Frost] Let's just come on to the economy, the Russian economy at this vital time. How is your economic battle going?

[Chernomyrdin] To me that's the most important question. It's very important, I should tell you that the situation is quite difficult. I'm not simplifying, to us the road we are covering at the moment is very important, it's a road of change. And the issues of economic reform, that's the most important phase. I think that we have already passed the most difficult time, there is no going back, there will be no going back, there are no such forces anymore in Russia which can reverse these decisions. Today we are putting forward the goal of accelerating the rates of economic reform, we have set specific goals. The budget we are adopting at the moment is very austere, it's very stiff, but we are managing to keep to our program. We hope and I am convinced that all the negotiations we are holding with the IMF, with other financial institutions, that the parameters that were set, that were set by us for ourselves, that we will keep to the parameters.

[Frost] When will the benefits feed through to the Russian people, here we talk about the feel-good factor, when will the benefits feel good to the Russian people and the sacrifices be over?

[Chernomyrdin] I would love to see the people living an easier life, unfortunately the main questions have to be tackled first because without that it would be too difficult. So the task is set ourselves for '95, first of all to suppress inflation, to curb price rises. Then the process of accumilation will start, investment will start, reproduction will start, revitalization of industry, of plants will start. That's what we need. As for today, all we'd like is for trust in us, to believe in us. The Government is being supported, although I can feel that the credibility is at it's limits, our credibility is at it's limits.

[Frost] Well, as you go into the future, Prime Minister, we wish you all the best, all the luck in the world. Thank you for being with us.

Ministers Upbeat on Franco-Russian Cooperation Prospects

MM0603101695 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 Mar 95 p 3

[Report by Yuriy Kovalenko: "'Grandfather Clause' May Revive Ties With France. Debts on Czarist Loan May Overshadow Them"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Paris—"We succeeded in giving a boost to bilateral economic ties by political means," Economy Minister Edmond Alphandery summed up the results of the meeting of the Franco-Russian Economic, Financial, Industrial, and Trade Council during a conversation with me; he is chairman of the French part of the council. "We paved the way for Viktor Chernomyrdin's visit to France"

In the near future, following approval by the State Duma, I was told by Nikolay Drozdov, deputy minister of foreign economic relations, our legislation will enshrine a so-called "grandfather clause"—in other words protection for the investor against undesirable changes in legislation. Thus, foreign investors will be protected against surprises with which the legislature may present them.

All this will evidently make it possible to get moving key projects involving the French oil giants Total and Elf Aquitaine. An agreement on mutual protection of investments may be signed during the council's next session in Moscow in late 1995. But we have already been promised major capital investment in the ferrous and nonferrous metallurgy industries.

Let me cite another two of the highly promising bilateral projects—namely, the construction of a furniture manufacturing plant in the city of Balakovo in Saratov Oblast and French provision of cabin equipment for our Il-96's, which may have U.S. engines and Russian stewardesses.

At this time members of the national association of Russian loan holders have dramatically livened up.

Around 300,000 French people—at one time there were 1.5 million of them—hold Russian bonds issued by the czarist government, arrears on which are to date estimated at 160 billion francs (the debts account for 40 billion while the rest is interest). They intend to get the question of compensation included in the program of the main contenders in the presidential elections, which are due to take place 23 April and 7 May.

The national association has the support of a group of 290 parliamentary deputies from various parties led by the enterprising Eric Rault [surname as transliterated].

"Politicians will only tackle our problem if we hold a knife to their throats," the determined leaders of the holders of Russian bonds said; their interests are defended by the well-known lawyer Jacques Verges. "Our election votes are just such a knife and this is a formidable weapon."

The presidential contenders have not stinted on promises during the election campaign, thus counting on winning the support of a sizable number of voters."

Germany's Kinkel: EU Seeking 'Long-Term' Ties With Moscow

LD0803114995 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1132 GMT 8 Mar 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Bonn March 8 TASS—"The visit by the German, French and Spanish foreign ministers to Moscow, starting on Wednesday, should confirm the interest of the European Union in establishing long-term partnership relations with Russia," German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel stressed in a statement here on Wednesday in connection with the trip of the three ministers to the Russian capital.

"Our special interest lies in the sphere of European security where I advocate achievement of strategic partnership between NATO and Russia," Kinkel continued. "Taking into account its size and importance, Russia should take a worthy place in the future architecture of European security," the minister noted.

"On the other hand," Kinkel added, "we should intimate in Moscow that the Chechen events can tell on the development of our relations with Russia." The minister underlined that Russia should prove in practice its readiness for a political solution of this conflict and for respect of human rights.

Kinkel announced his intention to discuss a return to Germany of cultural values (during bilateral talks with the Russian leaders) which were displaced to the former Soviet Union during the Second World War.

"We shall firmly and consistently continue talks to achieve our aim: full return of these cultural values to Germany," the foreign minister stated.

Hungarian Prime Minister Begins Official Visit

Holds Talks With Chernomyrdin

LD0603131495 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1147 GMT 6 Mar 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Gennadiy Yezhov]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 6 Mar—Russo-Hungarian intergovernmental talks between full delegations, including Russian Federation Prime Minster Viktor Chernomyrdin and his Hungarian counterpart Gyula Horn, have started in Moscow today. After the talks are over, it is planned that two intergovernmental agreements on promoting and providing reciprocal protection for capital investments and on perpetuating the memory of servicemen and civilians who died in wars and on their burial status will be signed.

Opening the meeting, the head of the Russian Government said that he was satisfied with Russo-Hungarian relations on the whole.

"There are no political differences between us", he emphasized. "This is, of course, pleasing, but also imposes on us a responsibility to maintain what we have achieved."

The Russian prime minister said he was convinced that Hungary would remain "a good and positive partner just as it is currently perceived in Moscow." According to Viktor Chernomyrdin, commercial and economic cooperation between the two countries also merits a positive appraisal. In particular, we have achieved a high trade turnover. However, there are further prospects here, too, the head of the Russian Government said.

Chernomyrdin To Heed Advice on Chechnya

LD0603135795 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1320 GMT 6 Mar 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Gennadiy Yezhov]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 6 Mar—Moscow will heed the opinion of Hungary, chairman of the OSCE [Organization for Security and Confidence in Europe], on the question of the settlement of the Chechen crisis and is prepared to discuss all proposals put forward on the problem, Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin said in a conversation with journalists after the talks with Hungarian Prime Minister Gyula Horn today.

Chernomyrdin added: The OSCE is following the events in the Chechen Republic intently, taking active part in the attempts to find a peaceful solution to the crisis in Chechnya. We are satisfied with the way Hungary is "running this process," Chernomyrdin stressed.

Discusses Repayment of Russian Debt

LD0603183595 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1703 GMT 6 Mar 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Mar 6 (Interfax)—Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and his Hungarian counterpart, Gyula Horn, held talks in Moscow Monday to find ways for Russia to repay the ex-Soviet debt to Hungary with Russian manufactured goods.

Russian First Deputy Economics Minister Yakov Urinson, who attended the talks, told an Interfax correspondent later that the former Soviet Union's debt to Hungary stood at $900 million. The Hungarian side is positive about Russia's proposal to deliver trucks and equipment for gas storage facilities to settle the debt, he added.

According to Urinson, Russia showed interest in repaying a part of the debt with supplies of special equipment.

Meanwhile, sources in the Hungarian delegation told Interfax that Russia delivered six Su-27 assault jets last year towards settlement of the debt. However, Hungary seeks to "minimize these supplies and receive various manufactured goods from Russia," the sources added.

Received by Yeltsin

LD0703091595 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0804 GMT 7 Mar 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Andrey Shtorkh]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 7 Mar—Russian President Boris Yeltsin received Hungarian Prime Minister Gyula Horn in the Kremlin today.

Welcoming the high-ranking guest, the head of the Russian state congratulated him on the occasion of his "first visit to Moscow as head of the Hungarian Government."

Boris Yeltsin told Gyula Horn that he knew about the results of his meeting on Monday with Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin.

"I understand you are satisfied with the results of the talks," the Russian president noted.

The Russian head of state stressed: "We have already made progress in resolving many questions, some of which were discussed with you in Budapest at the OSCE [Organization for Security and Confidence in Europe] summit in December last year, which turned out to be so full in a political sense."

Taking part in the talks in the Kremlin on the Russian side are Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev and Dmitriy Ryurikov, aide to the Russian Federation President on foreign affairs; and on the Hungarian side are Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs, and other officials.

Says Russia To Repay Debt by 1998

LD0703175295 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1418 GMT 7 Mar 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Mar 7 (Interfax)—Russia pledged to pay off its total debt to Hungary by 1998, Hungarian Prime Minister Gyula Horn reported at a press conference Tuesday.

In his words, Russia's debt to Hungary totals more than $1 billion, $150 million of them—for the supplies of Hungarian goods to Russia in 1991. The debt of the former USSR totals $900 million. Horn declared that the agreement to pay the debt through clearing - deliveries of Russian cars and equipment to Hungary - is of prime significance. In addition, Russian construction workers will participate in the construction of the Budapest subway.

Horn also reported that the parties provided for "mediated payment of debt" as well: Russia will supply coal to Ukraine and Ukraine, for its part, will deliver electric power to Hungary.

According to Horn, the negotiations in Moscow also discussed possibility of construction of a transit pipeline on the Hungarian territory by Russia and export of spent fuel from the Hungarian atomic power stations.

As Horn reported, while discussing the Chechen problem Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin expressed gratitude to Hungary for an active participation in settling the Chechen crisis and for deliveries of humanitarian aid and for assistance in preparation of democratic elections in Chechnya. Horn also reported that Viktor Chernomyrdin reassured him that Hungary's intention to join NATO would not influence further Russian-Hungarian relations.

Meets With Rybkin

LD0703215495 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1547 GMT 7 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 7 Mar—ITAR-TASS was informed by the State Duma press service that Ivan Rybkin, chairman of the State Duma, met Gyula Horn, prime minister of the Hungarian government, today.

The head of the chamber informed the leader of the Hungarian government of the State Duma's lawmaking work and of laws adopted and under development. In particular, he dwelt on the priority trends, among which he especially singled out work on the Land Code. According to Rybkin, "in Russia it has proved impossible to solve the land problem from as far back as 1861, and it is just as difficult during the year granted to the present Duma."

Speaking of the lawmaking work of the Hungarian parliament, the prime minister said that it was helped in its activities by the Council of Europe, thanks to which a legislative basis for democracy was set up. Ivan Rybkin, speaking of the importance for Russians of the Hungarian experience of economic reforms, stressed in turn that "we would like the pace of our inter-parliamentary ties not to slow down. Together we should push forward the development of contacts between us."

Deputy Calls For Peacekeepers To Stay in Croatia

LD0803121595 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1200 GMT 8 Mar 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Aleksandr Kondrashov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade March 8 TASS—"I think that the upper house of the Russian Parliament should do evrything possible for preventing the withdrawal of the U.N. peacekeeping force from the Serb Krajina. Otherwise a bloody war will once again break out on the Serbian-Croat confrontation line," Petr Shirshov, chairman of the Russian Federation Council committee for security and defence, said in an interview with ITAR-TASS today.

"I visited two of the Russian "blue helmet" battalions, and talked with their commanders," the Russian deputy further said. "Our officers do not simply forecast, but are confident, as professional and experienced people, that the departure of the "blue helmets" will inevitably lead to a new great war," he said.

"That is why after my return to Moscow, I will inform the Federation Council leadership of such an alarming situation. I consider it necessary that not only our committee, but also the entire upper house of the Federal Assembly should take the initiative and call on the president, the government and the foreign ministry to make efforts to extend U.N. peacekeepers' mandate on an international basis, and persuade Croatia to give up its plan to oust the "green helmets"," Shirshov said.

The U.N. peace force's departure will not only mean a new Serb- Croat war, but it will also create a number of dangerous problems for the security of Russian soldiers and officers, because the situation that will occur after March 31, all possible routes of the Russian battalion's withdrawal will be fraught with high risk. It is our duty as deputies to prevent danger to life and security of our military personnel contingents, Ptr Shirshov emphasised.

Kovalev: Moscow Denounces Yugoslav Human Rights Violations

LD0703093795 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0813 GMT 7 Mar 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Konstantin Pribytkov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Geneva March 7 TASS—Russia firmly and unequivocally denounces violations of human rights and humanitarian norms in former Yugoslavia by anybody, said head of the Russian delegation Sergey Kovalev, well-known human rights advocate, here on Monday, speaking at the 51st session of the U.N. Human Rights Commission.

Russia consistently defends the principle of "an objective, unbiased and just approach" to a degree of guilt of every side in the conflict.

Spelling out Moscow's position on the Yugoslav crisis, he stressed: "We hold that it is impossible to ignore positive changes in the policy pursued by the leadership of the Yugoslav Republic, above all, the approval by Belgrade of the Contact Group plan, closure of the border with Bosnia and Herzegovina and the deployment of the international observer mission there".

According to Kovalev, it is also unjust to keep mum about the grave humanitarian situation in Yugoslavia, which "has difficult consequences for women, children, the aged and refugees".

Speaking of the Afghan tragedy, Kovalev stressed that, following the end of the Col War, that state has turned into "a pariah of the international community".

Russia believes that "the community of nations has no right to leave millions of people, living there, face to face with the epidemic of clan and religious extremism and to forget about humanitarian problems, including liberation of former Soviet prisoners of war".

Moscow is worried over the fact that the world community has not found a solution permitting to restore peace and stability in Rwanda. "The abnormal situation from the viewpoint of human rights persists on Cyprus," the delegation head said.

"Attempts to legalise the so-called Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus interfere with restoring contacts between the two Cypriot communities."

The liquidation of apartheid in South Africa, the breakthrough to peace in the Middle East and the return of President Aristide to Haiti inspire hope for the triumph of human rights against the background of crises and tragedies raging in many parts of the world.

"The world needs changes, the world is waiting, and it is worthy of changes for the better," concluded Kovalev, expressing hope that "processes of democracy, observance of human rights and supremacy of law will be picking up steam".

Moscow Forms Plan Following Tensions in FRY

LD0703173595 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1622 GMT 7 Mar 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Mar 7 (Interfax)—The Russian Foreign Ministry is preparing a plan of action "following aggravated tensions" in former Yugoslavia, an official spokesman for the ministry, Grigoriy Karasin, told a briefing in Moscow Tuesday.

According to Karasin, "Moscow will start to implement the plan jointly with its international partners, once approved by Russian President Boris Yeltsin."

Karasin emphasized that Moscow was increasingly concerned about the developments in former Yugoslavia, particularly in Croatia.

As has already been reported, Zagreb had announced its intention not to extend the UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] mandate after March 31, 1995.

Moscow, Kiev Still in Debate Over Fleet, Debt

LD0603174995 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1656 GMT 6 Mar 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Oleg Velichko]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow March 6 TASS—Controversy between Russia and Ukraine over the division of the Black Sea Fleet and rescheduling of Ukraine's debt to Russia still remains, Russian First Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Soskovets told a working meeting.

Agreements are being drafted for the Russian-Ukrainian summit ahead on Russian-Ukrainian friendship and cooperation, Black Sea Fleet division, rescheduling of Ukraine's debt to Russia and on double citizenship.

Russia intends to invite Ukrainian experts to Moscow to polish these draft agreements, the working meeting was told today.

In addition, ITAR-TASS was told by an informed source in the Russian Government that Soskovets is due to go to Kiev on a working visit on March 14-16.

Russian Black Sea Fleet Commander Feliks Gromov said the fleet issue must be handled on the basis of earlier agreements between the Russian and Ukrainian presidents, under which Sevastopol is to be the home to the Russian part of the Black Sea Fleet.

The Russian president's decree directs Soskovets to prepare Yeltsin's visit to Kiev. Soskovets held talks, early in February, with Ukrainian First deputy Prime Minister Yevgeniy Marchuk in Kiev.

Kozyrev Seeks UN Help in Settling Tajik Conflict

LD0703182995 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1622 GMT 7 Mar 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, Mar 7 (Interfax)—Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev called for coordination of efforts with UN in having the Tajik conflict resolved.

He told UN Deputy Secretary General Aldo Ajello in Moscow Tuesday that "very serious efforts and coordination of activities will be needed to further stabilize the situation and have different personalities cooperate in Tajikistan."

Kozyrev admitted that the Tajik problem was not easy and expressed appreciation of Ajello's efforts in trying to resolve it by saying that they had brought about significant results such as the latest extension of the truce between Dushanbe and the opposition and preparation for a second round of talks between Tajik factions to be held in Moscow.

A senior Russian diplomat told Interfax that this round which had been repeatedly postponed would be held either at the end of March or early in April.

Kozyrev To Visit Middle East Mar-Apr

LD0703180195 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1643 GMT 7 Mar 95

[From the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature: by diplomatic correspondents Aleksandr Korzun, Igor Porshnev, Yevgeniy Terekhov, and others]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Mar 7 (Interfax)—Late in March or early April Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev will leave for the Middle East, Director of the Middle East and North Africa Department of the Russian Foreign Ministry Vladimir Gudev, told Interfax on Tuesday.

Commenting on reports carried in some foreign news media about Kozyrev's tour to the region beginning on March 26 with a visit to Egypt, the senior diplomat said: "This information is not exact. The Minister's tour to the Middle East is scheduled for a later date."

Gudev did not rule out the schedule being changed.

The diplomat said that during the upcoming tour, the Russian Minister plans to visit Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Israel and the Gaza Strip, where he will hold talks with Palestinian leader Yasir 'Arafat. "So far Jordan is not part of the schedule," said the diplomat.

Shumeyko Calls Talks With Israel's Rabin 'Positive'

LD0703232695 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1609 GMT 7 Mar 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Anatoliy Kerzhentsev]

[FBIS Translated Text] Tel Aviv, 7 Mar—The State of Israel and the new democratic Russia are linked by the common nature of their problems and by their striving for mutual understanding and cooperation on equal terms, Vladimir Shumeyko, chairman of the Federation Council of the Russian Federation, said in an interview with the ITAR-TASS correspondent. Shumeyko is in Israel on an official visit.

Today the chairman of the Russian parliament's upper chamber had a meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhaq Rabin.

Summing up the results of the talks, Vladimir Shumeyko described them as "positive." He noted that the half-million-strong army of Russian-speaking Israeli citizens who had emigrated from CIS countries in recent years were helping to bring Israel and Russia closer together.

Links between Russia and Israel are developing at the current stage mainly in the intellectual and political spheres, Vladimir Shumeyko added. This applies also to the exchange of experience by members of parliament from both countries. For instance, the sides have reached a common view on the need to elect at least two-thirds of parliamentary deputies by direct vote and not by party lists, so that citizens can monitor how effectively their elected representatives are working.

The head of the Russian parliamentary delegation also said that visiting the Yad Vashem memorial complex, which was built in Jerusalem in memory of the millions of Jewish victims of German Fascism during the Second World War, compels one to regard Israel's security problems with great understanding and to have faith in the sincerity of its aspiration to peace and good-neighborly relations with other countries and peoples of the Middle East.

Military Delegation in Damascus for Cooperation Talks

LD0803091595 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0855 GMT 8 Mar 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Anatoliy Golovastov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Beirut March 8 TASS—Syrian Defence Minister Mustafa Talas and Russian Deputy Defence Minister Konstantin Kobets discussed the state of and prospects for the development of relations between the Russian and Syrian Armed Forces at a meeting in Damascus on Tuesday.

General Kobets came to Syria at the head of a Russian military delegation for a week-long visit.

Syria and Russia signed an agreement on the resumption of Russian weapons' deliveries to Syria during a Damascus visit by Russian Vice-Premier Oleg Soskovets in April 1994. The supplies were stopped after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

In June 1994, chiefs of the Syrian and Russian general staffs Hikmat al-Shehabi and Mikhail Kolesnikov signed 12 agreements in Damascus on technical cooperation in the military sphere between Russia and Syria.

Russian Embassy in Morocco Boosts Security After Attack

LD0303202795 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1620 GMT 3 Mar 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, Mar 3 (INTERFAX)—The Russian Embassy in Morocco (as it is known, a terroristic act was committed in the consular section of this Embassy some days ago) adopts all necessary security measures, Director of the North Africa and Middle East Department under Russia's Foreign Ministry Vladimir Gudev reported to Interfax Friday.

He indicated that guarding posts around the Embassy have been reinforced. "Our citizens were instructed to increase vigilance and not to leave the city without any need," Gudev said.

In his words, vigilance of the employee of the consular section of the Russian Embassy in Morocco helped to avoid casualties. "Our diplomat paid attention to an extraordinary behavior of a visitor who appeared to be a terrorist. The diplomat rushed out of the room and closed an armored door. As a result, the terrorist appeared alone and was killed due to a bomb explosion," Gudev said.

He pointed out that "the terrorist who blew up the bomb was not a professional." "This was an illiterate man, probably, not quite sane," Gudev said.

Gudev believes that one should not attach special significance to the fact that there was a slogan with the signature "Chechnya" in the Arabian language on the kamikaze's body. "The events in Chechnya had practically no influence on the situation around Russian Embassies in the countries of this region. There were some attempts to picket them but there were no coercive actions," Gudev said.

Moscow Ready To Assist in Settling Somali Crisis

LD0703171295 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1600 GMT 7 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Russia has stated its preparedness to give what assistance it can to settle the crisis in Somalia, Grigoriy Karasin, head of the Press and Information Department, told a briefing at the Russian Foreign Ministry's press center. According to him, following the completion of the UN peace-keeping operation in Somalia, prospects for restoring peace and legality remain very vague there for the time being. h1

Primorye Government Opposes 1991 Accord With PRC

LD0303131895 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1123 GMT 3 Mar 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] VLADIVOSTOK, Mar 3 (Interfax-Eurasia)—The government of the Primorye territory of the Russian Far East insists that the federal government and national parliament find a legal way to keep the whole of the territory Russian. Under the Soviet-Chinese agreement of 1991 Russia is to cede part of the Primorye territory to China.

The press secretary of Primorye governor Yevgeniy Nazhdratenko, Nataliya Vstovskaya, said Friday that Nazhdratenko "has no intention of spoiling relations with the Chinese" but feels that the errors of those who phrased the agreement of 1991 ought to be corrected for Russia's sake.

Lukin: Parliament Views PRC Border Treaty as 'Necessary'

LD0303142995 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1401 GMT 3 Mar 95

[By ITAR-TASS parliamentary correspondent Lyudmila Yermakova]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow March 3 TASS—The participants of the closed parliamentary hearings on the progress of the demarcation of the eastern stretch of the Russo-Chinese border, held in the upper chamber of the Russian parliament today, expressed the unanimous view that "the border treaty was necessary and useful for both countries", journalists were told here by Vladimir Lukin, chairman of the Duma committee for international affairs.

"A revision of the 1991 agreement is out of the question," he added. The MP said that today this viewpoint was also backed during the hearings by representatives from the Maritime territorial administration (the Russian Far East). This is important because the leadership of that territory had recently demanded the denunciation of the border agreement with China. Today, they no longer call for the revision of the border. They have referred only to some practical details of this work, in the course of which they could table some proposals.

The MPs and representatives of the Russian Foreign Ministry have expressed the view that some provisions concerning the border could be utilised at a purely practical level. Lukin said this was a far from easy problem since the borderline was extremely long. "Nobody wants to yield even a centimeter of national territory to the other side," he stressed. An agreement was reached during the hearings to send a team of MPs to the border area next Sunday.

It is worth recalling that ITAR-TASS was told the day before by a representative of the Chinese Foreign Ministry that "we positively assess the results of our talks with Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev, who is currently visiting China, as well as Russia's stand on the border problem."

Commentary Views Results of Kozyrev's PRC Visit

OW0603020495 Moscow Voice of Russia World Service in Mandarin 1100 GMT 4 Mar 95

[Commentary by Krichevskiy; from the "Current Events and Commentary" program]

[FBIS Translated Text] Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev paid an official visit to China. During his latest visit, no official documents were signed. In spite of this, there are reasons to confirm that his visit to China was a successful one. Both sides were satisfied with the results of the visit.

The visit showed that although relations between Russia and China were unstable, cool, and treacherous [fan lian bu ren ren] over the past decades, the two countries have now finally established normal relations. Kozyrev held there is every reason to predict that, during the final five years of this century and into early next century, relations between Russia and China will become more stable, friendly, and harmonious. Chinese President Jiang Zemin also said Sino-Russian bilateral relations should be built on the philosophical viewpoint of adopting a forward-looking attitude.

Mutual visits by leaders of the two countries are conducive to promoting friendly relations. Judging from this angle, 1995 will be another good year. It was learned that Yeltsin will pay an official visit to China before the end of this year. President Jiang Zemin will be invited to attend activities to celebrate the 50th anniversary of victory over German fascism in Moscow. Premier Li Peng is also scheduled to visit Moscow in May. People hope that his visit will further promote economic and trade relations between the two countries. We all know that trade volume between the two countries has decreased and that both sides are uneasy about the situation. Just as Kozyrev said, the level of bilateral trade should not be lower than the level of relations between the two countries. It is believed that during the Chinese premier's visit to Moscow, concrete agreements will be signed to establish a more perfect legal and financial foundation for cooperation between the two countries in various fields.

During his visit to Beijing, Kozyrev also discussed many international issues with Chinese leaders, including the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons issue. The Russian foreign minister handed President Jiang Zemin a letter from Yeltsin on this issue. As permanent UN Security Council members, China and Russia can make great contributions to protecting and strengthening the treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. The Chinese side expressed its intention to make efforts on this issue. During the Russian foreign minister's visit to China, the two sides also discussed the issue of strengthening coordination in the international arena, including the Asia-Pacific region. Neither Russia nor China want to establish cooperation on limited issues, but want to implement policies of cooperation between the two sides on all issues in an open manner.

China Helps Build Bridge Over Amur River

LD0703135295 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1250 GMT 7 Mar 95

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondent Andrey Kirillov]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 7 Mar—Russia and China are planning to build a bridge over the Amur [Heilongjiang] River. Plans for the construction of this major structure are now being discussed by experts at working talks in Beijing. ITAR-TASS was told this today by a high-ranking Russian diplomat. He noted that following Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev's visit to Beijing on 1 and 2 March the prospects for achieving an intergovernmental agreement on this project, which is unprecedented in Russo-Chinese relations, were "good at the moment."

According to the diplomat, it is possible that the agreement on the construction of the Amur River bridge could be signed by Li Peng, premier of the PRC State Council, during his visit to Moscow scheduled for May or during the visit to Beijing by Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin planned for the second half of the year.

The Amur River (in Chinese Heilongjiang, which translates as Black Dragon River) is 2,824 km long. The Russian towns of Blagoveshchensk, Khabarovsk, and Komsomolsk-na-Amure are located on this river.

Official Comments on Importance of Relations With China

LD0703180995 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1523 GMT 7 Mar 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Vladimir Suprun and Vladimir Taranov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow March 7 TASS—Russia considers its relations with China as "very important" and intends to go ahead with developing bilateral partnership in the 21st century, Yevgeniy Afanasyev, director of the 1st Department for Asia under the Russian Foreign Ministry, commented on the results of Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev's recent visit to Beijing.

According to Afanasyev, the visit confirmed Moscow's allegiance to the idea of concrete constructive partnership with China aimed at reinforcing security and peace both in the Asian-Pacific region and the rest of the world.

In the course of the Beijing negotiations, both parties reached an understanding that bilateral dialogue would be no less intensive this year, than it was in 1994. In particular, meetings at the level of vice-premiers, leaders of various ministries and governmental departments of the two countries are expected to be held in 1995.

Generally speaking, we are getting to the level which is comparable and possibly prevalent over our relations with any other country of the world, Afanasyev emphasized.

Touching on the problem of Russo-Chinese frontier, Afanasyev said that despite sporadic criticisms which are voiced in Russia, including representatives of certain regions, "we have a single state border, which is determined by the federal authorities by taking common national interests into account".

Officials Visit Border Areas Ceded to China

LD0703180395 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1418 GMT 7 Mar 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] VLADIVOSTOK, Mar 7 (Interfax-Eurasia)—A joint commission of Russian MPs and diplomats have visited sections of the Chinese border in the country's east to be ceded to China under the 1991 bilateral agreement.

The commission which arrived in Vladivostok on Monday is to look into a recent flare up of tension following the regional administration's demand that Russia should hold on to an area of 15 square kilometers close to the Hasan Lake.

It is led by heads of the international affairs committees of the upper and lower houses of Russian parliament Vladimir Podoprigora and Vladimir Lukin.

Political Issues

Yeltsin Gives Women's Day Address

LD0803094695 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 0650 GMT 8 Mar 95

[President Boris Yeltsin address on the occasion of Women's Day—live or recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] Dear Russian women, people of Russia: each year brings us, together with the spring, the bright and joyous holiday of Women's Day, the day of 8 March. In accordance with well-established tradition, we congratulate all women—our mothers, wives, daughters, sisters, and beloved ones.

The women's holiday is filled with cordial warmth, adorned with bright smiles and flowers. On 8 March, we find time to express everything kind and tender, everything that we did not find time to express before.

This holiday has been awaited, it has been long prepared. We are all endeavoring to surround you, sweet women, with the closest and most familiar people, with attention and care.

Our whole life is passed under motherly blessing. Our mothers—on this day our thoughts are of them. How much they have lived through and how much strength they have sacrificed to put children on their feet. It is they who spend nights on end not closing their eyes, caring for their babies. There is no standard that can measure the worry and alarm of mothers for their grownup sons and daughters.

The bright image of our mothers is ever with us. Ever with us are their tender, work-worn hands, their kind, all-understanding and all-forgiving eyes, self-sacrificing motherly love.

We will take care of our mothers and remember that a sympathetic word, telephone call, or letter will give them strength and health and give them great joy. And the best thing of all on this festive day is to visit them at home and look into their eyes, and in response, feel on one's head the warmth of a mother's hand.

Today we congratulate our wives on the holiday. They are custodians of our homes. With care and effort they create our domestic peace, bring up our children. There may be failures and troubles in life. In the most complicated, desperately difficult situations, it is good to have a wife close to you. A devoted heart will support you in trouble, instill a redeeming hope of success, and add strength and energy. But how often we miss the opportunity to express appreciation and love to our wives. Esteemed men: on this day, thank the women with words, gestures, and adoring looks for their devotion and love.

The 8 March holiday is our daughters' holiday. We want them to be healthy and happy. We want them to feel confident in their lives and, of course, to present us with grandchildren.

We congratulate our sisters on the holiday. Our parents' home unites us. It is very important that having achieved maturity, we do not lose each other in this world and be confident that should there be trouble, we have a relative who will come to help.

We congratulate our female colleagues. Whatever difficulties, whatever concerns they might have back home, they always try to be well-dressed and charming. Such is the female nature. Perhaps, it is in women's nature that they always create an atmosphere of warmth and generosity of the heart.

Gracious women, this holiday is yours. Regrettably, not all of you are happy today. There are irreparable losses of dear ones. Some of you will be lonesome today. But the winter is over—the coldest and hardest season in Russia. It is not accidental that 8 March is a symbol of nature's awakening, of the early spring and of hope. We have all been missing the sun and warm days. And they are to come soon.

I wish you cheerfulness. Let joy fill your hearts. I wish from the bottom of my heart that nothing may cast gloom over your lives, that your homes are cosy, warm, and prosperous. Dear gracious women, I wish you good health and happiness.

Chief Investigator in Listyev Case Interviewed

LD0703162495 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1501 GMT 7 Mar 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Mar 7 (Interfax)—"So far I can say nothing encouraging concerning the case of the murder of well-known TV journalist Vladislav Listyev," chief of a team of investigators, Boris Uvarov, said on Tuesday in an exclusive interview with Interfax. At the same time, he said, "a serious investigation is being carried out round the clock."

He refused to offer information about the method of investigation, because, he said, "detailed information published by the media, flares up a person's passions, not actually giving him anything, but, at the same time, making it easier for the criminal to evade punishment by changing his appearance."

Uvarov believes that the fact that the media carries computer photos of the suspects, "who most likely are not the real killers, was also undesirable for the investigation."

"Well, as to the investigation of such cases, these are of interest both for the investigator and the criminal and should not become common knowledge," said Uvarov.

He also noted that "some structures attempted to hamper the investigation process." He named, for example, First Deputy Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Public Russian Television and Logovaz President Boris Berezovskiy and his Deputy Arkadiy Patarkatsishvili. "These persons believe they are above the law and, though they are important witnesses, they frustrate interrogations, make up scandals on TV on the score," he said.

Uvarov questioned the information carried by some news media on the detention of possible murderers of Listyev in the Moscow Region town of Pushkino. This report was carried by ITAR-TASS on Tuesday with reference to a source in the Moscow criminal police. "I have similar phone calls from Ivanovo, Yaroslavl, and now from the Moscow Region," he said.

Uvarov said that "if serious things were reported, the investigators would be in the know." He believes that "this is rather another red herring made by some state directors, aimed at giving the impression that hard work is under way, and at reducing tensions in society."

Around 30 investigators from the General and Moscow Prosecutor's Office and 50 operatives are involved in the investigation.

Commentary Sees Political Exploitation of Listyev Death

MM0703154195 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Mar 95 pp 1, 2

[Commentary by Besik Urigashvili, Vadim Belykh, and Sergey Mostovshchikov: "Who Stands To Gain From Listyev's Death?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] You don't need a complicated method of deduction to grasp that a well-planned murder should have a purpose—an entirely ignoble one, perhaps, but at least one that is comprehensible from the viewpoint of elementary logic. The people who physically removed a popular journalist who occupied a major post must also have had a purpose. What was it? What did they manage to gain? We have tried to analyze what forces and structures in society might really have profited from the murder of Vladislav Listyev, a murder destined right from the start to be a nationwide scandal.

In the first commentaries occasioned by the perpetration of the crime it was frequently and enigmatically stated that its consequences were unpredictable. This is a splendid supposition. In that case, however, we would have to agree that the people who decided to kill Listyev were at the very least clinical idiots who simply did not know what they were undertaking. In view of the professionalism of the shooting at the entrance to house No.30 on Novokuznetskaya Ulitsa, we cannot agree with such an idea.

Another reason we cannot agree with it is that even in the investigation's preliminary and scanty assessments the purely criminal nature of the event, which has, it is hinted, some of the hallmarks of mafia vendettas, was remarked upon. And there are not many fools, we have to tell you, in the mafia, despite their short haircuts and tracksuit pants. Therefore let us instead reason from the viewpoint of a man who has mastered secondary education and who has enough sense to realize that it is sometimes painful to jump barefooted onto a sharp saber.

Before March 1 1995 organized crime in Russia engaged in contract killings only for their own internal vendettas, which allowed the shady economy to be maintained by lethal extra-economic measures. Was Vladimir Listyev an active member of the mafia? Hardly. Then we will have to acknowledge that 1 March 1995 for virtually the first time the Russian mafia carried out for their own purposes the murder of an outsider who occupied a major and prominent post in the country.

Why? Probably so that contracts not signed by Listyev should be immediately signed, so that advertising time on the "Ostankino" channel should be redistributed, and so that shares in Russian Public Television should go to the "godfathers," thus continuing to ensure them an peaceful and serene existence. Logical? Apparently so....

However, in actual fact, the impact of the crime is proving to be radically different. The aforementioned practical issues have not only not been settled but, so sources in the Russian MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] operational services inform us, Russia's major mafiosi are in a state of blind panic as a result of Listyev's murder. Especially after they were threatened on television with mass summary executions without trial or investigation after the example of "democratic Uzbekistan." As for the advertising profession and show business, they are preparing to incur serious financial losses as a result of the expected review and new round of chaos on the largest television broadcasting channel.

Thus even before the conclusion of the investigation the story that the murder of Listyev was the product of revenge or a cunning action on the part of the mafia elicits doubt. Representatives of this structure hint in confidential conversations: Why shoot Listyev—it would be simpler right away to lay down our heads side by side on the rails of a major trunk line.

Fine. But then so-called "certain circles" and destructive forces in society begin to line up in orderly columns before our eyes. They are well known and highly visible, like the letters in a spelling book for beginners.

Let us suppose that the Nazis—whose representative A. Vedenkin currently resides in a detention center for the crime of wanting to shoot Messrs. Yushenkov and Kovalev in the back—wanted to exacerbate the situation. But our homegrown fascists certainly have no time for Listyev right now, since, as a result of their colleague's endeavors, they are up to their necks in it. There exists an opinion that the aforesaid Vedenkin is performing the function of a provocateur who will shortly be set at liberty, and the real repositories of national socialist ideas will take his place on the prison bunks on the eve of the elections. These suspicions are not without foundation, since certain Russian MVD officers openly admit in private conversations that Vedenkin was recently an agent of their department. So that the prospect of having Listyev hanging round their necks as well was clearly not what the doctor ordered for these odious strata of society.

Who else do we have up our sleeves? Terrorists, political extremists, or Chechens, to whom all the sins of the Fatherland are traditionally ascribed? Perhaps. But in their case they would be obliged to leave their calling card, so to speak. Two days after the perpetration of the murder we have had no statements claiming responsibility for the action at the entrance to house no. 30. Intimidation somehow does not look a plausible motive.

What then does? Perhaps the investigation will tell us some time.

But. Who turned out to be the most prepared for the national scandal? Who began to notch up points immediately after the shots were fired on Novokuznetskaya Ulitsa?

Let us follow the sequence of what happened in the country on the morning of 2 March 1995. Approximately up until midday the Federal Counterintelligence Service [FCS], the state's most powerful special service, strenuously maintained that Listyev's murder bore a criminal-mafioso character and had absolutely nothing to do with the FCS. However, in the afternoon the counterintelligence service's stance changed diametrically. Its representatives, appearing in the mass media, stated that it was their sacred duty to help in the investigation of the Listyev affair, and unobtrusively reminded the shaken populace of the absolutely futile reforms in the KGB, which from 1991 onward weakened the former rights-defense power of that organization.

What happened in the intervening period? Boris Yeltsin's appearance on "Ostankino." Having offered his condolences to the hushed assembly and to the whole country, the president effectively delivered a policy speech which, all the signs suggest, will determine our lives in the immediate future, and perhaps for the long term as well.

To begin with he resolved organizational and cadre questions by declaring that in connection with the journalist's murder Vladimir Pankratov, chief of the Moscow Internal Affairs Main Administration, would be dismissed. But here is an interesting fact. At least four days before Listyev's murder it became known in Moscow's police circles that Pankratov had already been effectively dismissed, in which connection the issue of his possible successor was being discussed.

Furthermore. The president did not spare Moscow Public Prosecutor Gennadiy Ponomarev either. The issue of the city public prosecutor's office was also no novelty. There had been attempts to unseat the prosecutor ever since his subordinates discovered that the documents by means of which Aleksandr Rutskoy was supposed to have been sent down resembled forgeries. At that time, Ponomarev's people, who are still working in his department, also interrogated on this subject the current acting prosecutor, Ilyushenko—whom, it has become known, the president intends to recommend for parliament's ratification once more.

Finally, yet another name figured in the president's words about Moscow as a whole, a city which has distinguished itself virtually as a separate criminal state; although he did not actually pronounce this name, he clearly had it in mind. It was the name of Mayor Luzhkov, whom, as is well known, the Presidential Security Service has long been trying to undermine.

Boris Yeltsin made no cadre announcements in this respect, but anyone who knows anything at all about the situation in Moscow clearly understands that the ground has begun to sink beneath the feet of the very powerful Yuriy Mikhaylovich with crushing speed. Following the attempt by the Moscow counterintelligence service to join battle with the representatives of the presidential bodyguard who laid out the "Most" group on the asphalt, Yevgeniy Savostyanov, chief of the capital's FCS bureau, suffered the consequences; his dismissal has significantly weakened Luzhkov's position.

Observers forecast yet another blow to his position in the city, hinting at the possible dismissal of a man whose name was also not pronounced in connection with Listyev's murder, and has in general never been widely pronounced with regard to the rampant crime in Moscow. He is the chief of the regional administration for combating organized crime, Police General Vladimir Rushaylo. While formally subordinate to the chief of the Internal Affairs Main Administration, the general is effectively in charge of a completely autonomous structure whose basic task is precisely combating the Moscow mafia. It is believed that Vladimir Rushaylo owes his immunity and breathtaking career precisely to the capital's mayor. But in view of the fact that this latest sensational murder has been deemed the result of the ineffectiveness of the antimafia fight in Moscow, the general's position is both strange and precarious.

But taking the capital under complete control is, all the signs suggest, not the last task. Just 12 hours from the moment of Vladimir Listyev's murder it transpired that presidential edicts on changes in "Ostankino" and on stepping up the battle with crime had, apparently, already been prepared. In view of the speed of the appearance of these documents their contents are still not known.

Of course, these remarks do not pursue the goal of voicing out loud any specific allegations. The investigation is examining various versions, including, one can guess, those according to which Vladimir Listyev's murder was commissioned by his own colleagues, who were unhappy with the program of cadre changes. However, irrespective of whether the truth becomes known as a result, we considered it necessary to draw attention to the way the death of the well-known TV journalist and executive director of Russian Public Television, Vladimir Listyev, at the entrance to his own house is being exploited in this country.

Moscow Government Official on Luzhkov Resignation Request

LD0703195295 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1622 GMT 7 Mar 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Mar 7 (Interfax)—The Moscow government has decided to apply to the heads of the Russian Interior Ministry and Prosecutor General's Office in order to display its disagreement with the decision to dismiss Head of the Moscow Main Law Enforcement Department Vladimir Pankratov and Moscow Prosecutor Gennadiy Ponomarev.

"This decision infringes on the rights of Moscow as the federation's constituent member and violates legislation," the Moscow government's Deputy Prime Minister Anatoliy Petrov told Interfax today.

He said the Moscow government had been convincing Moscow Mayor Yuriy Luzhkov not to hurry with his resignation. "His resignation will play into the hands of those inspiring the case," Petrov added.

Luzhkov told journalists Tuesday that he would apply for resignation if the decision on dismissing Pankratov and Ponomarev was not reviewed.

Petrov said the Moscow government backed the decision of Luzhkov to act "step by step and reasonably," primarily addressing the heads of the Russian Interior Ministry, the Prosecutor General's Office and President Boris Yeltsin proposing that they cancel the decision on the dismissal, then applying to the court and only after this decide on possible resignation as Moscow Mayor.

Interior Department Chief's Dismissal To Be Resolved

LD0703163995 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1502 GMT 7 Mar 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Mar 7 (Interfax)—Lieutenant-General Vladimir Pankratov, sacked from the post of Moscow Interior Department chief Monday [6 March], is on holiday, after which the issue on his dismissal from interior bodies will be solved, Lieutenant-General Igor Astapkin declared in an interview with Interfax.

There have always been personnel changes in the Interior Department's leadership, and, as Astapkin noted, it is hard to say whether these changes will end now. "After such a resounding murder, one can put complaints to all who are subordinate to the law enforcement bodies," the general noted. However, the issue on dismissing General Vladimir Rushaylo, chief of the Regional Department on Organized Crime at Moscow's Interior Department has not been decided and examined, Astapkin reported.

He said that it would be naive to hope that once Moscow's interior chief was changed "everything would change overnight." "We expect the situation to move as a result of a set of measures worked out by the Interior Ministry and efforts applied by the Mayor's Office to strengthen the interior bodies," Astapkin stressed.

Asked about the temporarily appointed Moscow interior department chief Nikolay Kulikov, Astapkin described him as "a well prepared specialist, young but promising."

Meanwhile, as the Moscow interior department's press service has reported to Interfax, Rushaylo, who underwent complex surgery has been staying out of work so far.

Officers Request Reasons for Pankratov's Dismissal

LD0703164295 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1503 GMT 7 Mar 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Mar 7 (Interfax)—Senior Moscow police officers, meeting on Tuesday, decided to request Interior Minister Viktor Yerin to give reasons for the recent dismissal of the capital's police chief, Lieutenant-General Vladimir Pankratov, police sources said.

Pankratov himself told the meeting that he still had not been officially informed why he had been dismissed, the sources told Interfax. He said his firing threatened to injure not only his own reputation but that of the Moscow police in general.

The officers questioned the legality of the dismissal, since, under the Constitution, it needed approval by the municipal administration. They also asked Mayor Yuriy Luzhkov, who has threatened to resign, not to do so.

Yerin: Dismissal of Moscow Interior Chief 'Irreversible'

LD0703195895 Moscow Radiostantsiya Ekho Moskvy in Russian 1900 GMT 7 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Today Yuriy Luzhkov, Moscow's Mayor, said he was prepared to resign if the decision on dismissing the Moscow prosecutor and the head of the city's Main Directorate for Internal Affairs [GUVD] is not changed. Yuriy Luzhkov plans to send relevant letters to the Interior Ministry and the Office of Prosecutor-General asking them to repeal the decision as one at variance with the law.

However, according to Viktor Yerin, Russian interior minister, the decision on Vladimir Pankratov's resignation is irreversible. Interviewed by the POSTFAKTUM agency, Yerin stated there was no possibility to revoke this decision. Also, he believes that the former head of GUVD has reached his retirement age. The interior minister remarked that he was prepared to assign the strongest leader to Moscow, possibly even one of his deputies.

President Yeltsin Meets With Moscow Mayor Luzhkov

LD0703210495 Moscow Radiostantsiya Ekho Moskvy in Russian at 2040 GMT 7 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Today a meeting took place between the Moscow mayor [Yuriy Luzhkov] and the Russian president. No details of the meeting are yet available.

Gaydar Denies Switching to Opposition to Yeltsin

MM0703130395 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 7 Mar 95 p 2

[Report by Sergey Chugayev: "Ye. Gaydar Denies Rumors That He Is Switching to Opposition to B. Yeltsin, But He Will Probably Not Be Supporting Him at Next Elections"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The news agency reports of the statements made last week by Ye. Gaydar during his tour of the Russian regions provided definite grounds for concluding that the leader of the "Russia's Choice" Duma faction and the "Democratic Choice of Russia" party had decided to switch to opposition to the president. Immediately after Gaydar's return from his trip, IZVESTIYA's correspondent asked him to comment on these widespread rumors in Moscow.

"I have not issued any statement about switching to opposition to the president," Gaydar stated. "My position is well known and remains unchanged. We—and I am referring above all to the 'Democratic Choice of Russia' party—are categorically against the policy implemented by the Russian president in Chechnya. We consider it extremely dangerous. We are prepared to do everything to get that policy changed. And in that respect we are always ready for dialogue with the executive. We also categorically oppose any attempts to destabilize the political situation in the country. And we are against any postponement of the elections or the impeachment of the president. As for the position that the party will take in the course of preparations for the presidential elections, that will be determined by our Political Council. So far I can only express my personal view—I consider it very unlikely that our party will support B. Yeltsin if he decides to run."

Yabloko Leader Yavlinskiy Interviewed

954F1600A Moscow OBSHCHAYA GAZETA in Russian No 8, 23 Feb-1 Mar 95 p 6

[Interview with Grigoriy Yavlinskiy, leader of the Yabloko faction in the Russian Federation State Duma, by Pilar Bonnet, Moscow correspondent of the Spanish newspaper EL PAIS; Igor Malashenko, general director of the NTV television company; and Andrey Lipskiy, OBSHCHAYA GAZETA deputy editor in chief; with introduction by OBSHCHAYA GAZETA Editor in Chief Yegor Yakovlev; place and date not given; published under the rubric "We and the Next Two Years: 1995-1996 Forecast": "The Strategist of 40 Right Steps"

[FBIS Translated Text] *The meeting with Grigoriy Yavlinskiy completes the series "We and the Next Two Years" we began four months ago. During this time the guests of our rubric have been Ivan Rybkin, Yegor Gaydar, Yuriy Luzhkov, and Gennadiy Zyuganov.*

When we began the series, the editors to a certain extent griped about "the times": after all, today as a rule it is difficult to foresee things a day ahead, let alone a year. Everything that happened after this definitely did not add stability to our life. What can one predict in the midst of the Chechen crisis?! Instead of predicting, one can only hope that retribution will inevitably catch up with those who have now decided, 50 years later, once again to let war into our home, to condemn to death thousands upon thousands of people whose only fault is that they were born in Russia. The OMON [Special Designation Militia Detachments]—the "Guard" of modern times—hide their faces underneath black masks, fearing retribution. But no mask will keep safe the Russian leaders, on whose orders all this happened...

One way or another, forecasts have been made for the next two years. They attest that today Russia has neither a program that will unquestionably attract voters, nor a leader to whom the absolute majority is willing to give their vote, nor a party uniting many. The more inarguable becomes the truth that in the near term Moscow and its elite will be unable to define the main roles and the actors playing them on the stage of the country's political theater.

Last time such an opportunity was granted to the forces that became accustomed to calling themselves democratic, more than a year ago—at the previous elections. And they brilliantly squandered this opportunity.

As is known, failures do not add to popularity. One can say with reasonable certainty that elections and the search for a new president will be defined by the regions. They will propose programs and nominate candidates, for Russia to appraise and to vote for. In the final analysis, this is a worthy finale to the process of self- assertion that has been steadily progressing since August 1991.

Keeping this in mind, our newspaper is beginning a new cycle: "We Are From the Provinces." First and foremost, we want to free both ourselves and our readers from fears that there are no alternatives. The very search for a more enlightened, sober, and law-abiding ruler is a regurgitation of the old tsarist idea. If the first Russian president has been able to shape the democratic and legal contour of our statehood to fit himself, nothing will keep others from doing the same. And besides, it will be good for us all to take a closer look at the regions. To understand what *concerns people there, what they hope for, whom they prefer in Cheboksary and Nizhniy Novgorod, Vladimir, Petrozavodsk, and Kaliningrad, and for what reason... These materials will appear in upcoming issues of our newspaper. Our special correspondents are already packing for the trip.*

[Signed] Yegor Yakovlev

A Horseman With Tied-Up Feet

[Lipskiy] What new do events in Chechnya bring into the disposition of political forces in Russia on the eve of the parliamentary and presidential elections?

[Yavlinskiy] The events in Chechnya clearly revealed who has what ideas of democracy, methods of preserving the country's integrity, and federalism. The extent of independence of our press, its strength and ability. The peculiarities of the current stage of democracy. For instance, it became clear that although you can say and write almost anything you want, this does not at all mean that the authorities intend to react to what you say or write. Unless of course we count as reaction putting pressure on you or the desire to interfere with you. But this does not mean that they are learning any lessons from it. Take, for instance, the president's message. Polls show that 80 percent of the population do not support the Chechnya operation. Nevertheless, in his message the president made it clear that the main problem in Chechnya is the technical, military one. Here is the attitude to popular opinion for you. The Chechnya events have revealed who supports the authorities. In parliament, this support unquestionably comes from Zhirinovskiy and the nationalists. The communists do so in a roundabout sort of way, since the Chechen gamble harms the authority, destroys it—as it does the military, as a matter of fact. And the communists are interested not merely in changing the authority—they want to change the regime. For them, Chechnya is like the Russian-Japanese war at the beginning of the century or the First World War—a springboard that can be used to change the regime. Much also became clear among the democrats: Some supported the Chechen operation at first, and then changed their mind. Others said from the very beginning that this solution to the problem is unacceptable.

[Bonnet] Still, how will Chechnya affect the election campaign?

[Yavlinskiy] People have already have answered this in the course of sociological surveys. They were asked: Are you going to take into account politicians' positions in connection with the Chechen crisis? The overwhelming majority said that they will.

[Bonnet] Have you discovered something unexpected for yourself in the reaction of your politician colleagues to the events in Chechnya?

[Yavlinskiy] First of all, I myself was caught unprepared for these events. I did not think until the last moment that the authorities would decide on such a measure, on such a scale, and in such a way. Even when I criticized the authorities, I treated them in a sense like democratic opponents. We could have different notions of democracy, but I did not think that they are capable of taking such a step. Both from the standpoint of the reaction of societal forces and from the standpoint of political tactics, I did not think that Yeltsin could allow Zhirinovskiy and the nationalists to become his main support base in parliament. I thought this was so disadvantageous for him that he was unlikely to allow it to happen. Neither did I expect Boris Fedorov to support these actions.

[Malashenko] Everything you do and say is based on a combination of certain assumptions—overt and implied. One of them is that you believe that the voters see democracy as some supreme value. Could it be perhaps that Boris Nikolayevich understands much better some beneath-the-surface attitudes of the electorate? Perhaps it is true that the voters are rejecting not the war in Chechnya per se but only the fact that things are not going well there? And maybe if we were able to smash Chechnya in two weeks, then thank God, everybody would be happy? Do you not fear that despite the negative reaction being registered by the polls, the Chechnya operation in reality adds rather than detracts points for the current authority?

[Yavlinskiy] I would like to draw your attention to the following circumstance. In order to wrap it up in Chechnya within two weeks, at the very least the following should have happened there: The whole people should not have taken up arms and begun fighting. And people would not have armed themselves and begun fighting if they believed the official version that all that there is in Chechnya is some group of bandits headed by the shady politician Dudayev. Political tactics must be commensurate with the real political situation. And if it did not work, it means that the situation was quite different, and hence no "two weeks" were feasible. The course of events answered the question of what is happening in Chechnya. And people can see this. The price of this undertaking also is an important factor for people: They are not prepared to achieve at any cost what is proposed to them.

[Malashenko] Still, what does the Russian electorate want: a working democratic system or a "good," "stern," "strong" tsar?

[Yavlinskiy] I dare say that if you ask a person: Would you like Russia to have an authority that would hear what you want, respond to what you want, protect you, and generally the kind you could change if you did not like it, 90 percent of people will say "yes." Then you can ask: And do you want the bureaucrats, including the main one, to not violate the law and the constitution? Everyone will say "yes." Then you ask: Or maybe it is better to have a good tsar who will decide everything for us? Many will say: There will be no such thing; he cannot decide everything for us. One of the fundamental bases of democracy is economic freedom. Ask people: Do you want to have property nobody has a right to touch? Everyone will say "yes." And another necessary condition of democracy is freedom of speech. Let us ask: "Do you want the authorities to throw you in jail for what you say? They will look at you as if you have lost your marbles. Why, they will reply—I want to say what I want.

[Malashenko] The foundation of every democratic system is participation. People must apply a certain effort to make things happen this way rather than another way. And Russian tradition has been different: A bureaucrat, a "boss," decided everything. We might find ourselves in a vise—people will say "yes" to democracy but realistically will not want to do anything. Then we will again have a "democrat"-president at the top, but the system will continue to function the old way.

[Yavlinskiy] Let me start with an allegory from a Russian fairy tale. There is a stone, and a horseman approaches it. It is written on the stone: Go to the right—find monarchy; go the left—find democracy; go straight, and you will find what we have now—some sort of oligarchic monopoly state. Russia today is a horseman, who not only does not have a horse, but whose hands are tied, whose feet are tied, who has forgotten how to walk, and who has generally become dystrophic. And his mouth is only partially open. He can only look at the stone. Our historic task is not so much to take Russia somewhere as to give it the opportunity to say what it really wants. As long as people do not have, for instance, economic independence; as long as there are no mechanisms of a civil society; as long as they are unable to tell the authorities what they really want—before you exhort them to do something, ask yourself what you have given them to enable them to do something. Just try to open your own enterprise, gain access to resources, start your own business! If you do not have economic independence, how much will you talk, do, go to rallies, and so on? In other words, the authorities absolutely did not do enough to give people any opportunity to act.

We are at a crossroads today. We can still try to turn in the direction in which people will become independent. Or we may, with greater ease, go the way we are going on the basis of an oligarchy between the authority and money, business, and monopoly groups. In this sense we have not changed the old system at all: It was a supermonopoly, and this is the way it has stayed. In the past, decisions were made by 15 Politburo members; now they are made, for instance, by 10 monopoly groups which are not difficult to enumerate.

Nobody Can Be Certain That Elections Will Be Held

[Lipskiy] What will be the decisive factor in the voters' decision during the elections: a positive economic program; attitude to the problems of statehood, the war in Chechnya; trust in concrete individuals; or something else?

[Yavlinskiy] Let us begin with the fact that all the contenders will be saying the same things. Between the four of us we can easily put together this list: They will talk about security; that we need to stop prices and reduce the decline in production; that they will promote culture and science; and so on down the list. They will strengthen the military, the borders, Russian statehood, and democracy. The regions are sacred. Human rights—even more sacred. If you analyze attentively our leaders' speeches, you will come to the conclusion that they like to say: fire and water, black and white. And simultaneously at that. For instance: We will strengthen the state to a maximum and give freedom to the regions. Thus, the programs will be very similar. If you think that people will be able to distinguish, for instance, the programs of Glazyev and Gaydar of the 1994-1996 vintage, this is unrealistic. Even economists do not find it easy, not to mention ordinary voters.

[Bonnet] Does this mean that programs will be of no importance?

[Yavlinskiy] It is more that they will serve as a formal "pass." But after they show the pass, many people will be judged by three questions. First: Does the person who is saying this really want what he says to happen? Second: Can he do it? And third: Is he a thief? And of course it will be important how precisely he defines what the people want.

[Bonnet] Are there real levers, mechanisms of combating corruption of officials, and as parliament members, do you use them?

[Yavlinskiy] There are practically no such mechanisms. And the outrage is that the group of people who called themselves democrats after the events of 3-4 October of 1993 supported precisely the kind of constitution that deprives them of any ability to react in such cases. These people wanted to create after 1993-1994 a leader- oriented system, and they have created it. The idea of a good tsar obviously stuck in their minds. The paradox of the situation was that it was those who at the time called themselves democrats who hoped most for a kindly democratic tsar. And they still called themselves that.

[Malashenko] Does this mean that if you are elected president, you will push for amending the constitution?

[Yavlinskiy] If we truly speak of what is called democracy, the first step of the new president should be to amend the constitution in such a way as to make the separation of powers correct from the standpoint of the current moment and the interests of the state. And this means that one person, no matter who he is, should not make all the decisions with respect to domestic and foreign policy personally in his name. In this sense, the distribution of rights, responsibility, and powers between the government, parliament, and president, the Constitutional Court, procuracy, and judiciary, and between Moscow and the regions—these are indeed the key questions. Then, by the way, we will be immune from potential pressure on the president. Because it is one thing when you, as president, know that they can come to you and say: Here, we have to deal with Ryazan, impose constitutional order there. And you say: All right, let us deal with it—10 bombers, and the issue is closed. And it is quite another matter if you have to reply: This has to go through the parliament. We have to ask the prime minister's opinion. The Constitutional Court has to concur on these decisions with me. We also have to do it in such a way that the general procuracy will not later tell me that I have violated human rights there. Maybe then there will be fewer people who will want to drop in on the president and say: Let us deal with something—a television company, a bank, a region, the Norwegian rocket aloft to study the weather, the near and far abroad, or simply a citizen.

[Bonnet] Are you sure that the elections will take place after all?

[Yavlinskiy] Not a single person in the country is certain of this. There are two political questions in today's Russia: How will the current rulers part with power? And what kind of elections these will be. When you say "elections" to an American, it does not occur to him to ask what they are. Elections are elections; he has been voting for 200 years and knows what this is. In our country the question was always different: What kind of elections? Times have changed, but the question remains. To ensure honest democratic elections, it is important what kind of legislation we have. Whether it will be laws or once again instructions. Who will enforce them. Whether we will have a "ministry of democracy" or there will be public control over elections. Whether the system of summing up the votes will be retained, where the rayons hand them over to the districts, the districts hand them over to the oblast, the oblast sends them to the republic, as the republic sends them to the top, and at each stage you can do what you want with the results. We have submitted a voting code to the parliament. All right, we can argue—code or no code; perhaps it is better to adopt individual laws. But it has been submitted, and it envisages these points. As an alternative, laws were rushed in by the president and Central Election Commission. And the latter have conditions built into them which by themselves may make normal elections simply impossible.

[Lipskiy] Within the framework of which party of the quasi- party political structure will you go into the upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections?

[Yavlinskiy] There is such a structure. It is called the Yabloko Public Movement. It has been registered in the Ministry of Justice and has 58 regional branches. In addition, last Thursday and Friday the Yabloko youth movement was founded. There are also other structures that have been set up to support Yabloko at the elections. It is another matter how effective they will be. We will try to make them known, and let them show their efficacy. By the way, do you know why there is such a boom in the party-creation business that three a day are being set up? Because time is running short; they are late, violating the laws. The law says that associations that were created six months before elections are announced have the right to participate in the elections—which means that they had to be registered before 12 February.

[Bonnet] Is there any possibility today of reaching an agreement with Gaydar on forming a coalition before the elections to parliament?

[Yavlinskiy] To parliament? What for? To get fewer votes? There are different views, different shades of views. Let every person in the country elect to parliament those people who reflect to the greatest extent his view of life and his view of the future. It is another matter that once in the parliament there may be different opportunities for alliances on concrete issues. For instance, we have always voted together with [Russia's] Choice on a score of important issues. Such as the Civil Code, for instance. There is consensus now on the need for parliamentary oversight of the executive branch. We were also brought closer together by our position on Chechnya. But there is also a score of principal differences. Generally, I would like to say the following. We can act differently, but if you want us to find a common vector some day, it is best to ask us less about it.

Yes, the President of Russia Can Be 43 Years Old

[Malashenko] There is a generation problem in politics. Do you not have a feeling that you are rushing somewhat? That the next president of Russia should be a person who today is about 10 years older than you are?

[Yavlinskiy] I am 42. Beyond this I can only say one thing: I offer myself; let the people decide.

[Malashenko] That is, you believe that in principle a 43-year- old contender can be elected president of Russia?

[Yavlinskiy] He may be elected. How it actually is to be, the people will decide. I, for instance, can imagine in 2000 a president who is 42 or 43 today. What I find difficult to imagine is some of today's politicians. Sometimes I watch NTV programs, and they show such moments that when I extrapolate to five years ahead, I do not have enough fantasy to imagine how it will look.

[Lipskiy] What will be the economic background of the 1996 elections? Will there be any signs of recovery in the Russian economy and will the current president gain any advantage in this connection?

[Yavlinskiy] What is your impression—has anything changed in our economic system as compared to February of last year? Well, 1996 will be exactly the same as 1994 was and 1995 will be. Unless some extraordinary events take place that will "liven up" the situation even more. All the sore spots that existed last year are still there. All the problems that existed are still there. Except that maybe this year they will avoid such an outrageous stupidity as pressing inflation down to 3 percent and then later letting it explode to 20 percent in one hour. Although judging by the government's program, it has not learned the lesson. It will be the same as last year: In the fall there will be the same song that we need to buy grain at crazy prices and supply the north. Then prices for fuel and electric power will jump again, and so on.

[Malashenko] In the West this would be enough for the incumbent president and everybody tied to him to lose. Will this be enough in Russia?

[Yavlinskiy] It will be very important. But there is another interesting question: What economic policy is in the offing for us as a background for the Duma elections and how it will change by the time of the presidential elections. And in general, I believe that the Chechen crisis is a result of the 11 October events.

[Bonnet] How?

[Yavlinskiy] Very simply. Such a major failure of reforms demanded coming up with some other endeavor—for instance, a victorious little war. Last year was a year of opening black boxes. We discovered on 11 October what is happening with respect to economic reform. Budapest showed us what the situation is with respect to foreign policy. And Chechnya showed us what is happening in domestic policy. In this sense the preparation for the elections is proceeding very successfully. People have every reason to see what really happened and where in reality such a course leads. Of course, I think this will play a role. Although, as you know, our voter is not simple, he behaves in interesting ways. He says, for instance, that the politician he trusts most is Sidorov, but he wants to elect Ivanov president.

[Malashenko] Everything you say and do is quite rational. But politics is not quite a rational business. Does it not frighten you that there is so little that is irrational in your platform?

[Yavlinskiy] I think that the very appearance of such a position as ours on the Russian political horizon is sufficiently irrational. Remember how many times many people argued with me: How can you tell the truth in politics? Yes, you can, I would reply. And you can avoid lying? Yes, you can. Is politics a dirty business? Yes, but you can make it so it will become reasonably clean, so that decent people can participate in it. Even in our politics, even in our times, even in these conditions. And now I will answer your question this way. One of our great chess players once wrote that if you do not know your opponent and know absolutely nothing about the kind of game he plays, what kind of debut and what kind of end game, what kind of tactics and strategy, but you sit down to play an important game against him, do not try to determine what his tactics and strategy are. Your task is different: to make 40 correct moves in the game. Then you have a chance of winning regardless of what his strategy is. That is why my strategy is to make the correct moves: white is white, black is black. You can make a mistake, but then afterwards you need to apologize. You may not understand something, but then say later: I did not understand. The point is that of two Zhirinovskiys, the real one will always be elected. I told one of my acquaintances who thinks he is playing out Zhirinovskiy's role: Remember, no matter how long you play his role, of the two, the real one will be elected. Just like of two Yeltsins, the real one will be elected.

[Bonnet] Based on the experience of the 1993 campaign, are there elements you intend to modify? And what will be your financial support?

[Yavlinskiy] Regarding modifying my actions as compared to the 1993 campaign, the point is that I did not have a campaign in 1993. As to finances, the question is still open.

[Bonnet] What do you mean by open? Are negotiations underway with banks, private groups?

[Yavlinskiy] This is a very sensitive issue which cannot be a secret. In order to later make it public without qualms, one has to be very careful today. In the course of the previous campaign I published every week all my sources of funds and how I spent them. We were the only political bloc that published weekly receipts and disbursements of funds.

[Lipskiy] Who will be your strongest competitor in the upcoming elections?

[Yavlinskiy] Whoever represents a different view. Communists, nationalists, and the undecided—all of them taken together—will be a fairly strong competition. I mean not a rival as a person but competition on the level of ideas and trends. Zhirinovskiy, communists, agrarians, socialists. And the part of the undecided that will inevitably gravitate to them. And the so-called centrists, who are still struggling to define themselves in our country and will inevitably join this part.

[Malashenko] Two tactics are possible here. One is to learn to pronounce certain words with pathos, and another is not to utter these words. Will you learn to say with pathos the words "statehood," "great power"? Or will you not?

[Yavlinskiy] Regarding pathos, I do not know. But in reality I do indeed consider it very important both to preserve the integrity of the state and to maintain order in the state. This is not an issue—the issue is how to achieve it. For Spain, for instance, integrity of the state also is very important. It is just that they do not use the same methods to impose it as we do in Chechnya. Although they also have this problem—the Basques and Catalonia. Canada has this problem too, and so do others.

[Malashenko] You have a weak point: It is hard for an ordinary person to identify with you. My daughter, in whom I try to implant anti-intellectualism any way I can, considers you "scholarly." Do you have any normal human interests? Maybe you have a drink with friends once in a while, go hunting or fishing?

[Yavlinskiy] All my "human hobbies" will necessarily be described in the opposition press, and this will be done throughout the entire election campaign. So you will be able to read it with your daughter—if you let her read such things. Whole journalistic squads will be specializing exclusively on my human qualities.

Postscript

Pilar Bonnet, Moscow correspondent of the Spanish newspaper EL PAIS

Grigoriy Yavlinskiy believes that he has accumulated solid political capital by taking a stand in defense of the middle class. Because of the progressive degradation of the Russian political environment, this call turned into the broader idea of defending the basic principles of legality, property, and freedom of expression. In light of the election campaign which has practically already begun, Yavlinskiy resembles a diligent student who absolutely does not intend to share the homework he has done with others, whom he considers more arrogant and stupid than he is. In any case, having set the goal of becoming president of Russia, Yavlinskiy certainly is not losing his head. He is calmly preparing for the elections, maintaining the skepticism of St. Thomas ("I will believe it when I see it"). I do not know whether Yavlinskiy will manage to become president, but I know that he is a politician endowed with a rich imagination, possessing the literary gift of imagining himself the hero of an adventure, and this is precisely what constitutes, regardless of political programs, a part of this complex phenomenon called charisma.

Igor Malashenko, general director of the NTV television company

Grigoriy Yavlinskiy differs from many other contenders to the president's job to a large extent by the passionate desire to become nothing other than president and implement his program rather than simply achieve supreme power. Judging by all the signs, power for him is not a great value by itself—which, of course, deserves the greatest respect but puts Yavlinskiy at a disadvantage ahead of time compared to his power-mongering rivals. Banal as it may be, Yavlinskiy's shortcomings are in fact an extension of his merits: He is too idealistic, too educated, and too honest for a normal politician. There is a great likelihood that the Russian voters' love for him will remain platonic, and his high personal rating—to which, it seems, he pays inordinate attention—will not translate into an adequate number of votes in the elections.

Andrey Lipskiy, OBSHCHAYA GAZETA deputy editor in chief

Judging by all the signs, Yavlinskiy's intention to compete for the president's chair is quite serious. To achieve success, however, it is not enough to have the image of an "honest and decent" politician, the leader of a democratic opposition to a pseudo- democratic regime. More prosaic preconditions are needed: the support of at least part of the state apparat and regional elites; the money and influence of industrial-financial circles; the ability to endear himself and be understood by so-called ordinary people; the willingness to reach compromise with other factions of the democratic movement, which would allow him under a favorable confluence of events to become a joint candidate of supporters of democratic and market reforms. Whether he will be able to meet this "candidate minimum" so far remains an open question. On the other hand, his age is such that an unsuccessful outcome will not be a defeat for him either: He has a considerable reserve of time for the next attempt, and the experience he will gain in the election campaign will only increase his political capital.

Yeltsin Warned of 'Fate of Napoleon'

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[Article by Dr. of Philosophical Sciences, Professor, Lieutenant General V. Serebryannikov, retired, academician of International Information Academy and member of "Fatherland's Security" Military Scientific Society under "Realists" Club: "The Army and the Political Regime in Russia, or Why the Chechen Army Proved To Be Reformed and the Russian Army Humiliated"]

[FBIS Translated Text]

What Is Happening to the Russian Army? What Kind of Reform Does It Need?

Despite their overwhelming superiority (there is talk of an eightfold superiority), Russian troops took two months to establish control over Groznyy with very great difficulty and large losses. The price of "victory" proved excessive.

One of the chief reasons for the unsuccessful course of the campaign was the fact that the unprepared federal troops suddenly found themselves facing Chechnya's strong, well-armed army. Colonel General A. Golovnev, deputy commander in chief of Ground Forces for combat training, who is permanently stationed in Chechnya and has excellent knowledge of what is happening, recently drew a highly eloquent conclusion: "Dzhokhar Dudayev taught our politicians an object lesson by implementing a military reform within a very short time in his own Ichkeria—a reform such as they, who understand by reform only the reduction and humiliation of the Army and the cutting of defense expenditure, have not dreamed of."

Politicians Finish Off the Man With the Rifle

Our Army is growing sickly and poor, is undernourished, is losing its combat might, morale, and technical base, and is rapidly lagging behind the majority of the world's armies owing, above all, to the leadership's irresponsibility and a bad military policy or, rather, the complete lack of a military policy.

Society and the Army have no sense that the president, who under the Constitution is obliged to decide military policy (and the need for military reform is now its central element), has fulfilled this function of his. He pays attention to the Army when the need arises to involve it in one more political fight and to save the power that is slipping from his hands. His visits to the court troops and his speeches to the military leadership give nothing to the Army. These speeches are distinguished by a total absence of analysis, good conclusions, or specific measures to resolve the Army's urgent problems but are full of splendid expressions and trifling instructions. Take the president's "work" at the conference of Army and Navy leadership personnel, held 14 November 1994, i.e. just before the start of the Chechnya war. At a time when the Strategic Rocket Forces are in a critical position, the Navy's ships cannot put to sea, the Ground Forces Military Council notes the troops' catastrophic position in a special appeal to parliament (no longer relying on the president!), etc, the president declares with the pomposity of a victor: "The Armed Forces' appearance is becoming increasingly worthy of Great Russia...," "great work has been done...," "the prospects (bright prospects, of course—author) for military building are becoming more definite," etc. The troops' withdrawal from the far and near abroad has been named as the "most important success" of 1994, as opposed to any positive processes in maintaining and strengthening the Army's combat might while improving servicemen's social position. As regards specific measures, they boiled down to parliament's finalizing the law "On Defense" more quickly, Chernomyrdin's ensuring full funding for the Armed Forces, the defense minister's drawing up a schedule of meetings with the commanders in chief of branches of the Armed Forces, etc. Were the military chiefs really expecting such revelations? All this was said not for the purpose of acting but to demonstrate the greatest "concern." They at once forgot the instructions, swallowing them with a smirk. The "full funding" for the Armed Forces proved to be half the necessary funds. This was a further crushing blow dealt to against the Army by the political leadership.

Everyone is talking about the need for military reform. The military is accused of implementing it badly. Addressing parliament 16 February this year, the president, who is also supreme commander in chief, drew a conclusion in contrast with his many recent positive assessments: "The reform of the Armed Forces is proceeding unsatisfactorily." He does not even know that no plans for military reform exist at all. The top generals (even on the General Staff) know nothing about any documents on reform. How can something that does not exist proceed unsatisfactorily? P. Grachev declared recently that it was only in the course of the Chechnya war that he has realized what military reform means: If a T-72 tank has put up a good showing in fighting, then it must be made the basis of the reform.... This understanding of the problem shook even people far removed from the Army.

The war in Chechnya has shown the total arbitrariness in Russia over the adoption of the most important military-political decisions. Parliament, the majority of the political parties and public associations, the leaders of republics within Russia, the legislative organs of all the Federation components, approximately 80 percent of the population, and so forth came out against the war and for a political solution to the conflict. Yet the president and his entourage made the decision to fight with incredible lightness, reckoning on a brilliant victory. We say "with incredible lightness," because the political leadership and the commander in chief personally did not make an in-depth analysis of the sociopolitical situation in the region, had no idea what resistance the Army would encounter or who would oppose it, and failed to allocate the prescribed time to preparing the command, the staffs, and the troops. The method and form of setting the Army's political tasks were the most primitive, third-rate, and muddle-headed in the entire history of wars. The president—the supreme commander in chief—was primarily to blame for this. But he has shifted the entire blame for Chechnya onto the generals.

I could cite a multitude of incompetent political decisions by the present potentates relating to conversion, mobilization readiness, military research and development, and educational work in the Armed Forces, which undermine the very basis of the Armed Forces' strength.

The colossal weakening of the Russian Army, which is comparable with a major defeat in a great war, is the consequence of an incompetent and incapable policy and the lack of a state mechanism for resolving the most important sociopolitical, scientific, technical, organizational, and other problems of the Army. But they did succeed in changing the uniform, symbols, and awards. They even contrived to abolish the orders of Aleksandr Nevskiy, Aleksandr Suvorov, and Nakhimov.

A mass poll of Defense Ministry, General Staff, and military academy officers conducted last summer showed that not one of them named Yeltsin as a possible candidate for the presidency in the 1996 election. This can be said to be the Army's assessment of him as supreme commander in chief.

Who Deprives the Army of Dignity?

It is impossible not to acknowledge a bitter fact: Society's confidence in the Army has been dropping continuously since the second half of 1992. It is not the mass media that are to blame for this. (See table)

Table of declining trust in, and growing mistrust of, the Army

Major dates	Trust	Mistrust	Undecided
1992 (second half)	55-60%	12%	28-33%
1993 (toward the end)	48-53%	18-20%	27-34%
1994 (July)	38%	28%	34%
1994 (31 December)	35.1%	40.3%	24.6%
1995 (1 February—provisional figure)	(a)31%	(a)50%	(a)20%

(a) = approximately

(Russian Academy of Sciences ISPI [expansion unknown] figures have mainly been used)

The Army's image has suffered badly in connection with the shelling of parliament in October 1993 and the Chechnya war. The Army is being exposed especially in order to humiliate it. It is forces that want to destroy Russia that are interested in this. The authorities and even the president himself are afraid to strengthen the Army because they see it as a threat to themselves.

There is growing dissatisfaction with the regime's policy in the country. In addition to using the guard forces and internal troops, the president will also try to use elite army units and combined units to pacify the people. This could succeed to some extent in Moscow, but the Army will not, on the whole, go against the people. Sooner or later the military will acquire proper dignity, in order to counter the potentates' wild behavior. Let us recall the fate of Napoleon. When France could no longer tolerate him, the generals with whom he had gone through dozens of battles appeared before him and asked him to step down for the good of the country. "I shall call upon the Army!" Napoleon cried. "Sire, the Army will not move from the spot," the generals replied. Thus the great emperor was deposed 4 April 1814. Russian generals could also resort to this option in order to save the motherland from ruin and to prevent the spread of violence and the proliferation of civil war.

Mutual Cover-Up

In Russia the president and the other state institutions are implementing policy in the interests of a minority consisting, in the main, of 10-12 percent of the population who have rapidly grown rich by robbing the country and the majority of working people. Not having a broad social base, this regime seeks to rely on force. The president is pursuing this doggedly by subordinating the Army to himself individually and depriving parliament and the government, let alone public organizations and citizens, of any rights over it. By bribing people dispensing privileges, by using the method of bloody bandages, the regime has succeeded in creating an obedient leadership in the Army, which allows the president to push it into antipeople, antidemocratic, bloody, and violent actions. The military leadership is isolated from independently minded, principled generals who are faithful to the interests of the people and the fatherland. This is convincingly borne out by the recent reshuffles among top generals. The leadership is increasingly influencing the regime, which in turn is becoming increasingly dependent on stubborn military figures. This is even talked about in public. Thus Grachev declared recently that he was almost the only defender protecting the president from inevitable dismissal: "If the Army is left without Grachev," the minister said without false modesty, "Russia will at once be left without Yeltsin."

But the Army is becoming increasingly aware of the perniciousness of the policy both of the present regime and of the top generals faithful to it and of the danger they pose to the future of the fatherland and the people. This has given rise to mass opposition among the officer corps: Opposition to the overall policy, particularly military policy, to the police-gendarme use of the Army, and to the war in Chechnya. In terms of its strength and scope this opposition is comparable with the Decembrists' movement and with the military opposition to the czar in 1916-1917, to Stalin in the thirties, and to Khrushchev in the early sixties. The special feature is the fact that, for the first time in the history of the Russian Army, it has taken the form of mass refusals to carry out the orders and the will of politicians. Approximately 90 percent of servicemen believe that their rights, material provision, and status are being systematically violated and that this can be tolerated no more.

Where Is the Way Out?

It is clear that the rebirth of the defense might of Russia and its Army, as well as of the country as a whole, is linked above all to a change in the existing system. A majority of citizens are aware of the fallaciousness of the present political system: It suits just 3 percent of Russians; 45 percent believe that shortcomings predominate but that they could be eliminated through gradual reforms; 43 percent are in a "revolutionary" frame of mind, believing that the system is totally useless and must be changed radically. No more than 6-8 percent of citizens now trust the president, while 75-80 percent mistrust him (Russian Academy of Sciences ISPI figures).

Bitter experience demands profound changes to the Constitution, above all in questions of war and peace and the command of the Army. There must be a constitutional organ to direct the military sphere, similar to the Chief Military Council. In all democratic states the elaboration of military policy, doctrine, and programs and plans for building and employing the Army are the common business of all institutions of the political system and all branches of state power, with parliament playing the decisive role. In the U.S. Constitution the Congress has the right to declare war; it is the prerogative of the supreme commander in chief to create and provide for the armed forces and to determine their organization, their equipment, and the regulations for managing them. Granting similar rights to our president would lead to complete mayhem: Instead of the six branches of the Armed Forces stated in the Constitution, there are 14 (special presidential troops, etc.) and a multitude of nonstate armed groups, detachments, and formations.

It is important politically to end the militarization of Russia's capital and the adjacent territory, the separation of troops into elite and neglected forces, and the selection of cadres on the basis of the principle of personal devotion.

I recall how, before a festival in 1993, the president sent the Supreme Soviet a draft edict conferring almost 150 generalships. Parliament scrapped that draft because it consisted mainly of armchair military officers, financiers, and rear service officers and troop commanders and chiefs were blatantly forgotten. But the president still signed the edict.

In conclusion I would like to emphasize that it is important to include the Army and all the power structures properly in the political system of society. This must help to assert people's power, parliamentarism, and genuine democracy and to strengthen the security of the individual, society, and the country.

Election Commission Denounces Call for Early Elections

LD0703161395 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1500 GMT 7 Mar 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Lyudmila Aleksandrova]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow March 7 TASS—The Russian Central Election Commission denounced bids of "public groups, party leaders and other political figures" to initiate the campaign for the parliamentary and presidential election".

A clarifying statement released by the commission today says the Russian Constitution ends the parliament's term in December 1995 and the president's one in June 1996.

The recent presidential state-of-federation address to the parliament reaffirms the president's commitment to the constitution-set election timetable, the statement stresses.

Federal election laws which are being drafted now project four months for preparation and conduction of the elections, the statement continues.

The Central Election Committee says efforts should be focused now on setting up a legal and technical basis for the elections ahead. The commission endorses the adoption of the automatic "elections" system to be used "under public control".

National Union's Baburin Backs Evolution, Elections

MM0703130995 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 7 Mar 95 p 2

[Report by Valentina Nikiforova: "Russian National Union Chooses Elections"]

[FBIS Translated Text] At a news conference dedicated to the preparations for the forthcoming elections, S. Baburin, chairman of the Russian National Union, announced that there are only two ways that Russia can be rescued from the abyss it finds itself in: the revolutionary path and the evolutionary path. The Russian National Union opts for the evolutionary path—that is, elections. The movement's fourth congress, which will be held 25 March, will examine the question of forms of participation in the elections. The first steps toward them have already been taken. The Russian National Union has set up branches in 52 regions. Seven organizations, among them the Officers' Union and the Derzhavnaya Party, have agreed to work as a bloc with the Russian National Union.

Agrarian Party, Villagers Will Not Back Yeltsin in Election

LD0703174895 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1418 GMT 7 Mar 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Mar 7 (Interfax)—If Boris Yeltsin runs for presidency in Russia next summer the Russian Agrarian Party and most villagers will not back him. This view was expressed in an interview with Interfax on Tuesday by Deputy Chairman of the Agrarian Party, leader of its faction in the State Duma, Nikolay Kharitonov.

He said that the Agrarian Party unites over 250,000 members and "the absolute majority of the country's villagers, which constitute one-third of Russia's population," support the party.

Kharitonov believes that Yeltsin, is "likely to propose his candidature" for the presidential elections to be held on June 12, 1996, since "the former and present presidential entourage is very much interested" in such a step.

Kharitonov believes that Yeltsin himself, who is being reproached for his incessant thirst for power, is not too eager to seek re-election". "If it was up to him," one of the AP leaders believes, "the president would not do this, but would prefer to retire."

Kharitonov believes that people from the entourage of the Russian president, "persistently pushing him to take part in the election race, seek, in so doing, to put off elections as far as possible from the tragic events, which they inspired and performed." Among such events, believes Kharitonov, was the signing of the Belaya Vezha agreement on the elimination of the Soviet Union in 1991 and privatization, "the shelling in 1993 of the Russian parliament" and so on.

Chernomyrdin Signs Order Dismissing Deputy Finance Minister

LD0703182595 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1622 GMT 7 Mar 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, Mar 7 (FIA, Interfax)—Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin signed an order Tuesday on dismissal of Deputy Finance Minister Sergey Aleksashenko. Aleksashenko said so in an inclusive interview with Interfax's Financial Information Agency. According to him, he resigned on his own free will.

He said that the order "bears no date or number yet" but said that this was probably his last working day in the ministry.

Aleksashenko listed several reasons of his resignation, notably "replacement of nearly the entire team into which I was invited by certain people but now I have to deal with others and abide by other rules of the game."

Investigation Agencies To Be Restored in FCS

LD0703140695 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1231 GMT 7 Mar 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Mar 7 (Interfax)—Investigation agencies will be restored in the Federal Counterintelligence Service (FKS) [FCS], which will enable it to "actively join efforts to expose particularly grave crimes," the secretary of Russia's Security Council told journalists on Tuesday. He informed the press in detail of the Council's session held on Monday [6 March].

The session, he conceded, was emotionally influenced by the death of Vladislav Listyev and by the latest sensational crimes that failed to be solved. One-third of the thousands of murders committed in Moscow last year remained unsolved, he noted. Today many such crimes are committed on fundamentally new grounds.

The president demanded that the Finance Ministry and its head, Vladimir Panskov, in person ensure full funding for the federal program for combating crime worked out last year, Lobov said. It was acknowledged that last year the funding of that program had been hampered.

According to Lobov, the president is worried by the fact that the State Duma cut by one half the one trillion rubles allocated for efforts to combat crime this year. The president, Lobov said, suggested to Chairman Ivan Rybkin that the Duma should consider this point of the budget more attentively at the final, fourth, reading.

The president also called for prompt consideration of the law on protecting judges. The law may even be introduced part by part, Lobov said.

Lobov said, the session discussed the possibility of introducing the post of deputy premier in charge of law enforcement agencies. However, this issue provoked discord at the session, and the president took no final decision on it, Lobov concluded.

Ministry Working Groups To Help Moscow Fight Against Crime

LD0703204295 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 2023 GMT 7 Mar 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow March 7 TASS—An operative staff on coordination of the activities of services of the Russian Interior Ministry and interior bodies of Moscow has been established with the aim of rendering aid to the Moscow Chief Interior Department in solving the most grave crimes including "contract murders" and ensuring security of residents of the Russian capital.

According to information from the Center of Public Relations of the Russian Interior Ministry, which was received by ITAR-TASS on Tuesday, departments of the Interior Ministry are setting up working groups comprising the most experienced officers. One of their main tasks will be to provide practical aid to officers from interior bodies of Moscow in solving grave and particularly violent crimes including criminal cases initiated in connection with killings of well-known public figures, journalists and representatives of commercial and banking structures.

Special attention was paid to work of units on duty, timely registration of applications and reports by citizens and rapid reaction to them.

Measures were outlined to improve activities of district militia officers and preventive measures concerning teenager crimes, as well as work with personnel.

Urgent organizational measures will be taken to strengthen fight against crime and ensure security of citizens, and to set up an effective system of control over implementation of planned operations.

Colonel-General Aleksandr Kulikov, deputy interior minister of the Russian Federation, was appointed head of the operative staff.

Media Issues

Aide Says Edict on Changes in Russian Public TV 'Unlikely'

LD0603135095 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1151 GMT 6 Mar 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Andrey Shtorkh]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow March 6 TASS—A presidential aide, who requested anonymity, in an ITAR-TASS interview on Monday, has described as "highly doubtful" the possibility that a presidential decree would introduce changes to the principles for the corporatisation of the Russian Public Television (known for its Russian acronym of ORT).

Such rumours appeared among the Moscow journalistic community following the remarks made by President Boris Yeltsin at the meeting with the Ostankino Television Company personnel in view of the assassination of Vladisalv Listyev. Yeltsin said he would sign a decree introducing some changes which would of benefit to Ostankino.

Yeltsin's aide believes that "such matters should not be decided upon in an off-hand manner, for they require a thorough elaboration". The aide said the presidential administration has no draft decree concerning the ORT so far but it is not ruled out that such a decree is in the works.

At present 51 percent of ORT shares belong to the state and 49 to commercial organisations such as, in particular, the Logovaz joint-stock company, Menatep and Stolichny Banks, Mikrodin, and the Russian Gazprom joint-stock company.

Media Representatives Protest Duma Proposal

954F1585A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 28 Feb 95 p 4

[Letter signed by media representatives, published under the rubric: "From the Editorial Mail": "The Duma Is Not Interested in Culture"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Disaster has come from unexpected quarters: The State Duma Committee on Information Policy and Communications has proposed cutting mass media subsidies by half, leaving budget financing only for ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA and publications for the blind. In the overall volume of the budget, this savings amounts to such an insignificant sum that it is not worth mentioning except for one "but": With this decision, adopted on M.N. Poltoranin's initiative, they are destroying a unique phenomenon which has no analogs in the world—Russia's thick literary journals.

Is it not a paradox that the literary journals, which appeared in 1729 as appendices to the government SANKT-PETERBURGSKIYE VEDOMOSTI and existed for more than two centuries, are being destroyed today in order to enable the government mouthpiece ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA to exist, for it will receive the lion's share of the remaining 82 billion in subsidies.

Along with these journals will go the many centuries of culture and that same spirituality they like so much to talk about in the Duma. Literary schools, the great Russian publicistic literature, criticism, poetry, and unique editorial mastery will become nonexistent!

But this disaster will affect more than just the literary journals: A terrible blow will be dealt to the provincial press, about which our Duma is so concerned in its words. Hundreds of newspapers and magazines will shut down—independent ones that do not look for monetary support from the local administrations and commercial structures. Publications that have devoted themselves to serving scholarship and culture and dozens of children's publications will be destroyed.

It is time finally to recognize that there are publications that will never be able to survive without state support—and these are mainly newspapers and magazines with cultural and artistic focus and the provincial independent press, which is just getting on its feet. To kill them now is a crime.

We cannot regard this Duma decision as anything other than political games pursuing momentary advantage. We cannot regard the people who have committed this act as anything other than politicians who are prepared to sacrifice the great Russian culture for the sake of backroom games.

We insist that this decision be revoked. We hope that the Duma will not only not approve it but will express its principled attitude toward attempts like this.

[Signed] S. Zalygin, NOVYY MIR; S. Chuprinin, ZNAMYA; A. Anenyev, OKTYABR; A. Slovasnyy, INOSTRANNAYA LITERATURA, D. Avraamov, ZHURNALIST; A. Yurkov, RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA; A. Udaltsov, LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, V. Simonov, KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA; P. Gutiontov, Committee for Protection of Freedom of Speech and Rights of Journalists; G. Nikolayev, ZVEZDA; V. Pyetsukh, DRUZHBA NARODOV; Ye. Sidorov, Russian Federation Ministry of Culture; and S. Gryzunov, Russian Federation Committee on the Press.

Presidential Council for Sci-Tech Policy set Up

MM0703122995 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 7 Mar 95 p 1

[Unattributed report from the "In the Corridors of Power" roundup: "President Among Academics"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A Council on Scientific and Technical Policy has been formed under the Russian Federation President. Following hot on the heels of Ella Pamfilova's Council for Social Policy, this is the second such structure working purely on a voluntary basis. The main task for the Council is to keep the president up to date on processes under way in the scientific- technical sphere in this country and abroad.

Military, Nuclear & Space Issues

Illegality of Chechnya Decisions Emphasized

MM0703120495 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 7 Mar 95 p 2

[Article by Natalya Kravchenko and Aleksandr Lavut of the "Memorial" Society: "Human Rights Campaigners Call for Criminal Proceedings Against Those Who Launched War in Chechnya"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The representatives of several human rights and sociopolitical organizations have passed on to the Russian Federation Prosecutor's Office a statement addressed to Acting General Prosecutor A.N. Ilyushenko, calling on him to institute criminal proceedings against the officials responsible for making the decision to use the Armed Forces in the Chechen Republic and who headed the implementation of this operation, since their actions are covered by the Criminal Code on the grounds that they exceeded their authority, and this has serious consequences.

The authors of the statement point to severe consequences, such as the mass violation of rights, the killing and maiming of a huge number of entirely innocent Russian citizens, and the destruction of housing, vital facilities, medical and children's institutions, and production enterprises.

The statement analyzes in detail the official argument that it is lawful to use armed violence to protect the country's territorial integrity and to eliminate bandit formations, and the references to the Russian Federation Law "On the Status of Servicemen" and the Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949. In this connection it says that the Law "On the Status of Servicemen" does not regulate the questions of the use of the Armed Forces, it fleshes out the constitutional rights, freedoms, duties, and responsibility of servicemen. The additional protocol to the Geneva Conventions extends the humanitarian norms of the protection of the victims of armed international conflicts to conflicts of an international nature and cannot influence the international-law basis for the use of the Armed Forces to eliminate conflicts within the state.

The statement particularly notes that "in both Russian and international law any use of state coercion—much less armed force infringing citizens' rights and freedoms—is strictly regulated by federal laws and implemented in accordance with the Constitution." But under Articles 20 and 21 of the Russian Federation Law "On Defense" the basis for the use of armed force within a country is a state of war, martial law, or a state of emergency, and this list is not subject to any broader interpretation. Russia cannot be at war with the Chechen Republic—which is part of its own territory—and there has been no proclamation of martial law or a state of emergency.

The definition of the Chechnya hostilities as a police operation does not stand up to criticism, if you take account of the methods used to "restore order" and the scale on which they were used. The use of arms when implementing police operations is strictly regulated by the law, which also cannot be given a broader interpretation. The Law "On the Police" permits the use only of firearms and only in the cases envisaged by Article 15—none of which relate to military operations.

The use of bombing and missile strikes KNOWINGLY presupposes the violation of the aforesaid laws, since they would inevitably lead to enormous losses among the civilian population and irreparable material damage.

The authorities' actions cannot be justified by the need to protect the country's territorial integrity. Article 2 of the Russian Federation Constitution defines the following priorities—people and their rights and freedoms are termed the supreme value and, consequently, cannot be sacrificed to any other values.

The statement's authors recall that the role and boundaries governing the use of the Armed Forces are laid down by Article 10 of the Russian Federation Law "On Defense": "The Russian Federation Armed Forces are designed to repulse aggression and defeat an aggressor, as well as to carry out missions in line with the Russian Federation's international commitments. The involvement of units, subunits, and other Russian Federation Armed Forces formations in missions unconnected with their role is permissible only on the basis of the law."

In this instance the interpretation of the term "AGGRESSION" is of decisive importance. The legal concept of aggression defined by the UN resolution of 14 December 1974 extends only to interstate relations and, consequently, an internal threat to a state's sovereignty and territorial integrity is not covered by Article 10 of the Law "On Defense." At the same time, there is no norm in existing legislation which could broaden the scope for the use of the Armed Forces.

The Russian Federation presidential edict "On Measures to Curtail the Activity of Illegal Armed Formations in the Chechen Republic and in the Ossetian-Ingush Conflict Zone" takes Article 80 and Paragraphs e and f of Article 114 of the Russian Federation Constitution as its basis. But these articles of the Constitution, defining the president's duties and powers, do not regulate the means used to implement them. The procedure for using the means selected is laid down by the normative acts referred to earlier.

Thus, the statement says that the Russian Armed Forces' military operations in the Chechen Republic should be described as having been carried out in violation of Russian and international norms and as aimed against humanity.

It should be noted that the statement does not name the individuals against whom criminal proceedings should be instituted. Clearly, it is assumed that the list of these persons should be drawn up by the Prosecutor's Office.

The 12 organizations which signed the statement include the "Memorial" society, the Moscow group to promote the implementation of the Helsinki accords, the Russian Soldiers' Mothers Committee, the Committee and Coordinating Council for Aid to Refugees and Displaced Persons, the Glasnost Defense Foundation, and the "Democratic Russia" movement.'

Gaydar Says War in Chechnya Will Last 'For Years To Come'

LD0703174095 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1418 GMT 7 Mar 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Mar 7 (Interfax)—Leader of the Democratic Choice of Russia Party (DVR) Yegor Gaydar believes Moscow must try to economically convince Chechnya to stay put as part of Russia.

"Regrettably, we have chosen a different way and it will take us a long time before things are sorted out", he said speaking at a meeting of employees of the Kvant company in the town of Zelenograd close to Moscow.

On Russia's military campaign in Chechnya, Gaydar said this was the first major issue to drive a wedge between his party and President Boris Yeltsin.

"This war was easy to start but will be very hard to end because it may continue as guerrilla war for years to come", the DVR leader said.

No Candidates To Head Post on Restoring Chechnya's Economy

LD0703154795 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1504 GMT 7 Mar 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Mar 7 (Interfax)—Seven candidates to the post of the leader of a department for restoring Chechnya's economy, being created in the Russian government, rejected the post. It is still vacant.

Interfax learned that six candidates for the posts of deputy heads of the new department were proposed to head of the Cabinet's administration Vladimir Babichev. They all agreed to work in the department.

In addition, he was proposed names of four persons for the posts of chiefs of sections in the new department. According to information obtained by Interfax, 27 persons are to work in the department.

The department is being created in line with the Russian government resolution of February 21. The department is to help the state commission to restore the economy and social sphere in Chechnya. The commission is headed by Deputy Russian Prime Minister Oleg Soskovets.

Public Accord Conciliation Commission Examines Chechen Aid

LD0703215195 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1639 GMT 7 Mar 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Igor Belskiy]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, 7 Mar—Today's sitting of the conciliation commission for implementing the Public Accord Treaty deemed it necessary to establish "public and state control" over the distribution of humanitarian aid to the Chechen Republic. The session was chaired by Sergey Filatov, head of the Russian presidential administration. Those speaking at the session claimed that a considerable amount of aid had not reached its destination and had been kept in warehouses.

The session examined proposals on settling the conflict in Chechnya. In connection with this, poor coordination of the activity of federal bodies of authority aimed to normalize the situation in the Chechen Republic was noted. Thus, according to Arkadiy Volskiy, the answers given by the Russian Government to five proposals submitted by the working group he heads "show that the recommendations had not reached the prime minister."

The session decided to form a delegation representing the conciliation commission and to send it to Chechnya.

Moscow To Host Conference on Chechnya Settlement

LD0703194395 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1848 GMT 7 Mar 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, Mar 7 (INTERFAX)—A conference on the settlement of Chechnya will be held in Moscow on March 14. The head of the Russian presidential administration, Sergey Filatov, called it "an important step to surmount the crisis in the region." The conference will discuss establishing a ceasefire in the republic, preparing future elections of all bodies of power and determining the republic's status.

Filatov told a meeting of the conciliatory commission for implementing the Social Accord Pact in Moscow Tuesday that the conference had been initiated by a number of people's deputies, parties and public movements of Russia.

The conference will be attended by representatives of the North Caucasus as well as Chechen community in Russia and the republic's districts.

At the same time, Filatov admitted that the conference was unlikely to achieve unity on all issues. "There will be differences, fierce arguments and various, maybe contrary proposals. Without constructive work, no peace can be established in Chechnya," he added.

Filatov also said a number of conferences will be held in late March and early April to discuss the Chechnya issue. In particular, Russian industrialists, entrepreneurs and clergymen will meet in Peterhof. North Caucasian cultural workers will hold another conference of their own under the auspices of Russian President Boris Yeltsin. This will promote the establishment of peace and accord in this region of Russia, Filatov emphasized.

More on Soskovets Proposal for Special Group on Chechnya

LD0703202295 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 2001 GMT 7 Mar 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Oleg Velichko]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow March 7 TASS—It is necessary "to tie up restoration operations with political settlement in the Chechen Republic," Russian First Vice-Premier Oleg Soskovets told a meeting of state commission on restoration of economy and social sphere in Chechnya on Tuesday.

Soskovets drew attention to "poor interaction between local authorities and the federal troops". In this connection, he proposed to form a body, which will be answerable to the federal government and predict developments in Chechnya and help work out corresponding decisions.

According to Soskovets, Russian Ministry of National Security and National Policy should act as "motor" of the new body, whereas the ultimate aim of the new structure should consist in working out a model for the federal government to follow, should analogous conflicts happen elsewhere in Russia.

According to Russian Construction Minister Yefim Basin, who also participated in the meeting, a plan for restoration of the destroyed buildings and amenities has been worked out. All buildings will be examined soon and the builders will begin restoration operations.

Since 60 percent of housing are in private possession, it was decided to involve local population in the course of the first stage of the restoration operations. The second stage will consist in restoration of multistoried buildings, and only after that the builders will set about working at those buildings which are in need of a thorough repair. The order for individual housing construction was also determined.

Police forces were brought up to strength in 11 districts of the Chechen Republic. Locals account for 40 percent of the Chechen traffic police forces, representatives of the Russian Defence Ministry said.

Ministry To Reprocess Own, Foreign Spent Nuclear Fuel

MM0603134095 Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 4 Mar 95 p 2

[Unattributed report: "Foreign Nuclear Electric Power Station Fuel To Be Processed in Russia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy, as envisaged by the corresponding Russian presidential edict, is beginning construction of an RT-2 plant in Krasnoyarsk-26 which will process spent nuclear fuel from water-regulated water-cooled VVER-1000 reactors. This was said by Georgiy Kaurov, chief of the Ministry of Atomic Energy's Information Administration, at a news conference yesterday.

He stressed that although the construction of the installation was planned a fairly long time ago, there was no money for it. It has now been decided to use for this purpose money obtained from foreign states which deliver spent nuclear fuel from their nuclear electric power stations [AES] to Russia for processing. However, it is a question not only of Soviet-designed stations, whose fuel is traditionally processed in the Russiian Federation, but of others too. Once the spent nuclear fuel has been processed and the "valuable substances" (uranium, plutonium) extracted from it, it will be sent back to the producer country. Georgiy Kaurov stressed that these operations are authorized by the president's edict. What is more, many states, France and Britain, for instance, do the same.

However, international cooperation is not very efficient, Rosenergoatom Vice President Boris Antonov noted. According to him, Russia's attempts to secure major investment, particuarly for the construction of new AES power units, have ended in failure. Western countries generally do not offer the services that Russian AES's need.

Moscow Launches Three Satellites From Baykonur

LD0803124295 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1232 GMT 8 Mar 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Mission Control March 8 TASS—Russia has launched "Cosmos-2307", "Cosmos-2308" and "Cosmos-2309" satellites from the Baykonur (Kazakhstan) space-vehicle launching site on March 7. They are designed to work in the global space navigational system (Glonass).

The satellites have been put into a near circular orbit with the intial parametres:
—orbital period—11 hours 15 minutes;
—distance from the earth—19,132 km;
—inclination of the orbit—64.8 degrees.

Airborne apparatuses on the satellites are reported to be functioning normally.

Federal Assembly

Rybkin on Moscow Mayor's Intention To Resign

LD0703173095 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1622 GMT 7 Mar 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Mar 7 (Interfax)—State Duma (lower house of Russian parliament) Chairman Ivan Rybkin said the rejection by Moscow Mayor Yuriy Luzhkov of the decision of the Russian Prosecutor General's Office collegium to dismiss Moscow Prosecutor Gennadiy Ponomaryov was "reasonable to a large extent."

However, Rybkin said he disagreed with Luzhkov reacting in the same way to the Russian Interior Ministry dismissing Head of the Moscow Main Law Enforcement Department Vladimir Pankratov.

Rybkin told Interfax in an exclusive interview today that the proposal to Gennadiy Ponomaryov last year that he take the post of the Russian Prosecutor General rejected by Ponomaryov proved rather convincingly the level of his professionalism and the level of the Moscow Prosecutor's Office on the whole.

Luzhkov said former chief of the Moscow Main Law Enforcement Department Vladimir Pankratov had done a lot for strengthening the Moscow police after replacing in this post physicist Arkadiy Murashov but had, however, failed to bring the performance of the police in line with the actual demands for the fight against crime.

Rybkin said he believed that the head of the Moscow police must be the highest professional in the area of investigative work.

Commenting on Luzhkov's statement that he was ready to resign on Tuesday if the decisions of dismissing Ponomaryov and Pankratov were not reviewed, Rybkin said Luzhkov was a very good administrator and manager. Rybkin said Moscow needed Luzhkov and the issue of his resignation should not be resolved in a rush.

Rybkin said the State Duma Council would discuss the proposal of the Russia's Choice faction that the State Duma consider the information of the federal law enforcement on the results of investigating the murders of priest Alexander Men, journalists Dmitriy Kholodov and Vladislav Listyev, State Duma parliamentarians Valentin Martemyanov and Sergey Skorochkin on March 10. On this day the State Duma will have a "government hour" to consider the investigation reports.

Rybkin said the murder of State Duma parliamentarian Andrey Aidzerdis had been solved.

Regional Affairs

*Tatarstan-Russia Treaty Seen as Model for Federalization

954F1553A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 18 Feb 95 p 2

[Article by Nail Aminov: "The Tatarstan Model. On the Anniversary of the Signing of the Treaty Between the Russian Federation and the Tatarstan Republic"; Nail Aminov is the Tatarstan Republic's Plenipotentiary Representative to the Russian Federation]

[FBIS Translated Text] **State construction**

A major milestone in relations between the Tatarstan Republic and the Russian Federation was the signing of the Treaty "On the Demarcation of Objects of Jurisdiction and Mutual Delegation of Powers Between Bodies of State Authority of the Russian Federation and the Tatarstan Republic," whose anniversary we are now observing.

The signing of the Treaty was a genuine realization of Article 61 of the Constitution of the Tatarstan Republic, from which it follows that the Tatarstan Republic is a sovereign state and a subject of international law that is associated with the Russian Federation—Russia—on the basis of the treaty on mutual delegation of the powers and subjects of jurisdiction. We think this fact graphically confirms the rightness of relations between federal bodies of authority with one of the subjects of the Federation.

The Treaty not only deals with "technical" questions of demarcating objects of jurisdiction and mutual delegation of powers between bodies of state authority of the two parties, it also fixes and affirms the Tatarstan Republic's new status, conditioned by the results of a referendum of the citizens of Tatarstan in March 1992 and the Constitution of the Tatarstan Republic that was adopted later on its basis in November 1992.

This approach reflected the status specifications of the Tatarstan Republic as a sovereign state which is joined to the Russian Federation, takes part in international relations, and recognizes the priorities of the principal rights and freedoms of human beings and citizens, and also the primacy of international law. Because of this, the Treaty has its own character and the kinds of features which make it possible to assign it to the special category of legal instruments which are essentially of an interstate nature. Therefore, any attempt to minimize its political importance and its reforming role in the juridical implementation of the new federalism, to reduce it to a mere intra-state agreement—and such attempts are being made in certain circles—are both politically and juridically incorrect and untenable.

The Treaty is of an inter-state character. This is reflected not only in its title (the Treaty of the Russian Federation and Tatarstan Republic) but also in its content, starting with the Preamble. The system of rights and duties embodied in it, and the mechanism of resolving disputes, making amendments and interpretations, and responsibilities for complying with its norms, are binding equally on the Russian Federation and the Tatarstan Republic in the person of their state bodies.

This assessment of the Treaty and the intergovernmental agreements to be formed on its basis take account not only of the specifics of the Tatarstan people's exercise of their right to self-determination and equal rights but also Russia's international obligations as a member of the UN.

There is another important point. This approach is fully in accord with the provisions of the present Constitution of the Russian Federation (Preamble, Article 5.11). The historic role of the Treaty of 15 February 1994 is its preservation of the general political-legal and economic space of Russia and Tatarstan, territorial integrity, and practical ties between their peoples. The Treaty has naturally received an overall positive assessment in public opinion both here and abroad. Today in Russia itself, in the CIS countries, and foreign countries where there are "hot spots" and conflicts, disputes between states and state formations, reference is made to the

"Tatarstan-Russian model" of resolving complex issues of state construction and interethnic relations.

The republic's new social, political, and economic realities, its changed status, and the stability of its political and social situation, as well as its precise relations with Russia on a treaty basis, have all enhanced the interest in the Tatarstan Republic which countries of the near and far abroad have shown.

International public opinion has an increasingly accurate perception of the Tatarstan Republic as a secular democratic state, a reliable and economically advantageous partner which fulfills its obligations. This is attested by rising interest in Tatarstan by foreign investors and growing foreign trade, which last year exceeded two million dollars. The republic passed a law "On Foreign Investments," and President Mintimer Shaymiyev issued an edict "On Stimulating Foreign Investment in the Tatarstan Republic." These acts reliably protect the rights of foreign investors and offer favorable terms to attract essential funds to the republic's national economy and investment projects. There are now about a hundred such projects. More than 40 foreign firms and investment funds are now involved in these projects, along with almost 200 joint enterprises. A consistent policy of treaty-based regulation of relations between Tatarstan and Federation subjects is being conducted.

An important stimulus to the development of bilateral relations was Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin's official visit to Tatarstan soon after the signing of the Treaty (30-31 May 1994).

Five years ago, on 30 August 1990, the Tatarstan Republic passed its Declaration of State Sovereignty. This step set the republic's policy in all spheres of social life. Nevertheless, sovereignty does not mean separation from Russia, or secession from it, and never has. Our republic's leaders, in particular Mintimer Shaymiyev, never tire of emphasizing that. Moreover, many of us probably recall our President's statement: "It sometimes appeared that some force was trying to expel us from Russia...." We have been part of Russia for over four centuries, side by side with Russians, Bashkirs, Chuvashes, Mari, Udmurts, and other peoples. A thousand threads bind us to them, and breaking these threads would be like breaking the blood vessels that nourish our whole body.

To us, sovereignty has always meant the possibility of managing our land's resources as we see fit, the intellectual potential of our people, of running our own economy, and determining the measure of responsibility which we can bear ourselves, thus freeing the Center of exercising petty regulation of our whole life, and entrusting and delegating to it those functions which are vital to the activity of the state as a whole.

And life has confirmed that the future belongs to these relations, that it is the only true path to genuine federalization and democratization of Russia. There is no turning back.

Irkutsk Oblast Administrators Discuss Agricultural Reform

954F1456A Irkutsk VOSTOCHNO-SIBIRSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 19 Jan 95 pp 1-2

[Article by Konstantin Zhitov, VOSTOCHNO-SIBIRSKAYA PRAVDA: "From a Blind Alley Into the Market"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Today it is probably no longer necessary to persuade anyone that the reforms conducted in this country have turned into a blind alley. Graphic confirmation of this is the situation in the agro—industrial complex, which is experiencing an unprecedented crisis. This has also affected the Angara region, which was the subject of discussion at a recent seminar-conference of heads of administration of cities and rayons that was organized at the initiative of the oblast department of agriculture.

Opening the conference, V.A. Berdnikov, deputy head of the oblast administration, told the gathering about the results of the past year. They are not comforting: The production of milk, as compared with 1989, when the highest indices in recent years was achieved, decreased by 23 percent; for meat, production was down by 21 percent; for eggs, the figure was 22, and for wool, 60 percent.

Doubtless, the effects of heavy drought, which twice during this period descended on the Angara region, have made themselves felt. But the main reason still lies in the unequal interchange between the city and the countryside. The disparity in prices has turned out to be much more devastating than the elements. Judge for yourself: If in 1991 peasants could acquire a K-700 tractor for the price of four tonnes of meat, 22 tonnes of milk, and 63 tonnes of grain, last year one had to lay out for the same thing 73 tonnes of meat, 400 tonnes of milk, and 380 tonnes of grain.

But the mayors of cities and rayons were convened not in order to state the well-known facts of the state's weak support of the countryside, but to search for their own ways out of the crisis. Therefore, let us listen attentively to the opinion of the participants in the seminar-conference.

How the Monopolists Wound Up With Egg on Their Face

A.S. Kirilenko, first deputy head of the oblast department of agriculture: It would seem as if rural commodity producers and processors had the same interest: to provide the population as fully as possible with foodstuffs. Only here is the problem—the former always come out the losers. Their average pay has barely edged over the R150,000 mark, whereas it has reached R355,000 in the dairy industry, R377,000 in the mixed fodder industry, and R412,000 in the meat industry.

There is no cause for surprise, however—the processors live in clover at the expense of the producers, whose share in the retail price is significantly lower than the share of their partners. Incidentally, the retail price in recent years, from the moment of liberalization, has grown even 2,500-fold, while the procurement price (at which the peasants sell their produce) has grown by a factor of only 230. It is not difficult to guess who ended up the winner. The processors, of course, having seized the controlling packet of shares, which allows them to dictate the procurement prices.

True, monopolism brought no good, and now many enterprises are reaping the fruits of economic egoism. The Usolskiy meat processing and packing plant is operating at only 14 percent of its capacity, and the Zaparinskiy creamery, at just a little more than that. Farms not wishing to reconcile themselves with such inequality of rights are trying to take a worthy place in the market: They themselves organize the processing of raw materials, and themselves sell the finished products.

Tens of mini-shops are functioning in the oblast, as a result of which individual farms process up to 85 percent of their milk and meat on site. All of the mini-shops are making a profit, and side by side with their own stores they give kolkhozes and sovkhozes the opportunity to have the cash that is so needed both for the payment of wages and for expanded reproduction.

Unfortunately, far from all peasants have experienced a taste for trade. In Zhigalovskiy Rayon, there is only one store under their authority, whereas at the October Anniversary kolkhoz in Kuitunskiy Rayon, there are four. And that given the fact that the trade outlets of the oblast consumer cooperatives have either been closed down completely or have lowered their commodity turnover to a minimum.

Incidentally, on the basis of the oblast's consumer cooperatives, with more than 1,500 stores, 39 refrigerators, and 54 vegetable storehouses, it would have been possible to create quite a good wholesale produce market, but no one can be bothered with this, including the heads of administration.

And can it be the case that a review of tax policy on our territories with respect to rural commodity producers is not the direct affair of the mayors of cities and rayons, of local representatives of the organs of power? Today the kolkhozes and sovkhozes, besides taxes to the oblast and federal budget, are obligated to make up to 13 types of deductions into the local budget, and this is ruinous for them.

What About the Taxes

V.M. Baldakov, first deputy head of the oblast tax inspectorate: The heads of kolkhozes and sovkhozes and the owners of peasant and owner-operated farms often complain about their back-breaking tax burden. It really is great, and it "eats up" often up to 90 percent of their income, even though its optimal level should constitute no more than 40 percent.

But rural commodity producers have themselves to blame to no small extent. After all, few of them participate actively in the elaboration of the corresponding legal acts in the oblast legislative assembly. And who if not agrarian deputies will stand up for the interests of the countryside here, will succeed in making the taxes into the local budget less onerous for the peasants.

I can imagine how acute the struggle will be at the January session for the confirmation of the oblast budget. The dividing of the financial "pie" would take place amid noticeably more calm if taxes from the localities to this same oblast budget had come in, in a timely manner. But even now many enterprises, including Irkutskenergo, Vostsibugol, the East Siberian Railroad Administration, and the Bratsk and the Ust-Ilimsk timber industry complexes, are tardy with the payment of taxes.

Incidentally, one-quarter of 25,000 enterprises evade payment of taxes altogether. And here the heads of administration of cities and rayons have no one to blame; after all, they themselves registered these enterprises, although they knew in advance about their insolvency. It is astonishing, but nowhere over the past year has the question of bankruptcy and the liquidation of loss-producing plants and factories, kolkhozes and sovkhozes been raised at the initiative of the local organs of power.

I will tell about one more unclaimed source of monetary funds into the oblast treasury: from construction projects. In Irkutsk, only 30 percent of them have been assessed. That means that the others are not paying taxes. The situation with the payment of these taxes in other cities is also no better, and all of this has a negative effect on the oblast budget, and hence also on the financing of agriculture.

The Land Needs a Master

Yu.M. Vakhrin, chairman of the oblast land committee: Four years have passed since the beginning of the agrarian reform. What has changed in that time? The main users of land here are as before the kolkhozes and sovkhozes. But the number of horticultural establishments, collective gardens, and subsidiary small-holdings has risen noticeably, and peasant farmers—whose numbers have topped 3,000—have forced conversation about themselves to take place out loud.

Unfortunately, the change in ownership has not always led to better use of the land. Only last year, about 1,000 hectares of agricultural land had to be withdrawn from peasants, including no small portion of arable lands overgrown with tall weeds. Many peasant farmers are fictitious: They register a document to receive plots of land, but they themselves engage in buying and selling, neglecting their land. Evidently, the time has come to change the laws, to grant people land on a competitive basis, and not to give it to whoever comes along. And not to limit people in terms of area, as happened with the farmer Pinigin in Ust-Udinskiy Rayon. The man succeeded in acquitting himself extremely well and asked to be allotted an additional plot, but was refused.

Meanwhile, 50 percent of the agricultural lands that have been transferred as a result of the agricultural reform to the rural soviets have been taken out of circulation altogether and have become seeding grounds for weeds. Our specialists have been confronted with such facts in Zalarinskiy, Tulunskiy, and many other rayons. What the heads of rayon and municipal administration are doing is impossible to say.

An even more frightening picture of the use of land was brought to light by the most recent agrochemical inspection, which was conducted last year. It turned out that 700,000 hectares, or 40 percent, of arable land has a low humus content, that the amount of land that has been subjected to water and wind erosion has risen by 200,000 hectares, and that the area of acidified soil has increased by 140,000 hectares.

I will not go into all the reasons in detail, but I will name the main ones. They are a disrupted farming system, nonobservance of crop rotation, and nonfulfillment of soil fertility programs. Only a strong master can bring order to land use, and they are in short supply, since the state has thrown them to the caprice of fate, and then in the localities, they receive no support. [passage omitted]

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One of the people who participated in the work of the seminar-conference and gave a speech there was the oblast's governor, Deputy of the Federal Assembly of Russia Yu.A. Nozhikov. He called upon the municipal and rayon administration heads to pay greater attention to cadre policy, because cadres, both formerly and especially now, decide everything.

"Now you have more levers than earlier to replace leaders who are not coping with their duties," Yuriy Abramovich emphasized. "And you should make fearless use of these levers. Idlers have no place at the head of economies." [passage omitted]

Tyumen 'Rospechat' Chief Views Current Problems

954F1500B Tyumen TYUMENSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 1 Feb 95 pp 1, 6

[Excerpts from an interview with N. Toporkov, chief of the Tyumen Oblast State Company for Distribution of Printed Material, by A. Romenskiy; place and date not given: "What Does 'Rospechat' Offer Us?"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] **I went to the meeting with N. Toporkov, chief of the Tyumen Oblast Rospechat [State Company for Distribution of Printed Material] with just one goal in mind—to ask him what is new today in the reading market and how the surge in prices of periodicals has affected the tastes of Tyumen residents. But the conversation began with a different topic....**

"For some reason," complained Nikolay Valeryevich, "Rospechat representatives are never invited to conferences held by journalists and publishers. The same happened at the latest one, Editor Day in Ishim—attended by L. Roketskiy, by the way: We were again forgotten. Meanwhile, the subject of conversation there was the most sore spot: preservation of a common information space."

[Romenskiy] I remember, you were among the first to feel the beginning effects of the oblast's division. About two years ago, when Tyumen Rospechat was split. By the way, whose initiative was that?

[Toporkov] The Ministry of Communications of Russia. All in all, over eight years of work in Rospechat I witnessed four major reorganizations: We were merged, "unmerged," and the subscription function was taken away from us. And then in 1992 the Ministry of Communications registered simultaneously three state enterprises—one of Tyumen Oblast (the city of Tyumen and southern districts) and two autonomous okrugs. And by the law on enterprises, one cannot be a component part of another. A painful division began. Okrug enterprises separated from us, leaving a huge—by the measure of those times—debt: about R20 million. This was a very serious blow: That year we lost the subscription functions and an integrated retail network.

[Romenskiy] Do okrug enterprises of Rospechat work with you now?

[Toporkov] Practically not. What work? We have direct contracts with a number of northern cities—Novyy Urengoy, Noyabrsk, Khanty-Mansiysk, as well as Berezovskiy and Sovetskiy Rayons: We send them newspapers, and they sell them. Others are not open to such contacts. To the best of my knowledge, they do not have direct contracts with leading oblast newspapers either. For instance, TYUMENSKAYA PRAVDA is not sold in retail in Surgut and Nizhnevartovsk. This, of course, also destroys the common information space.

[Romenskiy] Perhaps the okrugs are not happy with the former form of subordination?

[Toporkov] There is no subordination in this. In the past, okrug enterprises sent us their balance sheets and reports, and we sent them plan indicators and directives from structures of authority higher up. The modern form of relations looks completely different. We can work by direct contracts with all cities and rayons. But these relations must be clearly set forth for both sides: We give you the goods, and you pay us. There is nothing else we need from our companions.

[Romenskiy] But who is supposed to say the first word?

[Toporkov] I have already said all the words. I only regret that I learn of all the conferences, where the question of common information space in the oblast is raised, from press reports. Because this integration probably begins at the economic side, with those who provide information communications. Yes, I understand that it is not easy to produce a newspaper, but it also needs to be brought to the readers, and this is a problem of your affiliates. [passage omitted]

[Romenskiy] Which periodicals are in greatest demand in Tyumen?

[Toporkov] In terms of printing runs, the leaders are TYUMENSKIYE VEDOMOSTI (30,000 copies), TYUMEN (20,000), the Friday edition of BLITS (18,000), BAYT (10,000) and ARGUMENTY I FAKTY (8,000). Among daily newspapers, TYUMENSKAYA PRADVA increased its printing run fourfold in the new year. But I think even this figure does not reflect the real demand for your newspaper, because this printing run was set by the editorial staff. TRUD and SOVERSHENNO SEKRETNO sell briskly, as usual. [passage omitted]

[Romenskiy] Nikolay Valeryevich, what question have I not yet asked you?

[Toporkov] Probably about robberies of kiosks. About the work of our glorious police. Well, over the past two years not a single theft of more than 100 committed against Rospechat—which means that every kiosk had been robbed twice—has been solved. For instance, as soon as we put a new kiosk near the House of Press, it was immediately set on fire—the losses in merchandise alone amounted to R2.3 million.

[Romenskiy] And the scandalous robbery of the kiosk in the oblast Duma?

[Toporkov] Still is being investigated. In a way, the police themselves encourage juvenile criminals, who sense their impunity and make a run on kiosks. Perhaps I, as a taxpayer, should not pay taxes to maintain a large staff of the internal affairs administration and give this money to private detectives—let them get things in order. What else is there to do?

[Romenskiy] Well, let us wrap up our conversation on this eternal question. I know that in a few days you are leaving for Moscow, where the question of creating a new Rospechat joint-stock society will be discussed. I hope we will hear good news!

St. Petersburg's Mayor Comments on Mafia, Crime

954F1663B St. Petersburg NEVSKOYE VREMYA in Russian 3 Mar 95 p 1

[Comments by St. Petersburg Mayor Anatoliy Sobchak, recorded by Andrey Vermishev; place and date not given; under the rubric "Firsthand": "Mafia Does Not Like Free Press"]

[FBIS Translated Text] I am shocked by events, and I think that in this case we are dealing with the fact of the horrendous explosion of organized crime—especially in Moscow. The state must fight crime with the toughest methods available. I think that in this situation such measures as sacking the chief of the city GUVD [city administration of internal affairs] or the capital city procurator are not enough. To do so is simply looking for the last in line, scapegoats. In reality everything is much more serious. And thank God in St. Petersburg the mafia is not yet as brazen as in the capital. But this does not mean that St. Petersburg does not have similar problems.

Vladislav Listyev's death is not the first incident of terror against journalists. In my opinion, the shots fired at him are the best proof that far from everyone—and first of all criminal structures—likes the new independence of the press in Russia. I hope that the investigation in the case of Vladimir Listyev's murder will be conducted properly and we will finally get an answer to the question of who committed this crime and why. Something must fundamentally change in Russian society after this incident. Because we cannot live like this anymore.

By the way, we discussed earlier with the St. Petersburg GUVD leadership and editors in chief of city newspapers how to ensure the safety of St. Petersburg journalists. Of course, it is impossible to attach a bodyguard to each reporter. However, apparently we need to meet again, to have a more detailed talk, especially now that there is again reason to do so. What measures can we take in this sense? A month ago I ordered the disbandment of those city security structures that had been identified as having connections with the criminal world and organized crime. I think that, having liquidated so-called "official bandits," whom we had legalized in 1992—thanks to the decision of Khasbulatov's Supreme Soviet, which passed the law on private security structures—we will be able to create a more peaceful situation in the city. Because in my opinion it was this law that enabled criminal elements to create commando groups entitled to carrying arms, while ordinary citizens do not have such rights.

In a number of instances law enforcement organs know that particular groups have connections with organized crime but cannot do anything about it: Until these people are caught in committing a concrete crime, nothing can be done. I have sent communications on this issue to both the president and the Duma, insistently demanding that this law be repealed, but so far such a decision has not been made. One way or another, in our city we will close all structures that have been noticed to have any connection with the criminal world.

As to the need for security personnel, which does exist, we will make it up by hiring officers transferred to the reserves in connection with military personnel cuts, and former police personnel—especially considering that there are many such people in the city right now, who are practically out of work and have no outlet to utilize their professionalism and skills. We will set up official security structures working under the direct supervision of internal affairs organs, and entrust weapons to honest, principled people we can really rely on...

Murmansk Oblast Duma Session Reported

954F1472C Murmansk POLYARNAYA PRAVDA in Russian 1 Feb 95 p 1

[Article by V. Sidorin: "Think, Duma, Think...."]

[FBIS Translated Text] The second meeting of the first session of the oblast Duma took place over two days—26 and 27 January. Virtually everything planned was in fact examined. True, the second working day was extended—the meeting ended after 2000 hours. But it is the right of the deputies to determine how long they will remain in session and when their hearings will end. Whereas it is probably more important to the voters to know the final result—what was discussed and what their elected officials decided.

This newspaper has already informed its readers concerning some of the more than 15 issues discussed. Five of them were placed on the agenda during actual conduct of the session, which testifies as to their "timely review." A number of questions related to official business of the lawmakers—a draft law on the status of an oblast Duma deputy, one on the structure and authorized strength of the Duma apparatus, etc. Therefore, we will not dwell on them. Although it would probably not be inappropriate to state that the Duma apparatus will consist of 30 individuals, and in another month or two many of the lawmakers will have more staff assistants.

Once again we recall the Duma's adoption of the decree on the financing of oblast budget outlays during the first quarter. Essentially, the financing was adopted wholly and completely in the manner envisaged by the oblast administration. In other words, deputies pretended to be deciding something, but all the while it was that same chief oblast economist—A. Artemyev, deputy head of administration, who was "orchestrating the figures."

If this depiction agitates our elected officials, they can be calmed by the fact that things were the same during the days of the old soviet. And if this fails to console them, we may then recall that even with the curtailed rights the Duma currently possesses, budget income and outlays constitute an important prerogative of the representational organ of power. And if a deputy has a poor concept of this, why then did he join the Duma? Even then all is not lost—gaps in economic knowledge can be filled in by study. Just so long as such study does not drag on.

According to administration estimates, oblast budget income in the first quarter comes to R52.470 billion, outlays—R107.641 billion, and the budget deficit—R55.171 billion. Whether this is good or bad, only A. Artemyev knows. But he says everything is normal for the first quarter.

The Duma examined several draft federal laws (i.e., laws that will be examined by the State Duma)—on the general principles of organization of the system of organs of state power of Russian Federation entities, on the introduction of amendments and additions to the law on state guarantees and compensation for northerners, on the status of judges, on citizens with children. Not having the entire package of resolutions adopted at the session, it is difficult for this journalist to make judgments on all the issues. Nonetheless, comments may be made concerning the two for which documents are available.

The Oblast Duma decree on the draft law on general principles of the organization of power begins: "To approve on the whole the draft federal law...." And the decree on introducing amendments and additions to the law "on the northern regions"—"To approve on the whole the draft federal law..." To simply "approve" it! In the meantime, the verdict on any law will be issued by society, by actuality. So should our legislators be approving "on the run" that which has not been approved in practice? Perhaps we should be more exacting in our approach to the discussion of draft laws? After all, the stricter the approach to making a decision, the more well considered is the decision itself.

There is also some merit in touching upon another resolution adopted at the session. Perhaps it should even have been brought up at the outset—the resolution on the appeal of citizens and public associations to the Oblast Duma in connection with the events in the Chechen Republic.

The Chechen question was floating in the air as long ago as the first Duma session on 19 December. It was raised by Deputies V. Kalayda and A. Pustovaya. Their views were diametrically opposed—the former called the war in Chechnya a slaughter, the second justified an armed solution to the conflict. But be that as it may, their views failed to prompt deputies to put the issue on the agenda for discussion. Only on 27 January was it discussed, and then under pressure from society and mothers.

The Duma declared it necessary to immediately cease military operations in the Chechen Republic and resolve the conflict through negotiations. It was decided to dispatch a group of deputies to the Chechen Republic, etc. A decree on this issue will be published. In the meantime, we might emphasize that such a document could have appeared 40 days ago. Were the deputies more experienced, they would most likely not have permitted such a delay, and then their position, like the decisions of other legislative organs in Russia's regions, might have played a role. Perhaps both the Russian Federation Security Council, whose status is not certain, and the Federal Assembly, for which the same applies, would have pondered more seriously how to extricate ourselves from this situation. How much death and destruction does it take to realize that this war will not result in victory?!

But that which was adopted by the Duma is not bad, all the same. After all—better late than never.

I do not wish to get involved in organizational squabbling in these comments, but they were in fact present. There was the defiant departure of one deputy from the session, the telegram from Olenegorsk voters to a specific deputy that was "lost" within the walls of the legislative assembly, and the absence of certain deputies during the session for three or four days. We will categorize these as problems in establishing the Duma. So as not to disillusion the voters.

Murmansk 1994 Labor Statistics Cited

954F1472B Murmansk MURMANSKIY VESTNIK in Russian 27 Jan 95 p 5

[Unattributed report: "In the Oblast Labor Market"]

[FBIS Translated Text] As of 1 January 1995, about 500,000 individuals are employed in the economy of Murmansk Oblast.

And 48,354 individuals visited the oblast Employment Service over the period January-December 1994 seeking job placement; 26,045 engaged in consultations.

The number of individuals declared unemployed for 1994 by the employment centers was 32,241, including 13,016 persons aged 16-29, 18,217 women, and 320 invalids.

Some 23,330 unemployed citizens were registered as of the end of 1994, of whom 13,698 were women. Of the total number of unemployed, 4,642 individuals were laid off from enterprises.

Over the January-December period of last year, job placement was effected for 14,368 citizens. Women comprised 47 percent of this total.

The number of job vacancies submitted to city and rayon population employment centers was 2,607 as of the end of December, of which 1,821 were replacement positions.

Plans over the next two months call for the discharge of 6,127 workers, of whom 3,337 are women, 324 are people approaching pension age, and 746 are young people.

Two hundred ninety-four unemployed citizens were registered for early pension over the year.

In 1994, 2,759 unemployed persons were sent to occupational training, and 1,725 individuals completed occupational training over this period. Job placement was effected for 1,154 of the number engaged in occupational training.

Social projects over January-December 1994 involved the participation of 1,319 individuals, of whom 197 are continuing this work. The number of job positions created over this period for the participation of unemployed citizens in social projects was 777.

The most popular occupations required in the oblast: doctor, nurse, hospital orderly, educator, educator's assistant, accountant, chief accountant, inspector of various services (fish preservation, tax, personnel), insurance agent, policeman, vehicle driver, bricklayer, plumber, cook, ship repair metalworker, sailor, ship mechanic, stonemason, stoker, roofer, house painter, plasterer, carpenter, electrician, electric/gas welder, fitter/installer of prefabricated reinforced concrete components, watchman, elevator operator, loader, janitor at production and official premises.

The level of unemployment in the oblast as of 1 January 1995 was 3.3 percent of the able-bodied population (4.5 percent of the economically active populace).

Murmansk LDPR Gets New Oblast Coordinator

954F1472A Murmansk POLYARNAYA PRAVDA in Russian 28 Jan 95 p 1

[Article by Ye. Denisenko: "LDPR: Change of Power in Murmansk"]

[FBIS Translated Text] As Vladimir Volfovich stated in an interview for the magazine MAKHAON, transformations in Russia "must be begun from the head down." Zhirinovskiy supporters in Murmansk have followed the advice of the leader and said farewell to oblast coordinator V. Myasoyedov. The reason, in the words of members of the Coordinating Council, was that the coordinator combined public and personal matters to too great an extent, and in doing "his little business" spoke on behalf of the party organization. But the former coordinator does not feel he is to blame, for he flatly refused to give up the post voluntarily. Neither did he wish to travel jointly with the Coordinating Council to a "court of arbitration" in Moscow. "Mediators" went to the capital all the same, and even met with Zhirinovskiy himself, who listened to the voice of the people. On Monday, the "envoys" returned to Murmansk with the decision of the center: Myasoyedov must henceforth surrender his seat to Coordinating Council member A. Vikhorev (despite the fact that the party is termed liberal-democratic, and that both the LDPR [Liberal Democratic Party of Russia] coordinator and his council are centrally appointed).

In any case, D. Malyshev, faction representative from the State Duma in the oblast, warns that if anyone is thinking about conducting economic or ideological business with them, he should see the new "government" exclusively. Otherwise, the LDPR assumes no responsibility.

Shipment of Nuclear Waste Enters Final Stage

LD0803105895 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1043 GMT 8 Mar 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vasiliy Belousov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Murmansk March 8 TASS—The unique operation on shipment of nuclear fuel waste from nuclear icebreakers, begun by the Atomflot firm in the city of Murmansk two weeks ago, entered its final stage this Wednesday [8 March].

Journalists, including those from neighbouring Norway, were present for the first time at one of the stages of hitherto top secret operation.

"We know that this operation is completely safe for the personnel and the environment and want representatives from the mass media to get convinced of this," work supervisor Boris Kopylov said in an interview with ITAR-TASS, explaining this rare openness for nuclear workers.

"The new containers and special wagons for haulage of waste fuel withstood very serious tests. They meet all requirements of international inspection for nuclear safety. It's a pity that Russia has only one such unique complex," he added.

In Kopylov's opinion, this circumstance will contain the pace of shipment of fuel waste from temporary storages in Murmansk.

The train with nuclear fuel waste will head from Murmansk for the Urals several days later, to the Mayak production amalgamation. It will shuttle six times between the two places by the end of the year: nuclear waste is stored in the area of Murmansk both from icebreakers and nuclear submarines of the North Fleet.

Secret Uranium Plant Faces Conversion Problems

MM0803120595 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 0920 GMT 20 Feb 95

[From the "Planerka" program broadcast under "Business Russia" rubric: Report over video on formerly secret city of Glazov]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Unidentified correspondent] On the Chepets River in Udmurtia there is a small, unremarkable city by the name of Glazov. Until recently its existence was rarely mentioned in public. There is a simple reason for this. A plant is located here which is the only one of its kind in the whole of the former USSR. It is one of those plants formerly known only by their PO box numbers. True, by tradition, the plant also has a completely innocuous name for public consumption—Chepetskiy Machine Plant.

[Nikolay Ganza, general director] The plant has specialized in the production of uranium. We carry out refinement of uranium to a standard acceptable to the nuclear power industry. Formerly we also produced uranium for military purposes. We produce the calcium needed in the metallurgical industry for the production of pure and rare metals. In addition we produce zirconium, which is also needed in the nuclear power industry and in machine building.

[Correspondent] There is practically nothing in Glazov aside from this plant. The city's life is one way or another connected with the plant's production process or servicing. All the city's utilities have a dual purpose. They serve both the city and the plant. Back in 1947, when the Chepetskiy Machine Plant was placed under the Ministry of Medium Machine Building and mastered the production of secret defense output, the question of the city's comprehensive development was raised. Along with the new production units, kindergartens, schools, cultural and sports facilities, and swimming pools were built.

[Nikolay Ganza] Ours is a beautiful city. It consists of two parts, or rather three parts—the prerevolutionary part, a section of the old city which was built by the plant, and a third part, the new city whose development began 12 years ago. There are excellent housing estates where approximately two-thirds of the city's inhabitants now live.

[Correspondent] Then suddenly perestroyka burst on the scene. Military orders and the nuclear program were cut back. The plant's operation in conditions of the uncivilized Russian market resulted in very difficult circumstances for it. [passage omitted]

[Correspondent]..It became obvious that the plant could no longer bear the financial burden of maintaining the city's amenities and that most of the sociocultural facilities would have to be handed over to the city administration.

Putting it mildly, conversion is a tricky problem for the Chepetskiy Plant. The point is that its output intended for peaceful purposes is already being utilized to this end. And the wisdom of converting its main production facilities to turning out other output is questionable because of their uniqueness. Only three countries in the world have a similar production cycle. Giving up the positions which have been gained in the world market would be unwise, to say the least. The entire output of the Chepetskiy Plant carries certificates of international quality. The plant has not received a single complaint during its entire existence. Unfortunately, the development of sidelines cannot solve the plant's main problems. [passage omitted]

Vorkuta Miners Stage Underground Strike

LD0803092295 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0721 GMT 8 Mar 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Viktor Makarov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Vorkuta (Komi Republic) March 8 TASS—An underground strike was suspended on Tuesday [7 March] by 30 tunnellers from the Poloz mine-building firm, Vorkutaugol coal amalgamation. They stayed underground at the Vorkutinskaya mine from March 1, demanding wage delays for several months. The same demands were put forth by nearly 600 workers from the Poloz firm who struck on the surface.

The Vorkutaugol amalgamation appropriated funds to the firm, and its workers started receiving wages for last November and December. Therefore, tunnellers came to the surface. However, the strike has not been ended. The firm's workers plan to decide on March 9 what to do next.

Seven automation and gas protection fitters at the Komsomolskaya mine refused to come to the surface on Friday evening and announced a hunger strike. They demand wages for the last year and for January 1995. The Yuzhnaya mine in Vorkuta continues its strike.

Workers at other Vorkuta mines and other industries also grow restive, and local protest actions flare up all the time.

Leaders of miners' trade unions and the local labour movement express opinion that a mass wildcat strike can start any time, and it can spread to other cities and regions of the country.

Reportage, Commentary on Conflict in Chechnya

Ministers on Restoration of Communications

MM0703145795 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Mar 95 p 2

[Report by Nikolay Starodymov: "Trains Already Running Throughout Chechen Republic. Communication Lines Also Operating"]

[FBIS Translated Text] At least 1 trillion rubles [R] will be required to restore railroad transport facilities in the Groznyy section of the North Caucasus Railroad. At least R40 billion is needed to restore communications in Chechnya.

This data was given at a briefing held by Russian Communications Minister Vladimir Bulgak and Russian Federation Railways Minister Gennadiy Fadeyev. Both recently visited Chechnya as members of a government delegation and shared with those present their personal impressions of the trip and information about the work that has been done and is still to be done.

The ministers especially stressed that the Army is fulfilling its tasks in the most difficult conditions. They were referring not to the actual military operations, because the restoration of the railroad and communications facilities destroyed by Dudayev's supporters is largely carried out by the large-scale use of troops.

Thus, as soon as by 20 January, military railroad workers had ensured through traffic for both passenger and freight trains throughout the entire section between the stations of Ishcherskaya and Chervlennaya-Uzlovaya. As of today 250 km of track and four bridges have been repaired on republic territory. All this is in conditions of constant attempts by gunmen to wreck the repair work. In particular, there have been attempts to block the bridge across the Terek River by putting 35 cars on it in three groups. There are still 175 km of track and seven bridges to be repaired. This is especially necessary since it is through Chechnya that the main railroad supplying Dagestan with essential freight runs. The ferry crossing from Astrakhan to Makhachkala supplies only 3 percent of needs. In addition, this same line also leads to the Transcaucasus. Talking about this, Gennadiy Matveyevich noted that, as soon as "the military allow it," traffic along the southern branch line, which crosses Chechnya, will be restored within a week.

The problems faced by communications workers are no smaller. Bulgak noted that the communications system in Chechnya had been practically destroyed gradually and systematically. Even transit lines passing through republic territory were damaged. The phased restoration of the entire system has now begun. The number of communications channels has been increased, space communications stations, a temporary telephone station, and a television transmitter have been set up, and radio broadcasting has been organized. Nevertheless the lack of electricity and even of elementary batteries is making it impossible for many inhabitants to obtain information via electronic mass media. Therefore powerful loudspeakers which are broadcasting radio programs have been set up at military headquarters. In March another 14 sound broadcast stations will be set up in Groznyy.

When answering journalists' questions, the ministers reported that the construction of a railroad branch line bypassing Chechnya was planned but is now unlikely, since a 600-km bypass communications line will be laid within a very short time period.

Groznyy Claims Moral Victory Despite Losses

MK0703124095 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 7 Mar 95 p 1, 2

[Report by Natalya Pachegina under the "Chechen Republic" rubric: "Dudayev Sums Up After 80 Days of War. In His Opinion, Russia Has Reconciled Itself to the Loss of Chechnya"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On the eve of the three-month anniversary of the onset of the military operation in the Chechen Republic, President Dudayev's aide, Movlen Salamov, gave the following information to the NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA correspondent: During the 80 days of "occupation"—this is precisely how the campaign of the federal authorities to "restore constitutional order" is termed by the Chechen Republic leadership—27,000 civilians, including 4,000 children and 12,000 women, died in Chechnya. According to the Chechen leadership's data, about 80,000 people were injured, in varying degrees of severity. Of these, 22,000 have become disabled. About 340,000-350,000 citizens of the republic have become internal migrants. Naturally, the Chechen statistics also mention figures for the Russian army losses, which, in the opinion of Groznyy, are intentionally underreported by the federal authorities.

Operation "Chechnya" has cost Russia the lives of 18,000 servicemen; about 70,000 have been injured, of which 20,500 have become permanently disabled. During almost three months of the war, the Chechens, in their words, captured 2,400 Russian soldiers and officers. Of these, about 500 were returned to their parents, about 100 were exchanged for Chechen fighters, and the corpses of 20 servicemen were handed over to the Russian army command in exchange for Chechen corpses—one Chechen for two or three Russian soldiers. The Chechens claim that they have released, "on their word of honor," about 860 Russian servicemen. Today, a little over 940 Russian servicemen are in captivity.

Among the "trophies" destroyed over 80 days of war, Groznyy mentions one strategic TU bomber, 17 Su-25 attack planes, 63 helicopters, 1,100 armored vehicles, about 600 transport vehicles, and three ponton bridges. As to small arms and ammunition, according to Groznyy, the Chechen army has replenished its stock mainly in battles over the past several weeks and, therefore, it is difficult to give the exact figures.

According to the official representative of the Chechen Republic president, military operations on the territory of Chechnya have caused $46-$52 billion in material damage to the economy of the republic. Six villages have been completely demolished by the Russian army, while 80 settlements have been partially destroyed.

As is known, statistical data, in skillful hands, can be an effective tool, and the Chechen leadership demonstrates its perfect command of the propaganda art. In addition to radio speeches, in which the president of the Chechen Republic, addressing the Chechen people with pure Caucasian expressiveness, "stigmatizes" the imperial policy of Russia, the Chechen propaganda machine speaks of qualitative changes that have taken place in its war with Russia. On the one hand, the population of the republic is brainwashed to believe that it is impossible to "integrate" the spiritual values of the Chechen people into the moral virtue of Russia, since no such category exists in this country at present. On the other hand, the Chechen mass media and its ideologists focus public attention on the indirect implications of the actions of the federal authorities in the republic, who—in the opinion of official Groznyy—have, in fact, reconciled themselves to the loss of Chechnya. It is not by chance, the Chechen ideologists stress, that the Russian army destroys vitally important facilities in the republic. The historical and cultural heritage of Chechnya, including ancient burial sites, become artillery and aviation targets. As claimed by Groznyy, targets having no military significance—such as plants, workshops, house-building factories, elevators, and production facilities of the republic's food and light industries—are destroyed deliberately. In Krasnodar and Stavropol krays of Russia, special parking lots have been organized to store cars, that used to belong to Chechnya's citizens, as well as machine tools taken from the Chechen factories. These facts, in the firm conviction of the Chechen president, provide the best evidence of a moral victory of the Chechen people in their struggle for independence.

Need To Enhance Role in Restoration

MM0703115095 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 7 Mar 95 p 1

[Unattributed report: "It Is Important To Retain the Trust of the Population of Chechnya, Political Expert Emil Pain Believes"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The impressions which have remained from a recent trip to Chechnya are very complex and contradictory. There is no let up in military activities and marauding, which, of course, further alienates the population from the authorities.

Meanwhile, the task of the federal authorities, although it is formulated as the preservation of integrity, is not so much to preserve territory as to win the trust of the population.

At the same time, the idea that the whole population of Chechnya has risen up to fight a people's anti-Russian war is untrue.

According to data from experts and in line with those observations clarified during my conversations with representatives of various political forces, at least five of the 12 rayons demonstrate an attitude ranging from one which is blatantly anti-Dudayev to one which is more positive than negative toward Russia.

Another three rayons do not support either Dudayev or Russia—that is, they are remaining neutral. Only a few rayons in Dudayev's homeland are actively "pro-Dudayev."

But even in these "pro-Dudayev" rayons, in virtually all the cities and villages where his detachments are quartered, many people are anxious for the demilitarization of their settlements.

Consequently, it cannot ultimately be said that Chechnya has already been lost as a Russian Federation component. But in order to ensure that it is not in fact lost, there is need for very vigorous actions aimed not only at the country's speedy economic revival and, if not at freezing, then at the very least at restricting the military activities, but also at significantly enhancing the role of the Chechens themselves in the restoration of the economy and, most importantly, in the organization of the political life of the republic.

How far this will become possible also depends on the political course adopted on Chechnya.

Despite all the problems, the most important thing is the process of self-organization in the localities: the restoration of villages, the regeneration of farms, the distribution of humanitarian aid. A great deal will depend on the speed and effectiveness of the processes of the self-organization and the formation of local self-government in Chechnya, and, in particular, in those rayons not occupied by Dudayev's detachments.

Official Outlines Restoration Work

LD0703113595 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1118 GMT 7 Mar 95

[By ITAR-TASS special correspondent Sergey Ostanin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Mozdok (North Ossetia) March 7 TASS—"The work of various federal bodies is being greatly stimulated by the efforts of the federal commission for the normalisation of the situation in the Chechen Republic, headed by First Vice-Premier Oleg Soskovets," ITAR-TASS was told today by Nikolay Semenov, head of the territorial Federal Executive Board in Chechnya.

Semenov said that a federal programme for the restoration of the republic's economy would be ready before March 15. Russian ministries have lately become much more active and this is being felt in all the most vital sectors of Groznyy's urban economy. Water supply to the city's population will be resumed within the next three or four days. In addition to an atomic power plant, electricity will be supplied to the city via one more substation in Naur District. The population of the Staropromyslovskiy and several other districts of Groznyy are already being supplied with electricity.

In Semenov's opinion, the national revival government had lately exerted very vigorous efforts, particularly to repair the gas supply network. The population of many districts of the Chechen capital is already provided with gas. "The Russian Ministry for Transport is contributing effectively to restoration work in Chechnya. It has allocated 5.6 billion roubles for this purpose," Semenov stated. The ministry has made a weighty contribution to the restoration of bridges in the republic and to the resumption of traffic on three inter-urban bus lines.

Semenov also spoke highly about the work of communication workers, railwaymen, and detachments from the Russian Ministry for Emergency Situations. He said that fifteen initial installations were slated for urgent restoration, including some local water intakes and bakeries.

Severnyy Airport Operating

LD0703223195 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1452 GMT 7 Mar 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Oleg Velichko]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Moscow, 7 Mar—Oleg Soskovets, first deputy prime minister, has spoken in favor of "linking restoration work to a political settlement in the Chechen Republic". [passage omitted]

According to information from the Defense Ministry, the Severnyy airport has been opened. It will operate flights, but only in the daytime for the time being. Two kinds of passes are to be introduced in the near future—a general commandant pass covering the republic's entire territory and a special pass valid for a single site.

Clashes With Opposition of 'Positional Character'

LD0703164795 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1543 GMT 7 Mar 95

[By ITAR-TASS special correspondent Sergey Ostanin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Mozdok (North Ossetia) March 7 TASS—"Units of the armed forces of the Russian Federation have not been conducting offensive operations in Chechnya lately. Russian troops are preparing to disarm and force out illegal armed formations in a number of populated localities to the south of the city of Groznyy", a spokesman for the press center of the Russian Defense Ministry under the command of the united group of the federal forces in Mozdok told ITAR-TASS here today.

According to the press center's spokesman, armed clashes of the federal forces with militants are of a positional character.

Military intelligence is being carried out on the line of contact near the town of Argun for suppressing firing positions of militants by artillery and bombardment.

Warplanes and artillery of the federal forces at the approaches to the towns of Gudermes, Bamut and Shali make air raids on positions of illegal armed formations at the daytime preventing them from ground organization, the spokesman for press center of the Russian Defense Ministry pointed out.

Dudayev: Chechens Close to Freedom

LD0703182895 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1622 GMT 7 Mar 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, Mar 7 (Interfax)—Dzhokhar Dudayev has stated that the Chechen people have "never been so close to freedom and independence over the last 213 years as today and never before so close to total physical destruction."

In his address to the people broadcast on radio, Dudayev maintained that "the Chechen Republic has never sought to be an integral part of Russia, but wished (to have) good-neighborly relations on all levels," Dudayev's representatives in Moscow told Interfax.

Dudayev explained Chechnya's aspiration to freedom by saying that the Chechen people's values "cannot be integrated in Russia's system of values, and we do not want it to be."

According to Dudayev, the fact that the trust between the Russian and Chechen peoples is vanishing is not Chechnya's fault, but Russia's disaster. "It is not us who unleashed the war," he added.

Continued Fighting Reported

LD0703173395 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1622 GMT 7 Mar 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Nazran, Mar 7 (INTERFAX) - Sporadic fighting continues outside the rebel-held town of Achkhoy-Martan between Chechen units and Russian troops who took control of part of the Rostov-Baku highway close to that town in the west.

Our correspondent meanwhile reports that the warring sides are allowing the evacuation of refugees from the scene of fighting and road traffic went on almost unimpeded Tuesday with busloads of refugees heading for neighboring Ingushetia.

Nine people were killed, one of them a six-year-old child, and 13 others injured after a bus they were travelling in together with other refugees hit a landmine late Monday [6 March].

Colonel Vyacheslav Shmatkov, commander of a Russian police unit deployed in the west, put the number of incidents of road mining by Chechen rebels in the past month at more than 70 in an interview with Interfax. He said his unit had cracked down on three sabotage groups over the period.

The colonel also said that Russia patrol units constantly come under fire by the rebels.

A 200-strong rebel unit continues to operate in a forest outside the village of Samashki (10 kilometers off the border with Ingushetia) in spite of assurances by the elders on Sunday that there were no rebels in Samashki itself, he said.

Russian troops are being forced to shell one other village, Zakan-Yurt, still held by the militants, Shmatkov said.

Russian Troops Said Ready To Storm Argun

LD0703180795 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1700 GMT 7 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] During the last two weeks, federal troop and Interior Ministry units have completely encircled the town of Argun, to the east of Groznyy. The town has been heavily fortified by Dudayev's fighters.

A RIA-Novosti (RIA news agency) correspondent has learned from an informed source in the headquarters of the ground forces that there are between 1,500 and 2,000 fighters in the town, armed with a large amount of small arms, mortars, and several heavy guns. The fighters' main strongholds have been discovered by federal troops reconnaissance.

The source asserts that composite regiments of the Ulyanovsk and Samara airborne assault divisions have been brought into attack positions and are ready to begin an operation to storm Argun at any moment.

Russian Aircraft Mine Several Areas

LD0703194095 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1848 GMT 7 Mar 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Mozdok (North Ossetia), Mar 7 (INTERFAX)—The federal troops aviation force has been dropping mines on several Chechen regions controlled by Dudayev militants over the last few days.

A representative of the command of the Russian troops' united group told Interfax today that a strategically important section of the Groznyy-Nazran highway had been mined by Russian aircrafts. The same source said that as a result mass movement of illegal armed formations by the highway had stopped.

The same source said the federal aviation had also mined a forest near the Samashki populated center (to the west of Groznyy) where units of Dudayev supporters were stationed. The Russian military official said that militants in Samashki had tried to blockade the highway for movement of Russian troops.

The same source said that mines used by the federal aviation were delayed action mines which would go off at the appointed time.

According to the same source, the federal aviation has been attacking the positions of Chechen militants outside the populated centers. A command point of Chechen militants in two kilometers to the south of Argun which is an important part of the Argun defense system was eliminated.

The federal aviation eliminated two underground shelters of illegal armed formations in several kilometers to the north-west of Bamut. The Russian military official said the silos of intercontinental ballistic missiles had earlier been there.

Troops Take Measures for Peaceful Settlement

LD0703215095 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 2107 GMT 7 Mar 95

[By ITAR-TASS special correspondent Sergey Ostanin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Mozdok (North Ossetia) March 7 TASS—The commandment of the Joint Group of Federal Troops (CHQ) takes measures aimed at peaceful settlement in Chechnya. Representatives of the commandment of operational group of interior troops and heads of administrations of two Cossack villages - Staro-Shchedrinskaya and Novo-Shchedrinskaya - met on Tuesday, the CHQ press service told ITAR-TASS.

Elders and local religious leaders also took part in the meeting which occurred in presence of 2,000 locals. The officers came to the meeting bearing no arms. In the course of the meeting which lasted 1.5 hours, the standpoint of the federal forces was clarified, and proposals aimed at peaceful resolution of the conflict were aired. The speakers also touched upon the necessity of restoring the economy, preparations for the sowing season and re- establishment of peaceful life, the press service said.

According to the source, locals took proposals of the officers into account. They ruled unanimously that the federal troops shall not be fired on from the two villages. The officers, for their part, pledged that under these circumstances they would not let their armoured vehicles in the villages, because it would do harm to farmlands and vineyards.

The commandment of the Joint Group of Federal Forces in Chechnya hopes that people of other residential areas will also accept its proposals, the press service said.

Dudayev's Gunmen Fire on Federal Troops

LD0803084395 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0746 GMT 8 Mar 95

[By ITAR-TASS special correspondent Sergey Ostanin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Mozdok (North Ossetia) March 8 TASS—Gunmen of separatist leader Dzhokhar Dudayev fired on units of federal troops in Chechnya over the past 24 hours from firearms, field guns and mortars. Some troops were wounded, ITAR-TASS learnt on Wednesday from the press centre of the federal troops' command here on Wednesday.

According to the press centre, artillery of federal forces shelled illegal armed detachments in the villages of Chechen-Aul, Novye Atagi, Urus-Martan and other places. Aviation of the North- Caucasian Military District conducted air reconnaissance, carried troops and evacuated the wounded and the dead.

Russian forces destroyed, over the same period, two enemy trucks and captured several firearms, 11 grenade launchers, great quantities of ammunition to firearms, dozens of mines and rounds to grenade launchers.

Asked by ITAR-TASS about present-day tasks of federal forces, the press centre spokesman noted that Russian units will conduct operations in their zones of responsibility and blockade the Chechen capital Groznyy along the outside perimeter as well as improve fortifications in occupied areas.

Government Press Service on Latest Situation

LD0803161995 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1601 GMT 8 Mar 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow March 8 TASS—The press service of the Government of the Russian Federation released the following statement:

"According to a report from the mobile information center, for the last twenty-four hours the united grouping of the federal forces in the Chechen Republic was fulfilling the set tasks in districts under its control periodically coming under fire by illegal armed formations and returning fire.

During this period the federal forces carried out intensive reconnaissance of the disposition of groups of militants by all available means.

Warplanes of the military district performed tasks on determining the disposition of militants, transportation of troops and cargoes, as well as evacuation of wounded and killed servicemen.

Artillery of the grouping shelled positions of militants in the populated localities Chechen-Aul, Novye Atagi, Starye Atagi, Goita, Urus-Martan, Argun, Komsomolskoye and Ilyinskoye.

According to data from the Defense Ministry of the Russian Federation, the grouping seized two motorcars, a howitzer, as well as many firearms.

For the last twenty-four hours interior troops captured 11 grenade launchers, 2 flame throwers, 962 units of ammunition for firearms, 75 mines and 43 stands of ammunition for anti-tank grenade launchers.

There were no changes in the condition and composition of the northern and southern groupings of the federal forces.

The order of their actions for the current day is to continue to fulfill tasks in the zones of their responsibility and to block the city of Groznyy along the outward ring."

Economic Issues

Oil Decree Meets IMF Criteria for Pipeline Access

MK0703121095 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 7 Mar 95 p 2

[Konstantin Levin report: "Free Access to Pipeline in the Morning, Credits in the Evening"]

[FBIS Translated Text] At the end of last week negotiations between the Russian Government and the IMF delegation were marked by an accord reached between Viktor Chernomyrdin and Michel Camdessus on granting Russia a stabilization credit in 1995. This became possible, among other things, owing to a government decree "On Regulating Access to the System of Oil Pipelines, Oil Product Pipelines, and Sea Terminals for Transporting Oil and Oil Products Beyond the Customs Territory of the Russian Federation," signed by the Russian premier in a timely manner. This decree sharply reduces the possibility of administrative interference in oil export regulation.

Equal rights for oil shippers—regardless of their ownership status—in accessing export oil pipelines have in the past six months been one key issue of contention between the Russian government and international financial organizations. Back in September 1994 a Russian Government working group and an International Bank for Reconstruction and Development mission agreed that by the start of 1995 procedures will be worked out for discrimination-free access to oil pipelines. The main principle of the new oil export system was to be unlimited access to pipelines for all oil producers. Limitations could be imposed only in accessing oil pipelines with limited carrying capacity (primarily oil pipelines leading to Novorossiysk). In this event priority distribution of rights was allowed only within the framework of Russia's intergovernment obligations. "Common mortals" could count on oil export to the West in proportion to existing extraction volumes. In the future it was proposed to work out a mechanism allowing traders access to oil pipelines. However in 1994 the Fuel and Energy Ministry managed substantially to change the situation. A draft government decree, defining new procedures for oil and oil product export, stated that oil deliveries to the domestic market should constitute no less than 65 percent of the extracted oil volume. In other words, export quotas, to be abolished as of 1 January 1995, were replaced with internal quotas.

The reaction from international financial organizations was not slow in coming. In a letter IBRD President Louis Preston warned the government against a simple replacement of one oil export regulation system with another. The threat of ending up with no international credits proved strong enough: Internal quotas were excluded from the main conditions for using the system of main oil pipelines, as approved 31 December. True, access to pipelines still depended on oil supplies to the internal market. This situation generally suited the Fuel and Energy Ministry because it allowed it to control oil deliveries via intra-departmental orders and directives.

What the IBRD has failed to achieve (the abolition of oil delivery quotas) has been accomplished by the IMF. During the recent round of talks in Moscow the IMF mission has forced the Russian Government not only to undertake to change conditions for using the system of export oil pipelines but also to do that within the shortest possible time span. Under the latest government decree, "delivery of oil and oil products to the internal market may not serve as grounds for limiting shippers' access to transport systems or refusing registration of export contracts."

Even so, there is a fly in the ointment: The latest decree fails to equalize the rights of oil traders and producers to access pipelines, as expected. This task will apparently be addressed at the subsequent stages of horse-trading with international financial organizations.

RUIE Unhappy With Current Bankruptcy Procedures

MK0703083095 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 7 Mar 95 p 2

[Report by Lev Aleynik under the "Insolvency" rubric: "RUIE Experts Criticize 'Bankruptcyization Campaign.' They Think Federal Bankruptcy Administration Has Received 'Fantastic Powers'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Andrey Neshchadin, executive director of the Expert Institute of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs [EI RUIE] told yesterday's "Bankruptcy in Russia: Poison or Remedy" press conference in Moscow that "in Russia today there are three variants of bankruptcy: that of business and management, of property, and of enterprises which were set up under different conditions and have fallen behind forever." Sampling data about the operation of 170 enterprises, the experts drew conclusions about the situation in the textile sector, the chemical industry, and machine-building which formed the basis for a report scheduled for publication next week. While not objecting in principle to the proposition that a bankruptcy procedure is necessary and that enterprises' finances should be put in order so that funds get channeled to efficient productions, the EI RUIE accused the "incipient bancruptcyization campaign" of being controversial.

Igor Lipsits, pro-rector of the Higher School of Economics and adviser to the EI RUIE, stated: "We are on the threshold of a campaign where you might very well speak of 'shining examples' of bancruptcyization." RUIE specialists believe that a prodigious proportion of enterprises are loss-making and will not survive. With the growing amounts of nonpayments "it is hard to identify the specific culprit because everyone owes everyone." This makes it impossible to declare enterprises bankrupt for the most obvious reason—the failure by them to honor their obligations to their creditors. The government maintains that the underlying cause of the nonpayments crisis is dishonesty on the part of only a few key enterprises which with their economic practices first set up the wave of nonpayments.

RUIE analysts stated, however, that in the present circumstances the high credit interest rate and the growing costs of production "force even the most honest of managers" to either postpone paying for resources or roll back production and thus head for bankruptcy. They put "a great share of the blame" for the immoral business "on the state in the shape of its top leadership in 1992-1994." The researchers think "the worst consequence of the financial policy of the state which gave and continues to give unrealistic pledges consists in the fact that state debts have amounted to a moral excuse for the sharp decline in payment discipline."

Sharply critical of the position of the Federal Bankruptcy Administration, "which, in order to spur on privatization, has received a fantastic amount of powers and has virtually become the country's second government," the RUIE economists stated that the bankruptcy agency is out "to create some privatization mechanism under the aegis of privatization." In their view, today's conditions do not inspire hope that the property of bankrupt enterprises is going to end up in the hands of more professional managers, and the emphasis is being put on destatization of bankruptcies.

In Mr. Lipsits' view, the bankruptcy procedure should only be undertaken when the requisite conditions are there, that is to say, "paradoxically as it may seem, when economic recovery begins, when there are those to take over the thus released resources."

Central Bank Questions Economy Ministry 'Optimism'

MM0803105395 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 7 Mar 95 p 11

[Article by Andrey Grigoryev: "Central Bank Worried About Ministry of Economy's Investment Optimism. Prosperity Promises To Be More Moderate"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The history of economics offers rather few examples of more or less successful forecasting. Nonetheless, a multitude of scientific institutions operate all over the world, whose main task actually is to forecast immediate and longer-term prospects. Although, as a rule, the end results fail to materialize, the trends revealed in the course of the studies make it possible to select a satisfactory strategy and to apply more or less suitable instruments of economic policy. Forecasting as regards our country's economy, at least in the last 5-10 years, can be said to have been done on an ad hoc basis rather than along the lines of scientific analysis. Nonetheless, the official forecasts which have been regularly offered to the public's attention are interesting, at least from the viewpoint of the premises which the people elaborating them adopt as guidelines. An examination of these premises not only makes it possible to assess the qualitative results of the studies but also to glean an impression of the forecasters' ideology.

In this context it is interesting to look at the response by the Central Bank of the Russian Federation to the forecast of Russia's economic development through the year 2005, elaborated by the Ministry of the Economy. The Central Bank of the Russian Federation Department of Studies, Information, and Statistics has done its own calculations, on the basis of which it offers a more modest appraisal of the prospects for extricating the country's economy from the crisis.

In the opinion of Central Bank specialists, the main shortcoming of the ministry's forecast lies in its incorrect formulation of the objectives of economic policy: Market self-regulation and accelerated investment while preserving social orientation. The Central Bank believes that the basis of qualitative forecasting ought to be provided by "alternative structural changes in the real sector, evaluated according to the criteria of the efficiency of modernized industrial potential and the changes in GDP by sources of its formation."

The obvious purpose of the Central Bank's involvement in this rather abstract discussion is to promote its own concept of "utilizing the instruments of monetary and credit policy within the framework of state influence on the economy's development during the transition period, especially during the transition from the stage of depression to the stage of economic growth." Especially since the Central Bank's representatives, not altogether groundlessly, draw attention to the fact that "certain progress has been achieved in the sphere...of attaining financial stabilization on the basis of utilizing the instruments of monetary and credit regulation (which falls within the Central Bank's powers—A.G.), while progress as regards the elaboration of strategy for the attainment of economic growth (the Ministry of the Economy's task) is extremely insignificant."

As a matter of fact, the Central Bank's representatives are hardly likely to deny that the functions of their department, and specifically the use of tough monetarist methods, are not only simpler but also secondary as regards the task of ensuring economic growth and providing anticrisis regulation in general. Noting that the ministry's forecast pays insufficient attention to the extent of wear and tear of the basic production potential which exerts "limited influence on the speed of extricating the economy from depression," the Central Bank offers a more moderate trajectory of economic growth.

The translation of this theoretical dispute in practical terms shows that the Central Bank is worried by the excessive investment optimism shown by the Ministry of the Economy, given the absence of satisfactory noninflationary mechanisms for its materialization. By the way, this criticism of the liberally-minded ministry "from the right" does not fit in all that well with the Central Bank's excessive attention (evidently genetically inherited from Mr. Gerashchenko) to "structural problems."

*Small Banks Whose Licenses Have Been Revoked Listed

954E0610C Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 25 Feb 95 p 2

[Article by Ruslan Ignatyev: "Requiem for Small Banks"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **The licenses of 21 commercial banks were revoked this week.**

We asked the Central Bank of Russia to comment on this report. We were told that this was an extreme measure taken against financial establishments of this kind. Before the license of a particular bank is pulled, a fight for its survival goes on because in the event of its failure depositors take the main blow. One way or another, the closure of even a small bank undermines the authority of the entire banking system. This is why all means of assistance are used. One of them is to transform the perishing bank into a branch of a larger and stronger association.

Thus, out of 45 banks which were reorganized or liquidated by a decision of the meeting of shareholders in 1994, 40 turned into branches. Nonetheless, the licenses of 65 banks had to be revoked because of violations of banking legislation; at issue was their critical financial situation or improper credit policy.

In the first two months of 1995, only two commercial banks turned into branches whereas 41 lost their licenses, and most of them—in recent days.

These include banks from Moscow: Ost-Bank, Meridian, Everest, Dvoryanskiy, Nominal, Dinasko-Bank, Admiral-Bank, Sitrafiko, Revers, and Delovoy.

Among commercial banks from other regions of Russia were Kapital-Bank (Omsk), Start-Bank (Yekaterinburg), the Medvedskiy Commercial Land Bank (Yoshkar-Ola), Garant (Dagestan), Votum-Bank (Rostov-on-Don), the Karelian Bank (Petrozavodsk), Uktusskiy (Yekaterinburg), Praveks (Krasnodar), Andibank (Dagestan), Sozhbank (Smolensk Oblast), and Tashla (Stavropol).

These are mainly small banks. If this goes on it cannot be ruled out that a majority of small financial establishments will close down shortly. There are 2,527 such banks in Russia; in Moscow alone there are 946.

In the opinion of the Central Bank of Russia, close cooperation between the management and owners of commercial banks and the Central Bank is necessary in order to avoid bankruptcies. The Central Bank has many opportunities for resolving these critical situations.

Chubays on Edict on Abolition of Customs Privileges

LD0703223595 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 2000 GMT 7 Mar 95

[From the "Vesti" newscast; presented by Mikhail Ponomarev]

[FBIS Translated Text] Anatoliy Chubays, First deputy prime minister, today commented on the presidential edict on the abolition of customs privileges to an INTERFAX correspondent.

Chubays believes that the implementation of this decree will bring up to 4 trillion rubles into the Russian budget. Moreover, the edict guarantees an improvement of the financial situation in March and a lowering of the inflation rate.

For your information: The inflation level in January was about 17 percent and in February it was 11 percent.

Subsidiary Offices Gaining Popularity

954E0603A Moscow DELOVOY MIR in Russian 16 Feb 95 p 7

[Article by I. Sinitsyn: "What Is Better: A Joint Venture or a Subsidiary Office?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The German Economic Institute in Cologne recently published some interesting data. It turns out that foreign entrepreneurs entering the Russian market today are more and more frequently opting not for partnership with local businessmen within the framework of joint ventures, but for the creation of subsidiaries of their firms. It is therefore understandable that the overall number of joint ventures is shrinking.

Mathias Kenter, a representative of that institute, stated that "joint venture euphoria in Russia is over, subsidiary offices of Western enterprises with 100 percent participation of foreign capital are flourishing." Around 4,000 Russian subsidiaries of foreign companies were created over a relatively short period of time, with a tendency toward a further increase in their number.

At the same time, in the opinion of the German expert, the Chechen war will inhibit capital investments for a certain period of time. "Investors are now more cautious," M. Kenter believes. In the long term, however, the conflict in Chechnya will not affect commercial dealings with Russia.

So far, the North Caucasus war has frightened more Western politicians than businessmen. For instance, the Berlin Eternit joint-stock enterprise, which manufactures building materials, is still planning to open two new production lines in Moscow and one on the Ukrainian border, in Belgorod. According to Michael Mulis, however, the Eternit representative in Moscow, that will be not a subsidiary office but a joint venture.

It must be noted that even though according to the research done by the indicated institute, the tendency toward an increase in the number of subsidiary offices of foreign firms did appear in Russia, joint ventures have not become obsolete. German experts and businessmen note with satisfaction the fact that over 6,000 joint ventures existing in Russia according to statistical data for the end of 1993, provided employment for more than 300,000 persons. Even though they employed only 0.4 percent of all hired workers in Russia, their share in foreign trade amounted to 8 percent.

A good fourth of all these enterprises had their "origins" in the United States and Germany. They were followed by such neighbors of the Russian Federation as China, Finland, and Poland. The Germans also take note of the fact that the center of gravity in the activity of joint ventures lies in industry—37 percent of all joint ventures. Some 31 percent are shared by retail trade and gastronomic services, while 17 percent of the joint ventures are in the sphere of transport, telecommunications, and household services.

The export possibilities offered by joint ventures and subsidiary offices in Russia are very attractive to German investors. The value of goods and services delivered per employee of such a firm amounts to $10,200 a year, whereas purely Russian enterprises export only $600 per employee.

German experts are also focusing attention on the fact that many new foreign enterprises and joint ventures are shifting from the center to the periphery, even though around one-half of all joint ventures are still located in Moscow and St. Petersburg. The Dutch Aktso Nobel NV chemical concern, which is creating a joint venture together with the Akrikhin pharmaceutical enterprise east of Moscow and is building a plant for the production of birth control pills, serves as an example of such geographical shifts.

German partners feel that demand for products made at that plant is assured, inasmuch as at present Russia occupies one of the first places in the number of abortions.

Employment Service Releases Unemployment Data

MM0703140995 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 4 Mar 95 First Edition

[Unattributed report: "Two Million Jobless"—from the "Business in Russia" section p 1]

[FBIS Translated Text] More than 2 million Russians were registered as seeking work by the Federal Employment Service [FES] as of 1 February 1995.

Of this number 1.71 million had unemployed status, RIA-NOVOSTI was told by the FES. At the beginning of February there was an average of 5.5 unemployed people per vacancy in the country; one year ago the figure was 3.2. The number of vacancies notified to the FES fell by 14,200 in January (to 311,400).

The average unemployment level in the country (number of unemployed as a percentage of the able-bodied population) was 2.1 percent at the beginning of February. The leaders in this regard were Ivanovo Oblast (8.7 percent), Ingushetia (8.2 percent), and Pskov and Yaroslavl Oblasts (6.8 and 6.6 percent). In Yakutia, Moscow, and Smolensk Oblast the unemployment level did not exceed 0,5 percent.

During January 92,900 Russians found jobs with the FES's help,. This is 1,6 times more than in the same month last year. The service sent nearly twice as many people as in last January to learn new occupations. The fact that around 11,000 unemployed people took early retirement in January somewhat eased the pressure on the FES's institutions.

*Chief Critiques Northern Railroad Performance, Problems

954E0619A Moscow GUDOK in Russian 1 Mar 95 pp 1-2

[Interview with V. Predybaylov, chief of the Northern Railroad, conducted by GUDOK correspondent in Yaroslavl, V. Khovrin: "Alternative to the Market Elements"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **The Northern Railroad, which provides transport services to an entire series of oblasts, as well as to the Republic of Komi and the Yamalo-Nenets National Okrug, has a notable influence on the economy of the great northwestern region. Like the national economy of this region, the main railroad line is experiencing difficulties caused by the economic crisis.**

And yet, last year turned out rather successfully for the railroad. It was able to provide for the uninterrupted operation of the transport conveyer.

[Correspondent] Vitaliy Mitrofanovich, according to the results of work for 1994, the Northern Railroad is in first place among the main lines of the sector. How did it manage to protect itself against the market elements, and to attract cargo and passengers—after all, the economic situation was extremely complex?

[Predybaylov] The painful transition to market relations gave rise to many problems. We encounter them practically every day. The main thing is that the strengthening of the ruble did not occur. However, the strategy of economic stabilization developed by the leadership and the governing board of the MPS [Ministry of Railways] turned out to be quite timely. It allowed us to preserve the unity of the transport arteries of Russia—the railroads, and to protect them against serious economic collapse.

Within the framework of the sectorial program, our railroad's collective also sought means of emerging from the crisis under conditions of decline in the shipping volumes.

Last year, we developed our own program of seeking out reserves in the economic and financial activity of the main line, selecting primarily the tactic of improving operational work. In other words, we seriously undertook the curtailment of our own losses and expenditures.

What was done first? When volumes decline, it is necessary to introduce correctives also into the structure of shipments, to review the organization of the railroad car flows, so as to accelerate their movement. And that is what we did. A number of low-volume stations were eliminated, and the processing of railroad cars was concentrated at technically equipped stations. The following picture resulted: Today 12 stations have been closed, another 12 have been changed over to one shift of operation, and 18 stations have been consolidated. As a result, 44 switching and 8 transfer-hauling locomotives were made available.

All nine low-volume lines today operate in a reduced regimen. The number of workers was reduced by 2,500 persons. An entire complex of operations on economy of fuel-energy resources and materials has been designated. Because of this, the transport expenditures on the main line were reduced by 78 billion rubles (R) last year.

It is no less important to increase the income portion of the railroad budget, and primarily to accelerate the processing of payments, and thus to receive "real" money faster. For these purposes, technological centers for processing shipping documents have been organized in all departments, and an in-house banking system was created. A railroad commercial center is in operation, and pre-payment agreements have been concluded with most of the shippers.

On the whole, the realization of the economic program has yielded an effect in the sum of R272 billion. However, I must also mention the following significant factor. The success was facilitated by increased discipline in the collectives, by a sense of duty and responsibility, which has always distinguished Northern Railroad workers.

Last year, 73 million tonnes of cargo was handled, including coal, petroleum products and timber. The qualitative indicators of utilizing the rolling stock have been improved. On the whole for the main line, the profits reached R324.8 billion. The profitability comprised 21.6 percent.

[Correspondent] In the oblasts and in the Republic of Komi, which the railroad serves, the situation is far from stable. Strikes have been noted in the Yaroslavl region, another wave of strikes has rolled through the Pechora coal basin, and the lumber processors are sitting idle. Naturally, the railroad workers are not separated by any barrier from those social demonstrations which occur from time to time in other sectors. Nevertheless, all is calm at the railroad. Or is this only an apparent calm?

[Predybaylov] The normal working situation also has its reasons. The persistence of the MPS leadership has allowed us, for the third year in a row, to conclude a trilateral Sectorial Rate Agreement with the government. This document imposes mutual responsibility for the state of affairs in the sector both on the administration and on the railroad worker collectives.

Correction of the rates for transport of cargo and passengers, indexation of wages depending on the growth of prices, benefits for veterans, maintenance of the entire social sphere in the proper order, increased introduction of housing—all this bolsters the railroad workers' confidence about tomorrow, and ensures their relatively high living standard.

The labor wage for workers of the railroad's operations staff increased by an average of 2.5 times in December of 1994 as compared with December of 1993, and comprised R543,300. This corresponds to the Sectorial Rate Agreement.

We have exceeded the obligations specified in the railroad collective agreement-94, and submitted 81,500 square meters of housing area, or 1,464 apartments. Housing is being built using the funds of the railroad workers themselves.

The railroad's subsidiary farms produce meat and milk. When people feel that there is concern and attention directed at them, why should they protest?

For Russia, stability of railroad operation is the assurance of viability of entire regions. For example, the entire North is provided with everything by our railroad—from food products to all kinds of industrial goods—primarily through the efforts of the railroad workers. And any strike as a means of resolving labor conflicts would deal a direct blow to the northern residents, who are already not overly pampered with state support.

[Correspondent] They say that extremely unpopular measures have been taken at the railroad so as to avoid bankruptcy. They are supposedly being implemented under administrative pressure...

[Predybaylov] Yes, sometimes it is necessary to make harsh decisions, which would hardly be possible under a stable economy. This is done primarily in the interests of the railroad workers. Judge for yourselves. Of all the elements of expenditures, the relative share of the wage fund and deductions for social insurance associated with it accounts for almost 40 percent. And at the beginning of last year, over 5,000 persons were kept on in excess of the right to the existing volume of work. A sum of R8 billion was needed to pay their wages.

This, as well as the desire to save jobs, has become the main reason for issuance of the directive which provides for a set of measures for improving the organization of labor and reducing unproductive losses. And specifically: The review of labor standards; The application of a part-time work regimen at all the subdivisions; The establishment of regulated breaks for shift workers; The introduction of an interrupted work day, and a number of other measures. Of course, they must be implemented strictly with adherence to the labor legislation.

In implementing this work, we had hoped for positive results, and our hopes have generally been justified. Last year, 41,700 persons worked on the part-time work regimen, which made it possible to avoid laying off around 3,400 persons and to save over R8 billion.

It is true, there were some problems. At some of the individual main lines, the program was implemented with some delay, and at the Vorkuta section this work is only in its initial stages. Nevertheless, we will continue to strive for improved application of labor resources and for bringing expenditures into line with the volumes of work. I believe, 2-3 years will pass, and the Russian economy will overcome its crisis, and that means the shipping volumes will increase and locomotive machinists, electrical mechanics and railroad car inspectors will once again be needed. Our duty is to retain them.

[Correspondent] Recently, an expanded meeting of the ministry governing board was held, with the participation of leaders of government and heads of administration of the regions of Russia. As we know, the discussion centered around mutual action. How current is this topic for the Northern Railroad?

[Predybaylov] Once again, I would like to turn to the figures. Last year, the railroad incurred losses in the amount of R118 billion from passenger transport, including R30 billion from suburban transport. The losses from direct and local passenger transport are compensated by the indexation of rates on cargo shipments, and the losses of suburban transport must be covered from the budgets of subjects of the Russian Federation. However, as a rule, this does not happen.

Moreover, the railroad transport enterprises are levied with various types of "local tribute"—land tax, transport tax, taxes on maintenance of the municipal militia, on improvement of territories, for educational needs, for maintenance of municipal services and social-cultural-domestic facilities—even though we do not have the analogous infrastructure. This tax press must be weakened.

It is encouraging that mutual understanding has been found. Nevertheless, the signing of the General Agreement is only a start. The railroad has already signed a contract with the administration of Yaroslavl Oblast, and work is being performed with other oblasts and with the Republic of Komi.

[Correspondent] Will 1995 bring any changes for the better into the plan for paying off the incurred indebtedness?

[Predybaylov] Just last year, mutual accounting in the sum of around R700 billion was performed by the railroad. We are accepting treasury bonds from our clients. Practically all promissory notes issued by Yaroslavl Oblast and by the "Rostov Velikiy" bank have passed through the Northern Railroad. We ourselves have issued promissory notes in the sum of R30 billion for accounting with the budget, with metallurgists, coal miners and power suppliers.

All this has allowed us to significantly reduce the amount of turnover capital which is channelled toward the incurred indebtedness. Nevertheless, it is still high—R227 billion. In essence, these are the monthly payments of the railroad's entire clientele.

We will resolve the problem of non-payments, and primarily with the aid of the above-mentioned financial instruments. We are also taking measures to organize the payment of wages to the railroad workers through personal accounts at Northern Railroad-authorized banks.

[Correspondent] How do you see the future of railroad transport?

[Predybaylov] At the present time, it is operating in a stable manner, meeting all the cargo and passenger transport needs, and is the most accessible type of transport. And the stability of the sector is based on the following factors: Preservation of the integrity of the transport system of Russia and its material-technical base; State support of railroads, and primarily indexation of rates and conclusion of the trilateral Sectorial Agreement, which facilitates social protection and stability in the collectives; Retention of the professional cadre potential of the railroads; Realization of the program of economic stabilization.

If we adhere to these principles, then the protection from the market elements significantly increases. This means, there will be more guarantees of ensuring full employment, the shipping process will operate more effectively, and the individual person will feel better in transport.

International Affairs

Yeltsin Visit Postponed; Soskovets To Visit Instead

LD0703185295 Kiev UNIAR in Ukrainian 1730 GMT 7 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Kiev, 7 March—Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma today is to examine and sign the budget with a deficit of 7.1 percent, Dmytro Tabachnyk, the head of the presidential administration, told a briefing at the administration. [passage omitted]

An announcement was also made that Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin's visit to Ukraine had been postponed. It is expected that instead, [Russian First Deputy Prime Minister] Oleg Soskovets will arrive at the head of a Russian delegation to finalize the comprehensive political treaty. [passage omitted]

Foreign Ministry Official Views Croatia Visit

WS0703154995 Kiev KIYEVSKIYE VEDOMOSTI in Russian 23 Feb 95 p 3

[Interview with Volodymyr Khandohiy, chief of the Foreign Ministry Directorate for International Organizations, by Anatoliy Smetanin; place and date not given: "Future of Our Peacekeepers in Former Yugoslavia Will Be Determined After 31 March"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Deputy Prime Minister Valeriy Shmarov, Ukrainian minister of defense, has returned from his working visit to former Yugoslavia, where he met with the Croatian leadership and the UNPROFOR [United Nations Protection Forces] Command, and visited the Ukrainian peacekeeping battalion in Sarajevo. He was accompanied by Volodymyr Khandohiy, chief of the Foreign Ministry Directorate for International Organizations. We have asked Mr. Khandohiy a few questions.

[Smetanin] How long, do you think, will our peacekeepers stay in former Yugoslavia?

[Khandohiy] The Croatian leaders have declared that they will not extend UNPROFOR's mandate on the territory of their state. This decision has been made, given that according to the Croatian side, the UNPROFOR contingent preserve the actual status quo in this country. Part of the Croatian territory is controlled by the Serbs. We expect that after eliminating the contingent, the Croats will try to resolve this problem by force. In the UN general secretary's opinion, and according to our estimates, if the UN troops leave Croatia, a regular war with unforeseen consequences cannot be ruled out. In connection with this, we will continue intensive talks until 31 March, when the UNPROFOR mandate expires. We are considering setting up a contact group. We will continue looking for a compromise between Zagreb and Belgrade on the issue of Yugoslavia's recognition of the borders of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

[Smetanin] Provided the mandate is prolonged, what will happen to our peacekeepers?

[Khandohiy] If the mandate is prolonged it will probably be changed significantly. The contingent's functions will be changed, and the numeric strength of the contingent will depend on it. Most likely, the contingent will be considerably reduced. Then, of course, part of our force will probably be withdrawn. We may have to redeploy the entire contingent. Where to? It might be brought back to the homeland, or it can be deployed to new bases in Bosnia and Herzegovina

[Smetanin] Volodymyr Dmytrovych, you and Valeriy Shmarov have met Croatian President Granic. What is the Croatian leader's current stance?

[Khandohiy] We had the impression that Croatia will not change its decision: After 31 March, the UN troops will have to leave. Intensive consultations between the UN general secretary and the NATO Command are being held at the moment. In the event of the troops' withdrawal from Croatia, and possibly from Bosnia too, NATO will assist in the operation. That is to say, NATO will provide us with hardware and will guarantee security.

Joint Military Exercises To Be Held With U.S.

LD0703123095 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1148 GMT 7 Mar 95

[By UKRINFORM correspondent for TASS]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Kiev March 7 TASS—Ukraine and the United States plan to hold in May military exercises in the framework of NATO's "Partnership for Peace" programme. The exercises will be held in the Yavorovo army range in western Ukraine. The Ukrainian Defence Ministry announced this at a briefing in Kiev on the results of a visit to Lvov by a group of U.S. military that ended late on Monday evening.

Interregional Bloc on Ties to Russia

954F1650A Simferopol KRYMSKIYE IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 Mar 95 p 1

["Own information" report: "The MBR on Ukrainian-Russian Relations"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Council of the Interregional Reform Bloc Party recently issued a statement on Ukrainian-Russian relations.

Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the relationship of Ukraine and Russia has assumed particular significance for the present and future of our peoples and, at the same time, it has frequently been the subject of political speculation and has been complicated by expressly created contradictions in the interests of certain circles of the state bureaucracy and irresponsible political groupings, the statement says.

The MBR [Interregional Reform Bloc] Council clearly and unambiguously states its positions concerning the nature and prospects of the development of Ukrainian-Russian relations.

The MBR proceeds primarily from the obvious fact that the peoples of Ukraine and Russia never have been and cannot be alien, even less, hostile, to each other on account of the strongest interpersonal ties and the cultural and spiritual affinity that has taken shape in the course of their long joint history.

The members of this party are convinced that the cooperation on an equal basis of the independent states of Ukraine and Russia, on condition of their democratic development, could not only do away with the negative consequences of the disintegration of the former state but also become the point of departure for a new stage of their joint history in the interests of both fraternal peoples.

But while proceeding from this, the MBR categorically rejects the neo-communist calls for a restoration of the Soviet Union.

Under the conditions of the profound social crisis being experienced by our peoples and the intensifying lumpenization of society there is an expansion of the attempts to substitute for political and economic reforms the surrogate of pseudo-consolidation in the soil of the patently dead-end national idea, which could turn our states into a hotbed of civil and fratricidal wars, this document emphasizes.

The MBR Party declares that it intends to cooperate actively and closely with the democratic forces of Russia and to use its influence for the equal rapprochement of the fraternal peoples on the basis of a policy of economic and political reforms and resolute opposition to both the neo-communist and the national chauvinist danger in both states.

On this basis the MBR sees prospects of the immediate future of Ukraine and Russia in the creation of an open market space of both countries with the unrestricted movement of people, goods, and capital and all-around economic and political cooperation in the interests of the well-being of all citizens and fitting incorporation in world civilization.

OSCE Official on Relations Between Ukraine, Crimea

LD0703190495 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1622 GMT 7 Mar 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Simferopol, Mar 7 (Interfax-Ukraine)—The present relations between Ukraine and Crimea cannot be described as precipitous, a deputy head of the OCSE mission in Ukraine, Slavomir Dabrova, told a news conference in Simferopol Tuesday [7 March].

However, the differences in the root of the conflict still remained and negatively influenced these relations, he added. At the same time, both sides are doing their best to achieve a compromise.

Respecting Ukraine's territorial integrity, the OCSE mission at the same time stood against those in Kiev who sought the abolition of Crimea's autonomy.

Crimea's autonomy must be real rather than simulated, he remarked.

The OCSE will hold a round-table conference on Crimean-Ukrainian relations in Switzerland on May 4-6, 1995. Representatives of the Ukrainian and Crimean authorities, both representative and executive, as well as international experts will be invited. The conference will be presided over by U.N. high Commissioner for Ethnic Minorities Max van der Stool.

The talks between Kiev and Simferopol faced deadlock simultaneously with the aggravation of relations between the Crimean president and parliament last autumn.

Masol Resignation Discussed With British Ambassador

LD0703201095 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 1600 GMT 7 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Kiev—[Prime Minister] Vitaliy Masol's resignation will be accepted by parliament, Oleksandr Moroz, Supreme Council of Ukraine chairman, told a meeting with Simon Hemans, ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of Great Britain to Ukraine, on 7 March. He added he thought the prime minister's resignation was caused by Vitaliy Masol's realization that his "name and authority" had been "used as an argument in political struggle."

Oleksandr Moroz said he had a meeting with Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma and Vitaliy Masol on the day the latter tendered his resignation, which once again demonstrated that relations between them remained normal and there was "understanding and respect" for Vitaliy Masol personally.

Asked by Simon Hemans about parliament's attitude towards the candidacy of Yevhen Marchuk [first deputy prime minister] for the post of acting prime minister, Oleksandr Moroz said everything hinged on "the form of the presentation" of Yevhen Marchuk by the president. Should the president decide to retain the post of the prime minister, then, in Oleksandr Moroz's view, the problem of urgently passing a law on the Cabinet of Ministers would arise at once. Otherwise, "confrontation between the branches of power will be unavoidable."

Commenting on the veto by the Supreme Council on the presidential decree as regards financial and industrial groups in Ukraine, Oleksandr Moroz said "unscrupulous politicians" were playing this card in their own interests and it was not all "black and white." He recalled the decree had envisaged the submission by 27 February of a respective draft law for parliamentary consideration. There being none, the Supreme Council veto resolution instructed parliamentary committees and the government to present this law to parliament within a fortnight.

On the prospects for the formation of a two-chamber parliament in Ukraine, Oleksandr Moroz said this was "not a matter of the immediate future," since to create one today was "a certain risk from the point of view of the preservation of state integrity."

Ambassador Hemans, whose term in office is nearing completion, pointed out there was a need for a Ukrainian-British interparliamentary group. He reiterated that the importance of the accession of Ukraine to the Council of Europe had been recognized by all Western nations, including Britain.

National Affairs

Masol Resignation Seen as 'Planned Kuchma Move'

WS0803104295 Kiev INTELNEWS in English 0057 GMT 8 Mar 95

["Special to INTELNEWS" by Olha Ansimova: "Masol's Resignation, a Planned Kuchma Move"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The decision of Prime Minister Vitaliy Masol to resign took many by surprise, but not President Leonid Kuchma. The current situation, long envisioned in the President's strategy, can not help but influence the power restructuring process.

To begin with, the conservative Prime Minister, who lacked influence in the Cabinet, last December, staked his all to strengthen his power. He sent a letter to the parliamentary presidium about the "crucial recession in the economy," asking Parliament to discuss the situation in full session. Masol, not a member of any party but popular enough among the parliamentary leftist majority, expected Parliament to support him.

The President, however, having found the necessary mechanism to influence Speaker Oleksandr Moroz, managed to avoid a parliamentary discussion of this question. Instead, Kuchma held a session of the Cabinet of Ministers, where the economic policy of the presidential team was "explained" to Masol. Masol was cornered and stripped of any possibility to lead the government.

Many believe that Masol submitted his resignation right after this event. Masol neither confirmed nor denied these rumors. Instead, he evasively dwelled on the need to reform the executive power structures.

But a source in the presidential administration confirms that Masol submitted his resignation last December. The conclusion is inescapable—Kuchma did not approve the resignation, but retained the resignation letter for a more suitable political moment.

The President did not by chance choose March 1 to announce Masol's resignation. Shortly before this date, the Concord Committee in Parliament approved most of the ideas about the structure of Ukrainian government contained in the President's Power Bill.

The Committee's final debates centered on whether to preserve the post of prime minister within the Cabinet of Ministers, as Kuchma preferred, or to make the office accountable only to Parliament, as the left wanted. After this problem was solved, Kuchma no longer needed to use Masol as a shield against the leftists.

The President now has his hands free and can appoint his own man to the post, one who can carry out urgently needed measures in presidential economic policy. Explaining to local authorities why the government has temporarily suspended some of the new enterprise profit tax law provisions—according to which these payments should not go to the central budget as before, but remain in regional budgets—is among these needed economic measures. Another urgent economic measure is to control members of the government who disagree with Kuchma's policies, at least until the Cabinet approves the final draft budget for 1995.

Why didn't the President actually sign off on Masol's resignation instead of permitting him to take a holiday, supposedly for medical treatment, while appointing Marchuk acting Prime Minister?

The answer is hidden in Ukrainian legislation. The new prime minister must get parliamentary approval, which may not be easy for Kuchma to obtain. In the meantime, Parliament is about to debate the Power Bill, which contains a provision allowing the president to appoint all members of the Cabinet without Parliament's confirmation.

So, one may conclude Masol will undergo treatment either until Marchuk puts through the urgent unpopular measures outlined above, or until Parliament confirms the presidential Power Bill.

The President issued his decree appointing Marchuk acting Prime Minister only after Masol signed the necessary documents on March 3 for Ukraine to officially apply for an International Monetary Fund $1.5 billion standby credit. Kuchma obviously didn't want to mess that one up because of a lack of senior officials.

As far as the future of Marchuk and other government members is concerned, many new details are now clear.

Until recently the right and right-centrists had planned to demand Masol's resignation in order to prevent a left-wing attack on the government after the upcoming Cabinet of Ministers report.

Now, they have to quickly develop new tactics. Opponents of the left have decided to push for the resignation of the entire government to prevent the resignation of only Kuchma supporters, such as First Deputy Prime Minister Viktor Pynzenyk and Economics Minister Roman Shpek. They are sure this will give the President the opportunity to finally form the government he wants.

Kuchma's Analytical Service Chief Views Tasks

WS0703121595 Kiev SILSKE ZHYTTYA in Ukrainian 23 Feb 95 p 3

[Interview with Viktor Nebozhenko, chief of the Presidential Informational-Analytic Service, by Maryana Oliynyk; place and date not given: "Information Is Actively Used in Domestic Political Contests"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Oliynyk] What sources of information does your service use?

[Nebozhenko] Data from 30 information agencies—both Ukrainian and foreign—are downloaded into our computers. We monitor the media, sociological polls, and—frankly speaking—even analyze rumors. We also seek advice from special services.

I would like to point out that the former administration left behind a poor legacy. The Presidential Informational-Analytic Service had to be established virtually from scratch. What complicates the situation is the fact that we only have 10 people. In general, I would like to say that the Law on Authority is a good thing, but the presidential apparatus should start the reorganization of the system of authority from its own reorganization. The current situation within the apparatus is not in line with the tasks it is facing; it needs to be reorganized. This, primarily, concerns our service. Do you know how many experts there are in the Russian president's informational-analytic service? About 200. Those are scientists, reporters, and officials who process huge volumes of information. They have specific targets; their accomplishments are rewarded, and their conclusions help find solutions in tough situations. We do not have anything of the kind at this point.

Speaking in general, the informational-analytic support of economic reform is one of our weakest points. Our other drawback is the inadequate correlation between reform and sociopolitical processes, which was proven by the recent price increase. We have Viktor Pynzenyk, who is our Copernicus in economics, however we do not have a Copernicus in the social sector.

[Oliynyk] Who are the consumers of your information?

[Nebozhenko] Of course, primarily, those would be the president, the National Security Council, Leonid Kuchma's assistants and advisers, the Presidential Administration head, various presidential services, and the like. Incidentally, under the former leadership all the data were meant solely for top officials. Moreover, if those officials did not like some of the data they simply ignored our reports. Meanwhile, the new president has emphasized from his first days in office: "I want true information." We often have to inform the president about, mildly speaking, unpleasant things. Still, thank God, the "black rope" scenario—when messengers are put to death for bringing bad news—has never been applied. Initially, I was very afraid this might occur. As for now, we have not observed another negative phenomenon—the use of information in internal political fights. This, however, may be due to the fact that reform has not yet properly started, and the political fight has not yet been beefed up. This fight has been carried out in traditional Ukrainian style—sluggishly. Those processes are gaining momentum, however, and information will probably be used more actively in political contests.

[Oliynyk] Immediately after the presidential elections, sociologists claimed that people had cast their votes for Leonid Kuchma for two reasons—they believed that the socioeconomic situation would improve, and that Kuchma would "restore the USSR." Hopes for the restoration of the Soviet Union under Kuchma's leadership have probably disappeared by now. Those for a higher living standard seem to be vanishing, too. Do sociologists agree with that?

[Nebozhenko] We realized from the beginning that poor people would not support the measures undertaken to liberalize the economy. I assumed that those measures would be supported by the wealthy. However, my assumption was wrong. The consumptive way of life and the tradition of no confidence in governments have prevailed. Our society—both workers and the bourgeoisie—are affected with social egoism. The results of sociological polls, however, indicate that in general, our people continue to trust the president.

[Oliynyk] You have said that we do not have a Copernicus in the social sector. Perhaps, it would be worthwhile to introduce the post of deputy prime minister for social issues?

[Nebozhenko] I am against creating new posts; however, we definitely need a deputy prime minister for social issues. Moreover, the new deputy should have the right to object to decisions made by the deputy prime minister for economy, and even to veto them.

Incidentally, once we touched upon this issue.... I believe that the reorganization of the Cabinet of Ministers should be carried out simultaneously with the reconstruction of the presidential apparatus. The Cabinet of Ministers resembles a huge waiting room. Its fluctuation rate is immense and the spirit of impermanence prevails. I would like to point out that only those sectors and enterprises that have their visible or invisible representatives in government are manageable. Virtually every [government] official was appointed to uphold someone's interests. A lot of sectorial and regional structures have their lobbyists in the Supreme Council and are trying to penetrate the presidential apparatus. I would like to add, though, that thus far, their attempts have been fruitless. Meanwhile, the Cabinet of Ministers provides a very favorable environment for this kind of penetration. That is why we have two parliaments: The one elected by the people—motley and very interesting, of which we can be proud (one day historians will write about it); and the other—the corporatist industrial legislature represented by the Cabinet of Ministers. This fact should be analyzed before sorting things out between the president and the Supreme Council. The government all but inspires conflicts between the president and the Supreme Council and eventually, it reaps great dividends—of political, economic, and administrative nature—from those conflicts. Therefore, it is very relevant to initiate relations between the Presidential Administration, which is the political center of presidential authority, and the Cabinet of Ministers, which is the groundwork of executive authority.

[Oliynyk] You were a member of Leonid Kuchma's retinue during the election campaign. Immediately after the elections, you pointed to the accomplishments of that group of people, however you said that it was impossible to predict whether it would become the presidential team. What can you say about this now?

[Nebozhenko] Of course, the president's current team is not identical to the group of people that accompanied Kuchma in his race to power. This is not due to some sort of backstage political discussions or conflicts which, naturally, cannot be avoided. The reason is that enthusiasm and trust in the president did not always prevail. The situation is changing, and so do tasks and requirements. There is nothing strange in the fact that people come and go. One should also bear in mind that Kuchma was not supported by any powerful political party.

[Oliynyk] Incidentally, do you believe that any party can become "presidential" in the near future?

[Nebozhenko] We can see that certain parties are currently "making eyes" at the president, yet I believe that the president should be backed by vast social groups rather than one party.

[Oliynyk] We all know that your forecasts are very precise. Would you provide an outlook for Leonid Kuchma's next six months in office?

[Nebozhenko] I will try. The president will not soften his stance, given that he has been elected by a majority of voters. Besides, he has no other option. The Supreme Council does not have any attractive alternative to reform up its sleeve, although it will probably use some manipulations.

I believe that we will manage to form a strong presidential hierarchy and overcome the political crisis evoked by the president's desire to concentrate a sufficient volume of authority in his hands.

Pynzenyk Accused of Authorizing Baby Exports

LD0703214195 Kiev UNIAR in Ukrainian 1730 GMT 7 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Kiev, 7 Mar—As always, a news conference held by the leadership of UNA-UNSD [Ukrainian National Assembly - Ukrainian National Self-Defense] covered more than one topic.

Dmytro Korchynskyy, deputy chairman of the Ukrainian National Assembly, reported that another delegation of UNA-UNSD had left for the Caucasus. Its objective, in particular, is to discuss the situation that has taken shape in the Chechen Republic, which is engulfed in war. According to Dmytro Korchynskyy, the delegation members are discussing urgent issues with the Ukrainian patriotic structures in the region. The UNA deputy chairman also said that a Ukrainian-Chechen congress would be held in the House of Trade Unions on 11 March. It is expected that representatives of national and cultural societies and the diplomatic corps of Ukraine will attend the congress.

Yuriy Tyma dwelled on the export of babies from Ukraine. According to him, altogether 800 babies have been taken out of Ukraine to date, and the majority of them were not orphans. Yuriy Tyma believes that the majority of the babies were taken abroad with the aim of transplantation, i.e. they will be dismembered.and their separate organs will be used as transplants. Dmytro Korchynskyy added that the illegal export of babies was registered in documents and UNA-UNSD representatives had seen the signature of the current first deputy prime minister of Ukraine, Viktor Pynzenyk, on one of these documents.

People's Deputy from UNA Yaroslav Ilyasevych added that in Ukraine babies had become a commodity for criminal business. He said that one baby is sold for approximately $10,000 dollars, with bribes paid as an extra.

Education Program for Displaced Servicemen Viewed

WS0703153095 Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY in Ukrainian 23 Feb 95 p 16

[Interview with Hennadiy Aksyonov, executive director of the "Social Adaption of Servicemen" project, by Roman Vatrych; place and date not given: "It Is Better To See Once...."]

[FBIS Translated Text]

The International "Renaissance" Fund and the French Government Help Former Soldiers Find Their Place in Civilian Life

Nobody doubts that the Ukrainian Army needs an essential reduction. The "international imperialism" with which we were threatened not so long ago at every ideological corner, is gradually being transformed from "enemy" into our business partner. Our neighbors, although sometimes reluctantly, do recognize Ukraine as an independent state within its current borders. The Ministry of Defense recently declared that during 1995, the Army's numeric strength will be reduced by about 60,000-65,000 soldiers.

[Vatrych] What will happen to the officers who spent years in barracks and on test ranges, hoping to serve until retirement? Even more so since these days, it is difficult to find a well-paid job even as a specialist. The international "Renaissance" fund has decided to help the servicemen. At the end of 1994, the aforementioned fund and the Center for Education in Foreign Relations (CEFRI) financed by the French Government, signed an agreement on the joint reeducation of 780 servicemen dismissed from the Army in connection with the reduction of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

"Cooperation with France is an element of the 'Renaissance' fund's program which is already being implemented in seven regions of our country," says the program's Executive Director Hennadiy Aksyonov. "The 'Social Adaption of Servicemen' project is financed by well-known U.S. sponsor George Soros. We have a plan to adapt over 60,000 servicemen to civilian life between 1994-96."

[Vatrych] The program has been implemented for a year now...

[Aksyonov] Yes, I understand. We did not twiddle our thumbs, however. Due to our efforts and financial assistance the reeducation of 10,000 former servicemen has already been carried out. Two thousand of them have found well-paid jobs. The joint program of the "Renaissance" fund and the CEFRI is planned for two years. In addition, the major part of the expenditure is covered by the French Government. The EU is supposed to join the program in the future.

[Vatrych] Do you think that any serviceman can go and study entrepreneurship in Paris?

[Aksyonov] Yes, I think so, provided that their business plans and blueprints win the competition judged by the experts from the CEFRI and the "Social Adaption of Servicemen" program. Incidentally, the first group of 36 former servicemen have won this competition.

One can be sure that it is not common in the West to throw away money. Before assisting an individual, they want to know precisely what the future entrepreneur is going to do and how? Thus, if one has a realistic business plan and wants—let us say—to become a baker or a fruit canner, we are ready to help him. And we do help people. By the way, our joint program with France is specifically meant to support small businesses. It is primarily connected with the processing of agrarian products.

[Vatrych] How does it look in practice?

[Aksyonov] The method of implementing the project is original enough and consists of three stages.

It starts with a three-week course during which former officers draw up their blueprints. Then comes training at appropriate French enterprises. The saying "It is better to see once than to hear 100 times" makes sense. Finally, comes a three-month or four-month period of supervising and assisting the small enterprises established by the officers. This will be conducted at business centers of Kiev and the Crimea.

Thus, over six months, future businessmen will have the possibility of setting up new enterprises or expanding already existing ones.

[Vatrych] Of course, this is only the beginning of the complicated process of the former servicemen's adaption to civilian life.

[Aksyonov] Beyond any doubt, the agreement with the CEFRI and the new financial sources make it possible to expand the framework of the implementation of our program. In particular, they allow for the establishment of new enterprises, where former servicemen and their families would be employed. This will also become a good basis for the development of sub-programs, including "The Officer's Enterprises" and "The Conversion of Military Settlements," which we will initiate in 1995 with the assistance of George Soros and Gertha Seidemann.

Adviser Urges New Approaches to Crimean Issue

AU0703165395 Kiev URYADOVYY KURYER in Ukrainian 4 Mar 95 p 3

[Report by Oleh Oliynyk: "New Approaches in Policy on the Crimea"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Volodymyr Hrynyov, Ukrainian presidential adviser for issues of regional policy and leader of the Interregional Reforms Bloc, has held a news conference in Kiev on the results of his working trip to the Crimean Autonomous Republic.

In the Crimea, Hrynyov and his party colleagues familiarized themselves with the state of the Crimean economy, studied the situation of servicemen in subunits of Ukraine's Defense Ministry, and had meetings with leaders of the Autonomous Republic.

In Hrynyov's opinion, in the past, official Kiev took a passive position on the Crimea. This might have been rational when centrifugal moods prevailed there. However, now Yu. Meshkov's [Crimean president] and S. Tsekov's [chairman of the Crimean Parliament] power in the Crimea is increasingly weakening. Power on the peninsula may be seized by criminal structures and irreversible negative processes may start in leading sectors of the economy, in particular, in the recreational one. The government remains the only stable administrative structure in the Crimea, but it functions, so to speak, up in the air, without the support of the president or parliament.

Hrynyov spoke in favor of new approaches in Kiev's policy regarding the Crimea. Economic steps must be the main forms of intervention. It is necessary to create special economic zones in Krasno-Perekopsk, Kerch, and Feodosiya and to determine what is entitled to economic support. The Crimea expects this, because its residents view themselves as Ukrainian citizens and hope to get support and help from the central power.

With regard to the fate of Sevastopol and the Black Sea Fleet, Hrynyov pointed out that the city must eventually become demilitarized and be granted special economic status. The Ukrainian and Russian fleets must have a joint base.

A statement by the Interregional Reforms Bloc on Ukrainian-Russian relations, which was issued at the news conference, points out the following: "Cooperation on an equal basis between independent Ukrainian and Russian states in conditions of their democratic development may not just eliminate negative consequences of the former state's disintegration, but also become a starting point for a new stage of joint history in the interests of the two fraternal nations. We categorically reject irresponsible calls for the restoration of the Soviet Union. It is not a union of nations that neocommunist leaders are trying to restore, but a totalitarian empire. We see the future of Ukraine and Russia in creating an open market area for our countries with the free movement of people, goods, and capital and with comprehensive economic and political cooperation."

Obstruction of Crimea Mass Media Deplored

954F1664A Simferopol KRYMSKIYE IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 Mar 94 p 1

["Declaration of the Crimean Union of Free Journalists" by the Coordinating Council of the Crimean Union of Free Journalists]

[FBIS Translated Text] On 25 February of this year, during filming of the aftereffects of the explosion at the Lesbar cafe in Simferopol, several citizens calling themselves security personnel of the cafe owner impeded a correspondent group of Independent Television (NTV, Moscow) in the fulfillment of their professional responsibilities.

On 26 February, these same security personnel impeded and threatened with reprisals a group of journalists of Crimean Television, Nova Moda TV, and NTV, who were filming at the same location.

On 26 February, a number of individuals in Crimean President Yuriy Meshkov's security force prevented journalists from the Black Sea Television Company (Simferopol) from televising the president, and confiscated their TV camera and videocassette. Only on 27 February were these returned to their legal owners. Upon return, the footage of Yu. Meshkov had been erased. A television cameraman from the UT-1 company was also impeded in his work.

All these incidents testify to the fact that the professional activity of people working in the mass media is being restricted in Crimea, and that the constitutional rights of citizens to obtain information are being infringed upon. In this regard, the Crimean Union of Free Journalists declares its resolute protest to the law enforcement organs and Service of the Crimean President, and demands that the legal rights of journalists to work freely and securely be safeguarded.

Statements by Crimean Soldiers' Mothers Refuted

AU0703165895 Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY in Ukrainian 4 Mar 95 p 3

[Unattributed report: "A Garbled Version, or What Is Worse—the Afghan War or Service in the Ukrainian Army?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Press Service of the All-Ukrainian political association "Ukraine's State Independence" [DSU] has reported that yet another anti-Ukrainian organization has been created in Yalta [Crimea]—"The Union of Soldiers' Mothers." The ladies assert that in three years, the number of casualties in the Ukrainian Army was greater than over the 10 years of the Afghan war. That is why the "Union" will demand that Crimean residents be allowed to do their military service on the peninsula.

The report did not cite any specific data. That is why we asked Oleksandr Pilat, HOLOS UKRAYINY special correspondent in the Crimea, to find out what figures the activists of the organization were referring to. He turned to Marina Zhuravleva, chairman of the Crimean Committee of Soldiers' Mothers. She immediately warned him: "We are not the source of the figures circulating in Simferopol or Yalta." She added that Valentina Artamonova, cochairwoman of the organization of Ukraine's Soldiers' Mothers, had cited the data during the 3 October conference in Kiev. Well, quoting her, the Crimean activists say in their speeches that 1,629 servicemen, drafted from Ukraine, perished during the war in Afghanistan. In 1993 alone, 1,656 persons perished in Ukraine's Armed Forces, and over nine months of 1994—1,529 persons. Hence the estimates, she said.

We got in touch with V. Artamonova.

"There was no such conference in October," said Valentina Andreyevna. "Sécond, when I do cite data at meetings, I always make a reservation: They are, unfortunately, not accurate. However strange it might be, to this day, we have no precise data on the Afghan war casualties. The high-ranking persons responsible for that unjust war do not want people to know the whole truth.

Meanwhile, some individuals, using the garbled-version principle, are trying to obscure the issue and undermine the prestige of the Ukrainian Army and state."

We also turned to Ukraine's Ministry of Defense.

"It is really difficult to establish an accurate figure of the Afghan War victims," said Lieutenant Colonel Anatoliy Murakhovskyy, deputy chief of the ministry's Press Service. "The empire did everything to conceal the data on casualties. However, recently, the Ukrainian Television made public the following figure: 3,360—this is the number of Ukrainians, who perished in the Afghan war.

"Now about losses in our army. Let us take the year 1994, because the year before, there were fewer casualties among servicemen and in 1992—even fewer. Well, in 1994, casualties amounted to 385 persons. However, it is worth pointing out that 49 percent of them did not perish while on duty. For example, 38 persons became victims to road accidents, 24 persons perished while on leave, 32 were killed by criminals, and 16 poisoned themselves. It is therefore, mildly speaking, illogical to compare factual losses in our army with the losses in the Afghan war.

"With regard to the service of Crimean residents on the peninsula. At one of the Defense Ministry meetings, a possibility was discussed of introducing a territorial principle of army service. However, that is for the future. The point is that, in the past, cantonments and other facilities were located proceeding from the needs of the USSR and not, for example, of Ukraine. If we do adopt such a principle today, a number of regions in our state will become unprotected. Still, as already stated, this is possible in the future."

Economic Issues

Foreign Economic Relations Minister on Tasks

WS0703143095 Kiev VSEUKRAINSKIYE VEDOMOSTI in Russian 15 Feb 95 p 5

[Interview with Deputy Prime Minister Serhiy Hryhorovych Osyka, minister of foreign economic relations, by Oleh Panyuta; place and date not given: "Ukraine Must Not Be an Outsider"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The current year must become decisive for Ukraine's economy. Whether or not our country is able to restore its normal life and its normal economic development depends on the activities of the legislative and executive branches. In connection with this, the sector of foreign economic relations is considered to be very important. Deputy Prime Minister Serhiy Osyka, Ukrainian minister of foreign economic relations, kindly agreed to comment on several primary trends of the state strategy in this sector.

[Panyuta] **Serhiy Hryhorovych, what are the primary trends of transforming Ukraine's foreign economic policy?**

[Osyka] Financial stabilization is the strategic objective of the current policy of the president and the Ukrainian Government and—simultaneously—the primary means of resolving the crisis. Financial stabilization demands that the state budget deficit be reduced, which in turn is impossible without leveling the payment and trade balances. According to the Ukrainian president's program of economic reform, the leveling of the trade balance should be implemented through comprehensive encouragement of exports on par with a rational restriction on imports.

When I refer to export encouragement, I do not imply a mechanical increase in the volume of export that is expressed in tonnes, meters, cubic meters, units, and so on. The most important issue here is the ultimate use of a mechanism for obtaining hard currency revenues and increasing their amount. Along practical lines, this implies the expansion of the hard currency market, the strengthening of the national monetary unit, and the creation—on this basis—of qualitative new labor incentives, as well as the strengthening of state and local budgets.

As for reducing imports, such moves should be differentiated, should not affect its critical portion [kriticheskaya chast], and should take into consideration the interests of the domestic consumer market. The import reduction should also be achieved through the comprehensive encouragement of producers, who manufacture goods that are similar to imported goods, through the introduction of advanced technologies, and the development of relevant productions—including those under licenses—in Ukraine.

Regrettably, preliminary results of foreign economic activity in 1994 make us anxious. The negative foreign trade balance reaches $1,8 billion. The general conclusion is obvious: The state continues to live on credit. However, this is an extremely dangerous phenomenon.

An analysis of this situation shows that simultaneously with an increase in the import of energy resources that negatively affects the state of Ukraine's trade balance there are a variety of factors that hold back Ukraine's export. This concerns the use of various nontariff (qualitative, certificatory, antidumping, and pertaining to technical commodities) and tariff restrictions by industrially developed countries. For example, due to antidumping measures alone, Ukraine has lost foreign markets worth some $600 million.

Lack of supervision over the re-export of Ukrainian goods has a negative impact on the creation of favorable conditions for their distribution. Ukrainian products that are exported under the interstate contracts to the near abroad states are often sold there at prices that are lower than other prices on their markets. Therefore, a situation emerges whereby on the one hand, we face a genuine threat of an antidumping investigation [sentence as published], and on the other hand, markets for direct Ukrainian exports are shattered. In other words, Ukrainian goods compete among themselves.

We cannot resolve this problem without becoming an equal member of GATT and WTO [World Trade Organization]. When our close and traditional partners, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, have already become members of these organizations (for example, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Romania) or are preparing for such a membership in the immediate future (Bulgaria, Slovenia, as well as Russia and the Baltic states that have virtually developed their free trade association), Ukraine could find itself in a close ring of GATT and WTO trade systems, and could become a "trade outsider."

Another harmful trend in the development of foreign trade emerged last year. Almost half of the foreign trade is carried out on a barter basis. Such a form of trade has a right to exist, but its widespread use—in our country—eventually leads to a deterioration of the economic situation, because it cuts off the channels through which we obtain critical hard currency. It also leads to the eventual collapse of our financial-monetary system.

[Panyuta] **The Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, however, has recently drafted new mechanisms for handling foreign trade, and uses them efficiently.**

[Osyka] Regrettably, even after adoption of measures to liberalize our foreign trade, whose purpose was to level the trade balance through the encouragement of export and the removal of some flaws that existed in this area, they failed to resolve the problem of trade "barterization" [barterizatsiya]. It is sufficient to say that over the first six months alone 80 percent of the total trade turnover—worth some $2 billion—was conducted on a barter basis, primarily by selling products of high liquidity [vysoko likvidnaya produktsiya].

There are quite a few factors that promote the rapid development of "barterization." Among them are the instability of the financial-monetary system, a flawed taxation policy, an undeveloped banking system, noncompetitiveness of our goods, and the low purchasing power of Ukrainian consumers triggering problems with selling goods, and so on.

However, incomparable tempos of the liberalization of our foreign economic activity and privatization of state property is the primary reason for this phenomenon. That is, in the post-socialist time, the socialist principle—"everything around belongs to us, that is, to nobody"—in the foreign trade sector leads to "barterization" with all its negative consequences for the country in general, and all its illusory short-term advantages for those who carry out barter contracts.

Barter contracts that were subject to registration in November-December 1994 accounted for 61 percent of the total export turnover. The situation in various regions, where such barter contracts accounted for 86 percent of the total export turnover, was no better, while in seven oblasts of Ukraine (Ivano-Frankivsk, Mykolayiv, Rivne, Kharkov, Cherkasy, Chernivtsi, and Chernihiv Oblasts) 100 percent of all registered contracts were performed on a barter basis. Most concern is triggered by the fact that in barter contracts the share of products of high liquidity rapidly goes up. The picture is similar with specific goods. In particular, for example, as of 1 January 1995, barter contracts accounted for 78 percent of the total export of nonferrous metals (worth $318 million), 68 percent of the sugar export (worth $125 million), 62 percent of the oil export (worth $24 million), and 32 percent of the products manufactured by the chemical industry (worth $76 million).

These figures speak for themselves. It is unfounded to wait until the situation changes without implementing efficient economic measures. In addition, there is one other peculiar trend pertaining to revenues from barter import contracts: According to the contracts that were registered in November-December, barter import contracts had to account for some 81 percent of the total turnover of products designated for the fuel-energy complex.

Such a situation could likely be praised, unless we take into consideration the fact that these imported products are critical for us, and they are intended for ensuring the functioning of the basic branches of the national economy and our social sphere in the winter period. If attention is drawn to the structure of energy resources, you could see the other side of the coin. According to our data, white [svetlyye] components of oil products account for 51 percent of the total delivery of energy resources (according to data from oblasts, this figure is 82 percent). However, according to barter contracts, crude oil accounts for only 0.8 percent of the total delivery of energy resources.

To show the implication in economic terms, I will provide the following example: Ukraine will obtain white oil products—valued at $600 million—through barter contracts. If we imported crude oil for the value of $600 million and then processed it, we would have produced goods for a total of $785 million, including 3.5 million tonnes of residual oil that would have satisfied our needs for the winter period. So, according to registered contracts, our lost profits due to the inefficient structure of the imported energy resources—over two incomplete months alone—account for a total of $185 million. In my opinion, any commentaries are out of place.

[Panyuta] **This fact has triggered urgent work on a draft law on barter operations, has it not?**

[Osyka] Yes, that was also a factor. Taking into consideration the high level of "barterization" of foreign economic activity over the past period of time, and studying the structure of the export and import sections of barter operations, the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations along with other ministries and departments have drawn up a draft president's edict "On Regulation of Barter Operations (Exchange of Goods) in Foreign Economic Relations." The adoption of this edict will transfer the majority of export-import operations to civilized channels through purely economic levers. In a wider aspect, these efforts are aimed at strengthening state economic security.

Regarding state export policy in general, it is extremely important to use two strategically important levers to regulate it.

The first lever is a transition to differentiated taxation rates for producers, who manufacture products of high liquidity for export. At the same time, taxes should be channeled not only to the state, but to local budgets as well. However, the greatest portion of hard currency revenues should be left with producers of such products. It is difficult to overestimate the importance of producers, who manufacture such products of high liquidity, because nothing other than these hard currency revenues will allow them to technically retool their production and truly increase their own export potential.

The second lever is drafting state and, in particular, regional programs that envisage an increase in export potential. Japan used to efficiently implement this lever at one point. In my opinion, there is no harm in us using its experience.

The state import regulation policy deserves serious attention. Without such a policy, it is impossible to create conditions for leveling trade and payment balances in conditions when there exists a great difference between the Ukrainian industry, agriculture, and services in terms of their export-intensive and import-intensive nature [importoemkost i eksportoemkost].

Therefore, in our opinion, the problems of protecting the interests of Ukrainian entrepreneurs from unscrupulous competition, the problems of impeding competition from entrepreneurs—including foreigners—who deliver goods (labor, services) to Ukraine, the problems of reducing the noncritical import turnover, the problems of specifying a list of critical import commodities, and the problems of establishing privileges for implementing critical imports should be urgently resolved.

It is necessary to specify the list of currently imported products that can be produced in Ukraine, draft proposals regarding the granting of tax breaks and loans on concessionary terms to producers, and use measures to differentiate between the rates of excise tax for noncritical import commodities, depending on what state produces them and what their qualitative descriptions are.

[Panyuta] **What legal documents should encourage the efficient work of your ministry?**

[Osyka] The Vienna Convention on International Purchase and Sale of Goods has recently been ratified. The Ukrainian president has issued a package of edicts to forestall the export of goods at dumping prices, to establish a single state import regulation policy, and the mechanism to protect the domestic market and the national industry in compliance with the rules of GATT and WOT. The edict on the use of international rules to interpret commercial terms and the edict on measures to regulate accounts in compliance with unified international rules and financial practice have also come into force.

The government's proposals regarding implementation of the agreements of the Paraguay round of talks on national legislation, particularly, the regulation of state purchases are being drafted.

Work on the new version of the law on foreign economic activity is nearing completion. Amendments to the investment legislation, the law on free economic zones meant to improve the investment climate and restore the lost interest of foreign investors in Ukraine's economy—also through the application of rules and norms of international conventions concerning investment issues—are being drafted.

Strike Trends in 1994 Deemed 'Sizably Smaller'

WS0703154895 Kiev UKRINFORM in English 0855 GMT 7 Mar 95

[Report attributed to the Ministry of Statistics—from the "Business News Weekly" feature No. 9, 27 Feb-5 Mar 95]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] As compared to the year before, the strike tendencies in Ukraine in 1994 were on a sizably smaller scale with a total of 126,000 workers, or 0.5 percent of the nation's work force employed in the economy having taken part in strikes Ukraine-wide, versus 1993's figure of 260,300 workers (or 1.1 percent of the total number of workers).

Employees of the education system accounted for 74 percent of Ukraine's total number of strikers, followed by industrial workers (24.3 percent), construction workers (1.2 percent), and workers employed in other sectors of the national economy (0.5 percent). In 1993, 92.2 percent of strikers were industrial workers.

Last year's strike tendencies in Ukraine resulted in 385,500 days/worker lost, which might otherwise be put as each striker's average idling time of three working days. The average figure for the construction industry was 10 days of work stoppage per striker versus five days in other industries and two days in education.

The industry's material losses through strikes are estimated at 573.3 billion krb. [karbovantsi].

In the vast majority of cases, strikers received no wages for non-worked days. In those rare cases which involved wage and salary payment to the strikers, remuneration amounts were very small. Thus, Crimea's striking education employees were paid an average of 18,000 krb. per striker per day in October 1994.

As a general rule, the strikers' demands were basically of an economic nature, in particular, increased wages and salaries.

It should be noted that though labor conflicts occurred in all of Ukraine's administrative regions, Kiev, and the Republic of Crimea, striking periods and magnitudes were very different. Thus, whereas in 1989-1993, the strike tendencies were most massive in east Ukraine's Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, and Luhansk highly industrialized Oblasts, and in Lvov Oblast in western Ukraine, with predominantly coal-miners initiating the strikes to be joined by education employees and physicians, last year's strikes hit the Crimean Republic, Vinnytsya, Khmelnytskyy, and Chernivtsi Oblasts worst of all.

Oil Products To Be Sold at Free Prices

954F1651A Simferopol KRYMSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 3 Mar 95 p 1

[Unattributed article: "From the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Limited oil and gas resources complicate the work of the national economy complex of Ukraine. Corresponding measures have been taken by the government on stimulation of oil deliveries and the use of various sources of its origin. But despite this, the demands on the capacity of domestic oil-refining plants remain extremely unsatisfactory. One reason for such a situation has become the violation by state organs at various levels of guarantees with respect to the rights of owners of raw materials to the use and sale of petroleum products and the accumulated indebtedness for delivered oil.

Taking into consideration the fact that existing capabilities allow for refining the quantity of oil necessary to provide for the petroleum product requirements of the national economy, which is very important on the eve of the spring field work, the government appeals to the ministries, departments, enterprises, and subjects of entrepreneurial activity with the request to use their own funds for the purchase of oil.

The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine guarantees the monitoring of observance on the part of Gosneftegazprom, the ministries and departments, and the chairmen of oblast and city councils of people's deputies of the rights of the owners of petroleum products and the oil deliverers independently to dispose of petroleum products from their raw materials in accordance with legislation in force. In connection with the fact that since 13 February 1995, Decree of the Cabinet of Ministers No. 21 of 25 January 1995 "On State Regulation of Prices on Petroleum Products" has become invalid, the owners of petroleum products have the right to them at free prices, without any state interference.

Official Data on Agrarian Sector's 1994 Performance

WS0703153195 Kiev UKRINFORM in English 0855 GMT 7 Mar 95

["Ukrainian State-run Agricultural Sector's Overall Financial and Economic Performance in 1994"—from the "Business News Weekly" feature No. 9, 27 Feb-5 Mar 95]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] According to data furnished by the Ministry of Statistics, as of January 1, 1995, there were 12,576 farms within Ukraine's state-run agricultural sector, including 9,456 collective farms, 2,477 state farms, and 643 state-run interfarm associations.

As preliminary data may suggest, 726 farms finished their yearly activity as financial losers. These included 476 collective farms, 191 state farms, and 59 interfarm associations; this is a sevenfold increase in the total number of economically and financially inefficient agricultural entities versus 1993. These farms' aggregate losses are estimated at 1,931 billion krb. [karbovantsi], in which collective farms' share is 852 billion krb. versus 1,030 billion krb. for state farms and 49 billion krb. for interfarm associations. Average per farm losses are estimated at 2,659 billion krb.

Vinnytsya Oblast topped the list of agricultural bankrupts with 199 farms qualified as financial losers, largely because of an experiment which involved revaluation of agricultural production costs based on product marketing prices. It was followed by Mykolayiv (63 farms), Zhytomyr, Odessa (42 farms each), Kiev (38 farms), Sumy (36 farms), Kherson (35 farms) and Lvov (33 farms) Oblasts, which accounted for 58.0 percent of the aggregate amount of losses in the state-run agricultural sector.

The sector's net profit in 1994 increased 3.5-fold versus 1993 against the fivefold inflation index to amount to 61,161.8 billion krb., or 182,322,000 krb. per 100 ha. [hectares] of agricultural lands. Its profitability rate amounted to 46.1 percent in 1994, which was two times lower than in 1993, basically because of lower profitability in animal husbandry. So, profitability rates in Vinnytsya Oblast were 15.0 percent for beef production, 1.3 percent for pork production, and 33.9 percent for dairy products. Dnipropetrovsk Oblast's respective figures were 0.1, 5.2, and 12.9 percent. Dairy production was similarly cost-inefficient in Kirovohrad, Luhansk, Mykolayiv, Sumy, Kharkov, and Kherson Oblasts. Wool and poultry production were unprofitable in respectively 44 percent and 32 percent of all Ukraine's administrative regions.

Program for Ammunition Processing Detailed

WS0703155095 Kiev UKRINFORM in English 0855 GMT 7 Mar 95

[From the "Business News Weekly" feature No. 9, 27 Feb-5 Mar 95]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The National Program of conventional ammunition utilization was approved by the Ukrainian Government in late January 1995. The Program provides for disposal of 320,000 tons of ammunition categorized as unfit for combat applications and storage.

The Alliant-Kiev joint-stock society has been granted the right to utilize 220,000 tonnes of ammunition with 100,000 tonnes entrusted to the Sodruzhestvo (Commonwealth) association of enterprises. These include the Donetsk rubber-chemical factory (TNT recovery from shells), which can dispose of 13,500 tonnes of ammunition a year, Pavlograd's chemical plant (it can utilize 13,500 tonnes of ammunition a year, too), Petrovski chemical association (2,000 tonnes a year), and the Shostka-based "Impuls" plant (1,000 rounds of ammunition a year).

These are supposed to be joined by the Shostka Institute and Gorlovka's chemical factory.

National Program's Stages

The ammunition utilization scheme provides for three stages.

During the first stage and over three months beginning with the program's endorsement, a departmental committee will be instituted which will have to appraise the stability status of conventional ammunition. An interdepartmental committee will be established for appraisal of likely applications for utilized ammunition. Utilization technologies will be chosen on a contest basis.

The Ministry of Engineering, Military-Industrial Complex [MIC] and Conversion will have to draft a scheme within the six months following the program's approval for maintaining permanent facilities to be involved in ammunition utilization. The scheme will be subject to a feasibility study before being submitted to the Cabinet of Ministers for consideration and approval.

The first stage is supposed to end in 1996's first half and should result in disposal of 54,900 tonnes of conventional ammunition.

The second stage, which will last from the second half of 1996 well into the year of 2000, is expected to result in completed construction of ammunition utilization facilities.

The third stage, which will begin after the year 2001, envisages annual ammunition utilization rates at between 10,000 and 15,000 tonnes.

Those enterprises which will be engaged in the program's implementation, will have to submit quarterly reports to the Ministry of Engineering, Military-Industrial Complex and Conversion and the Ministry of Defense regarding amounts of utilized ammunition, as well as the amounts of recovered precious and non- ferrous metals, gunpowder, etc. The Ministry of Engineering, MIC and Conversion will draw its overall balance sheets based on these reports.

Utilization Financing

The above scheme of permanent facilities to utilize conventional ammunition will be financed through the national budget of Ukraine, as well as via the enterprises' own funds and credits. The conventional ammunition disposal effort is supposed to result in recovering 50,000 tonnes of brass, 170,000 tonnes of steel, 6,000 tonnes of copper, 25,000 tonnes of explosives, and 44,000 tonnes of gunpowder.

Ukraine's stocks of ammunition which is unfit for combat utilization because of expired dates increase by between 10,000 and 15,000 tonnes every year. Because Ukraine's arsenals are packed between 1.5 and 2 times their capacity, the risk of accidents is very high.

In the former USSR's defense conversion plans, which date back to 1989, provided for designing industrial technologies to get rid of outdated rounds of ammunition. The former Soviet Defense Ministry's GosNDIHP Institute was located in Ukraine and specialized in reprocessing pyroxylin and black powders. Russia's enterprises specialized in other ammunition components, such as explosives, ballistic powder, etc.

Recovery of shell explosives and missile solid propellants poses a major problem as does powder reprocessing.

Utilization's Products

As Minmashprom experts estimate, each average 100,000 tonnes of ammunition contains the following amounts of materials:
505 tonnes of construction steel;
32,815 tonnes of carbon steels;
24,617 tonnes of alloy steels;
3,288 tonnes of cast-iron;
5,985 tonnes of brass;
708 tonnes of copper;
72 tonnes of lead;
10,740 tonnes of explosives;
5,985 tonnes of gun powders;
15,285 tonnes of missile propellants.

According to Western experts' estimates, utilization costs may amount to $78.14 per ton, that is, $7,817,000 for 100,000 tonnes of conventional ammunition

Average marketing prices for utilized ammunition components are as follows:

(U.S. dollars per ton)

on Ukraine's market	on foreign markets
Brass 800	1,600-1,900
Steel 70	95
Powder	98-
Explosives	100-

Economic Crisis Fuels Crimean Brain Drain

954F1651B Simferopol KRYMSKIYE IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 Mar 95 p 1

["Appeal of Scientists of Crimea to the President, Deputies of the Supreme Council, and Members of Government of the Republic of Crimea: The People Will Not Forgive; History Will Not Forgive"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The scientific community—members of the Crimean Academy of Sciences—expresses serious concern and alarm in connection with the state of affairs in the national economy of our republic. In all of its branches, the production slump continues, threatening to lead to complete collapse.

The agrarian sector evokes especial alarm. The absence of the proper attention to this vitally important branch has already led to a twofold decrease in the production of food products, and to a catastrophic increase in their prices. Prognoses for the future are even gloomier. It is known that "a spring day feeds the year," and, if we again (as we did in the fall) leave fields unsown and private farms empty, then famine inevitably awaits Crimea in the near future.

The state of affairs is no better in other branches as well. Crimeans have not only begun to live significantly worse than they did before, but they have completely lost confidence both in today and in tomorrow. Criminal elements reign in the streets, general theft has grown into armed banditry, and it seems as though there is no force that is capable of stopping them. In cities, settlements, and villages, there is filth, unsanitary conditions, and desolation. In trade, shocking practices reign; underground business has made the price of vodka in Crimea the lowest in Ukraine. The population of Crimea (and not only the adult population) is ruining itself with drink.

The socioeconomic crisis has had a most painful effect on Crimea's intellectual potential. Thousands of scientists, teachers, physicians, engineers, and cultural workers drag out a miserable existence, and the best of them give up the work that is in no position to feed them and go into commerce, leave Crimea. The republic is swiftly losing its intellectual and spiritual potential, dooming the younger generation to vegetate in ignorance.

It would seem that, in the face of the advancing economic, social, humanitarian, and other shocks, the people in power should close ranks and with combined efforts oppose the ills that have befallen us, should, together with Crimean science, search for a way out of the situation that has been created. But strangely enough, just this is lacking in the higher echelons of power. Its leaders have not only begun to resemble the well-known swan, crayfish, and pike, pulling their cartload of problems in different directions; they are not dealing with these problems at all, having become bogged down in internecine, interparty struggle to elucidate who of them was elected the "nationwidest." These constant squabbles among the branches of power have already led not only to a difficult economic situation, but also to the partial loss of Crimean statehood.

Stop! Remember that it was not for this that the people elected you, so that you should fling mud at one another, without thinking of the fate of the republic. Crimea's situation at the present moment is more than serious; it requires that extreme measures be taken. In connection with this, the scientists propose that you set aside all "street-fighting" among the branches of power and within them. Positions must be taken, a program of action must be outlined on stopping the production fall, on its stabilization, and on getting out of the crisis. In this great, complicated, and crucial matter, we cannot get by without a scientific basis for the chosen directions and actions. Therefore, we, scientists of Crimea, offer you our services. It should not be forgotten that we are also patriots of our motherland—small, beautiful, but unfortunate Crimea.

The time for meditating and fence-sitting is over. The time has come for action. If we are too late, we will not be forgiven by the people of Crimea, and we will not be forgiven by History.

Approved at the annual Conference of the Crimean Academy of Sciences

17 February 1995

Belarus

Lukashenka Praises EU Aid

LD0703200695 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1642 GMT 7 Mar 95

[From the "Presidential Bulletin" feature]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belarus regards the documents agreements with the European Union as Europe's support of the Belarusian economic reform, Lukashenka said at a news conference in Brussels Monday [6 March].

He praised the EU aid in the framework of the TACIS program. Lukashenka said that access to Western technologies was very important to his country and welcomed the increase in TACIS funding of Belarusian projects from seven million ECU in 1994 to 14 million in 1995.

He expressed gratitude to the Humanitarian Office of the EU for the ECU 544,000 made available for medical aid to the victims of the Chernobyl nuclear disaster.

Lukashenka described the EU decision to increase the quota of imported Belarusian textiles as "a significant contribution to the republic's economy." He also welcomed the EU decision not to impose restrictions on import of Belarusian steel articles.

Lukashenka believed that the signing of agreements had been made possible by Belarus's consistent position on nuclear disarmament. He emphasized that it was historically the first occasion when a country voluntarily and unconditionally gave up nuclear weapons and signed appropriate agreements.

Lukashenka said that Belarus intended to continue integration in the world economy, giving Europe top priority. In his words, "As the economic reform continues, we do not lose sight of the ultimate goal of our integration in the European space, joining the European Union."

He added that there was no question of signing an association treaty and joining the European Union until Belarus met the high EU standards.

PRC Defense Ministry Delegation Visits

LD0703132095 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1154 GMT 7 Mar 95

[By BELINFORM correspondent Alexander Lyushkevich for TASS]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Minsk March 7 TASS—A delegation from the Chinese Defense Ministry arrived for an official visit to Minsk for talks on ways of implementing understandings reached during the recent visit to China of a state delegation from Belarus.

The Chinese delegation is led by Deputy Chairman of the General Staff of China's Popular [as received] Liberation Army Lieutenant-General Qao Ganjuan.

The press service of the Belarus Defense Ministry told BELINFORM news agency that the Chinese military would work in Belarus until March 12. They are due to visit a number of army units and industrial enterprises.

Democrats Warn Against 'Nomenklatura'

WS0703143895 Minsk BELAPAN in English 1409 GMT 7 Mar 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The leadership of the Belarusian Popular Front (BPF) has made a statement in view of the completion of its preparation for the elections. In the statement it is pointed out that on March 4, for the first time in the history of Belarus, the leaders of five democratic parties signed an agreed list of candidates for election to parliament. In the opinion of the BPF leaders the elections will take place under difficult conditions because, firstly, "the authorities have already started pressurizing opposition organizations and restricting democratic liberties; secondly, the authorities and pro-Russian forces do everything in their power to misinform and disorientate electors". "...we consider it necessary to warn, the statement reads, of the danger of leading the electorate astray as regards some former members of the communist party nomenklatura and representatives of the industrial directorate who call themselves democrats. They declared the establishment of an alternative bloc named 'Civic Concord'. According to the BPF leaders, the establishment of the bloc can be defined as no other than a deliberate attempt to split the unity of democratic forces and to confuse the electorate." The statement contains an appeal to the Belarusian public "not to yield to demagogy and to give their votes to candidates from the bloc of democratic forces—the BPF, the Belarusian Social-Democratic Hramada, the Belarusian Peasants' Party, the Belarusian Christian-Democratic Party and the National-Democratic Party of Belarus."

Popular Front Briefs on Electoral Bloc, Tactics

WS0703144995 Minsk BELAPAN in English 1409 GMT 7 Mar 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] "The forthcoming elections are a test not only for the Belarusian Popular Front [BPF] as a political force, its structures and nominees, but also for the public, regarding to what extent it is ready to accept and second our ideas," the chairman of the elections committee of the BPF Party Uladzimir Antsulevich declared at a briefing which took place on March 6. According to him, recently they worked very hard to unite democratic forces in the country, which resulted in the establishment of a preelection bloc. The BPF is holding negotiations and consultations with the parties forming it with a view to single out candidates from the bloc's parties in different election districts, work out a strategy and tactics of preelection struggle, as well as about the subsequent relations in the new parliament. "Work to determine whose candidate will be nominated in each constituency has practically been completed", Mr Antsulevich said. "There are only some districts at issue, and the parties are to come to a decision on them before March 12".

In general, it has already become known that the BPF Party will nominate its candidates in 131 districts (23 districts still remain unagreed with its allies), candidates from the Belarusian Social-Democratic Hramada will be nominated in 55 districts (15 districts unagreed), the Belarusian Christian-Democratic Party in 3 districts (2 unagreed), the Belarusian Peasants' Party in 21 districts (13 unagreed), the National-Democratic Party of Belarus in 1 district (4 unagreed). At the moment the allies are holding consultations on all undecided nominations at local level.

Judging from the optimistic statement of Mr. Antsulevich the BPF Party is sure that its people will be nominated in these 23 districts. Out of 260 election districts, in 7 constituencies not one of the parties of the bloc will nominate its candidates. This can be explained by the fact that there are no local organizations of the parties there. Two of them are districts in the Vitsiebsk region and 5 are in the Homel region. 14 elections districts were given to representatives of the parties not forming the bloc but who are well-known figures in the country. For instance, in the Homel region, on the basis of a separate agreement with the regional organizations of the parties of the bloc, in 7 districts candidates from the United Democratic Party will be nominated. The bloc is not going to stand in the way of some political leaders of the Republic and simply well-known people who are not members of political parties, for example, Iosif Syaredzich, Editor-in-Chief of the NARODNAYA GAZETA" newspaper, and Henadz Karpenka, one of the leaders of the "Civic Concord" bloc. Incidentally, the favourable decision concerning Karpenka, "well-known adherent of democracy", was taken after he submitted the list of nominees from his bloc in all republican districts to the BPF. However, according to Zyanon Paznyak, this fact by no means implies that the BPF has the same attitude towards the bloc "Civic Concord" itself and the Party of People's Concord that is headed by Mr. Karpenka. "We are well aware of who are behind the bloc—the former communist party nomenklatura, the directorate, people close to the presidential 'vertical'", Mr Paznyak said, "that is why it is no mere chance that the 'vertical' people want to make use of the 'Civic Concord' bloc to split the democratic movement in Belarus and to ride in it as in the Trojan Horse to the Supreme Soviet".

As for the representation of the BPF in the district election commissions, according to Mr. Antsulevich, the corresponding protocols about the participation in its work by members and supporters of the BPF were presented in all districts where the BPF organizations are present. "However, in accordance with the law, the final composition of election commissions is decided by the regional executive committees", Mr. Antsulevich noted with regret.

At present it is known that in Minsk, out of 42 district election commissions, representatives of the BPF will take part in 40, in the other two there are representatives of other parties of the bloc. Approximately the same situation is to be observed throughout the country, except the Vitsebsk and Homel region where the representation is a little poorer.

Opposition Regrets Decision on Arms Destruction

LD0703190995 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1622 GMT 7 Mar 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Minsk, Mar 7 (Interfax-West)—President Alyaksandr Lukashenka's decision to suspend the destruction of conventional weapons in compliance with international agreements is a departure from the constitution and national legislation and inconsistent with the peaceful principles of the Belarusian foreign policy and the interests of the Belarusian nation.

The Belarusian Popular Front parliamentary group expressed regret that the country's president had become dependent on the strategic interests of irresponsible people in the Russian authorities and political groups which had started a criminal war in Chechnya and wanted a confrontation of blocs on the European continent perpetuated.

Lukashenka in his capacity of the supreme commander-in-chief of armed forces issued an order in February to suspend, in the light of financial problems facing the country, the destruction of tanks, armored personnel carriers and aircraft that had started under the treaty on reduction of conventional weapons in Europe. He also expressed concern about the desire of numerous Central and East European States to join NATO, which, he believed, would disturb the balance of forces in Europe.

Under the treaty Belarus has until November 16, 1995 to eliminate 2,171 tanks, 1,462 armored vehicles and 134 aircraft. According to the National Control and Inspection Agency, about 70% of that number has been destroyed.

Border Official on Violations, Operations

WS0803091595 Minsk RESPUBLIKA in Russian 2 Mar 95 p 2

[Interview with Major General Vasiliy Morkovkin, chief of the Belarusian Main Border Troops Administration, by BELINFORM correspondent Svetlana Kalinkina; place and date not given: "What Kind of Padlock Does the Border Need?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Major General Vasiliy Morkovkin has become chief of the Belarusian Main Border Troops Administration only recently. He occupied this post following a raucous scandal that rocked this organization. What is now the most nagging problem of the Republic's chief border guard? What measures are being undertaken to make the popular saying "The Border is Locked" a reality? This is a topic he discussed with BELINFORM correspondent Svetlana Kalinkina.

[Kalinkina] **Judging by the agreements recently reached by Belarus and Russia, we are opening up our eastern border. What will change within the Border Troops as a result?**

[Morkovkin] Border and customs servicemen will soon leave the Belarusian-Russian border and go to the stretch of border which needs to be reinforced. The problem, however, lies elsewhere: Contraband caravans continue to traipse across the territory of the former Soviet Union. Attempts to illegally cross the state border are becoming increasingly frequent. We estimate that 200,000-300,000 individuals from Africa and Asia, who are resolved to sneak over to the West whatever it takes, are currently staying in the Republic. We cannot say how they are going to do it, but they do have such intentions, anyway. The flow of border trespassers used to subside in cold seasons. However, this cannot be said about this winter, which saw quite a few attempts to violate the border. The most popular route runs across Brest and Hrodno Oblasts, over to Poland. The number of the so-called "massive crossings" has grown. Recently, 40 citizens of Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and India made an attempt to illegally sneak into Polish territory. To get to the other side of the river, covered with a thin layer of ice, they split up and, barefoot and half-naked, set out for their cherished goal in the 8-degree chill. Police vehicles were already waiting for them on the Polish side. Our border servicemen foiled this attempt; but to fulfill their mission, they were forced to go 200 meters into the neighboring state's territory. One soldier was wounded. While all the trespassers were caught, their accomplices managed to escape. Criminal proceedings in this case were initiated both in our country and Poland.

So, the situation along the border is far from calm. Many violators were spotted in the Smorogonskiy border detachment and at the border sectors of Ostrovetskiy, Oshmyanskiy, and Voronovskiy rayons in Hrodno Oblast. Very frequently, to export the "live commodity," various sorts of hiding places are used. For example, we found perpetrators in vehicles, sealed by customs officers, carrying industrial and agricultural products.

[Kalinkina] **Border violators are sometimes not detected on Belarusian territory, later "surfacing" in Poland or the Baltic states. Why?**

[Morkovkin] Because cars that are sealed by the customs services of other states are not subject to careful examination. Our counterparts from the CIS countries should pay more attention to prevent commercial companies from smuggling the "live commodity" along with their cargo. Also, migration processes need to be kept under closer control. If this is not done, it should not be ruled out that dangerous infections may be brought into our country when the days become warmer—in March or April. I would like to bring the attention of all services to this possibility. As many as 170 passenger trains cross our territory in various directions every day. In one day alone, we take off trains from 2 to 1,000 trespassers, who have traveled extensively around the world, including in some of its most dangerous regions, in terms of sanitary and epidemiologic situations.

So, our organization, the KGB, the Interior Ministry, and the Customs Committee need to undertake all measures to establish control over the transit of people and cargo through our Republic.

[Kalinkina] **Your organization has frequently dealt with transgressors engaging in the forging of documents. How widespread has this kind of activity become in our Republic?**

[Morkovkin] Indeed, there are many such individuals. In January and early February alone, we identified 1,000 fake documents, primarily passports. Moreover, there are people who bring forged documents out of the country through roundabout routes to have them stamped with phony visas. We have reported 9,500 such cases since the beginning of this year. As for in which region the counterfeiting of documents is most widespread, I cannot tell you this, even though, of course, I have all the information.

[Kalinkina] **Cooperation with counterparts from other states is vital to your activities...**

[Morkovkin] Of course, we accept this kind of cooperation—but without sending our soldiers to the territory of other states and denying servicemen of other states the right to stay on our territory. I will continue to insist on this approach.

As for our relations with the Russian Federation, I believe that the course taken toward cooperation in protecting the borders and their logistical support is quite justifiable. In cooperation with Russia, we will work to form a specialized squadron and execute control over the borders running across rivers and lakes, which we have in the Polotsk and Hrodno border detachments.

[Kalinkina] **The Belarusian parliament has recently heatedly debated the draft budget. The most controversial issue was the fact that the power organizations, including the Defense Ministry, have called for hefty funds, which our country cannot afford. In this connection, I would like to ask: How efficient is your organization in terms of finances?**

[Morkovkin] The money that we return to the Republic is more than sufficient to offset the funds earmarked to support the Border Troops. In addition, if we were allowed to support ourselves for a year, we would be able to acquire new equipment, build housing, and supply ourselves with everything we need. For now, this is something about which we can only dream.

[Kalinkina] **Then, what sums do you return to the Republic as a result of confiscated contraband?**

[Morkovkin] I would rather not disclose the amount, as it is enormous.

[Kalinkina] **Does the movement toward the reinforced protection of the borders mean that the size of the Border Troops will grow?**

[Morkovkin] Yes. We make a special point of preventing officers from leaving the troops. By the way, border officers are still trained in the Russian Federation. All of our cadets study there for free and enjoy fair living conditions. Still, we have to pay for our other students studying abroad, and let me tell you frankly—this is too expensive for us. On the other hand, the border department has already been created at the National Security Institute, which will enable us to train our own cadre.

Moldova

Sangheli, Smirnov Discuss Debt for Russian Gas

LD0703191795 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1622 GMT 7 Mar 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] CHISINAU, Mar 7 (Interfax)—On Tuesday [7 March] Prime Minister Andrei Sangheli and the President of the self-proclaimed Republic of Transdniestria Igor Smirnov met in Chisinau to discuss ways to pay their common debt to the Russian concern Gazprom for gas supplies.

As Interfax learned the Transdniestrian government, the republic acknowledged its part of the debt for Russian gas, which amounts to about $135 million of the $190 million of Moldova's general debt. However Tiraspol cannot pay its debt because of lack of funds. Moreover, a way to make mutual settlements has not been worked out yet.

The two sides agreed that this problem will be considered at the next meeting between the Moldovan and Transdniestrian leaders.

The problem is aggravated by the fact that Gazprom cut its gas supplies and warned Chisinau more than once that they will be stopped altogether if the debt is not paid.

Government Accepts Call for Salary Indexation

AU0703195595 Chisinau BASAPRESS in English 1930 GMT 6 Mar 95

["Economic Commentary: Government Forced To Accept Trade Unions' Demands"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Chisinau BASAPRESS, 6/3/1995—After an energetic support of the idea of a large-scale protest action, many Moldovan union leaders began to doubt its timing. It seems that the government's intervention gave results. It suggested the trade unions to postpone or cancel the March 18 rally by making some concessions. The Cabinet of Ministers decided to improve the population's financial standing saying in its decision that "people's incomes are indexed, if the average consumer goods and services index is over 5 percent compared with the previous indexation." Income received as remuneration is indexed only for the employees whose earnings are not greater than [words indistinct] pensioners and 130,000 state employees, the unions disapproved of the methods of indexation arguing that "governmental proposals discriminates certain classes." Ion Godonoga, chairman of the Independent Trade Unions Federation (FSI), said that the increase in pensions and salaries will not increase the living standard of those 90 percent of people living under the poverty line. In this context, Victor Benu, chairman of the Health Care Trade Union, points out that "the March 1 governmental decision will change virtually nothing in the financial standing of people living under the poverty line." According to the governmental decision, the monthly salaries of 40-76 lei will be increased by 1.5-8 lei, and pensions by 2.5-7.2 lei. The indexation will be made beginning March 1, 1995. Experts estimated that inflation stood in February, 1995 at 2.9 percent and in 1994 at 105 percent. The unions also demand that indexation be made beginning June 1, 1994, the date of the last increase in the minimum salary. Vice Premier Ion Gutu said earlier that the state lacks sufficient funds to meet the unions' demands, mentioning that the debts to the state budget amount to 300 million lei which is far larger than the salary arrears. Dumitru Nidelcu, labor and social protection minister, said that to implement the two decisions will require extra expenses of 92 million lei. Anyway, at the March 6 meeting of the FSI Council, many union leaders favoured the postponement of the March 18 rally if the government accepts the proposals included in the protocol- convention drafted at the meeting and which contains all the demands. The Cabinet is forced to accept them even with the risk of not fully honoring them to prevent large-scale protest actions before the local elections.

Gagauz Referendum Results Released in Comrat

AU0703201895 Chisinau BASAPRESS in English 1930 GMT 6 Mar 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Chisinau BASAPRESS, 6/3/1995—The referendum on determination of territory of Gagauz Yeri-Gagauzia autonomous formation was held yesterday, March 5. According to Vasile Neikovchin, spokesman of the Gagauz administration, the referendum took place on a territory encompassing 143,000 inhabitants, of which 110,000 have the right to vote. 98,500 of this number are Gagauzians [words indistinct] actively participated in the referendum. Vladimir Barbaneagra, chairman of a local electoral commission, told BASA that he, as a Moldovan, will favour Comrat's joining Gagauz-Yeri. "I believe that the Gagauz autonomy will become a factor of integration and not of dissensions within Moldova," mentioned Barbaneagra. The village of Chirsova, six kilometers away from Comrat and mainly inhabited by Bulgarians, also participated in the referendum. According to the local electoral commission, about 85 percent of its inhabitants showed up at the ballot sites. A Bulgarian ethnic told BASA that he will vote for Gagauz-Yeri because the special status law guarantees communication in Russian on the territory of Gagauzia and the right for self-determination if Moldova loses its independence. "I think that most of my fellow-villagers will vote for Gagauzia only for the reason that, being part of it, we will not unite with Romania," he said. According to the local police, the situation in the Comrat district was quiet during the referendum. Foreign observers and Moldovan governmental representatives were accredited at the ballot sites.

Results of Referendum in Gagauzia

Thirty localities in southern Moldova out of 36 that participated in yesterday's referendum to establish the Gagauzia's frontiers favoured the joining of the Gagauz-Yeri-Gagauzia, Vasile Neikovchin, spokesman of the Comrat Parliament, told BASA. According to Neikovchin, these results were released today in Comrat by the head of the joint governmental commission for holding the referendum, vice premier Valeriu Bulgar. Neikovchin said that it was stated at today's press conference that no violation during the referendum took place. The Comrat leadership gave as an argument the opinions expressed by the foreign observers who monitored the plebiscite. Neikovchin stated that a new referendum will take place in six localities in which the villagers did not favour the joining of Gagauz-Yeri. According to Neikovchin, this "is governed by the respective decision of the Moldovan Government and the law on Gagauz-Yeri which provides separately for the mechanism for adhering or exiting the Gagauz-Yeri." In addition, Neikovchin explained the failure of the referendum in the six localities by the insufficiency of mass agitation. According to him, one of these localities is a village densely inhabited with Gagauzians in the district of Basarabeasca. Also, the Bulgarian villages of the district of Taraclia did not participate in the plebiscite and some localities from the south of Moldova with a multi-ethnic population withdrew their signatures for participation in the referendum several days before its beginning. In this context, Neikovchin accused the Christian Democratic Popular Front [FPCD] of agitating the withdrawal of the signatures in favour of the referendum.

Gagauz Administration Blames FPCD for Incident

AU0703202995 Chisinau BASAPRESS in English 1930 GMT 6 Mar 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Chisinau BASAPRESS, 6/3/1995—The ballot site in Chiselia Mare, Comrat district, was devastated on the March 4 night, representatives of the Gagauz administration told BASA. In the opinion of the Comrat leadership, the incident was connected to the visit paid to Chiselia Mare by the editor-in-chief of the Christian Democratic Popular Front [FPCD] publication TARA Stefan Secareanu, originating from this village, and FPCD deputy Ion Neagu. BASA learned from the Comrat district police commissariats that the ballot site in Chiselia Mare is blocked by Neagu and Secareanu. However, the information that the site was devastated was not confirmed. Later BASA learned that actually the ballot site in Chiselia Mare was not blocked. Deputy Ion Neagu and Vice Justice Minister Valentin Verejan denied the information relayed by Comrat, mentioning that the ballot site was visited by international observers who found no irregularities. Only 13 out of 480 villagers showed up at the referendum at that moment. "In my opinion, certain Comrat leaders are interested in organizing an incident in Chiselia Mare to hold a new voting. They realize very well that most villagers here do not want to be included in Gagauz-Yeri," said Ion Neagu. Twenty people voted in this village altogether. Referring to the situation in this village Vasile Neikovchin, Gagauz parliamentary spokesman, told BASA that on the eve of the referendum FPCD followers Neagu and Secareanu "harassed the population to baffle the voting." Neikovchin mentioned that 218 people signed for the organization of the referendum, but only 20 showed up. FPCD representatives rejected accusations of a certain attempt to put pressure on Chiselia Mare villagers.

Topal Rules Out People Turning to Islam

AU0703211195 Chisinau BASAPRESS in English 1930 GMT 6 Mar 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Chisinau BASAPRESS, 6/3/1995—The recently-circulated rumors about a possible turning of Gagauzians to Islam after the establishment of the frontiers of the autonomous territory are preposterous, said Stepan Topal, president of the self-proclaimed Gagauz Republic, in an exclusive interview with BASA in Comrat. "For Gagauzians, to give up Christianity means a new deluge," said Topal. In his opinion, as a positive example to that respect may serve the functioning in Ceadar-Lunga of a lyceum financed by Turkey. "I am fully aware of the things going on in the lyceum and I know that there has not been so far any attempt on behalf of the teachers who are ardent Muslims to convert any of the children," said Topal. He also ruled out the possibility of pressures in this respect on behalf of Turkey, stating that Ankara is interested in preserving the Gagauz people as Christians, "who will serve Turks as a linking bridge to the European civilization and culture." Referring to the situation in the southern Moldova on the eve of the referendum, Topal said that it is calm, ruling out the possibility of incidents. "There were, of course, some disagreements during the preparations for the referendum, but they had a purely propaganda character," said Topal. In his opinion, conflict situations are no longer part of the future, even with reference to the localities forming Moldovan or Bulgarian enclaves.

Kazakhstan

Role as Buffer Between Russia, China Noted

954F1658A Almaty KARAVAN in Russian No 9, 3 Mar 95 p 7

[Article by Viktor Verk: "Claims to Sovereignty: Or What Is Happening 'Between Russia and China'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA recently published a lengthy article by Prime Minister Akezhan Kazhegeldin, in which the head of our government repeated yet again the proposition concerning the advantages of Kazakhstan's geopolitical position and the republic's unique role ensuing from this in the political processes of both the Central Asia region and of the whole world.**

But however vast Kazakhstan may be geographically and however rich it may be geologically, it will remain for a long time yet outside of the front ranks in the political sense. For lead roles in world politics it is necessary to have primarily substantial weight in world economics. About which we can as yet only dream. As an author of KARAVAN put it recently, Kazakhstan today is "bottled up in a semi-stable space between Russia and China."

However offensive it may be to us all (patriots in quotation marks and without), such an assessment is as yet the objective reality. This is how we are perceived overseas, in any event.

Following Belovezhskaya Pushcha, the sovereignty euphoria led to optimistic forecasts linked first and foremost with "oil illusions," bolstered to some extent by geological prospecting. And after the agreement with Chevron, the idea that in just a short space of time Kazakhstan would be a second Kuwait became firmly established in the minds of Kazakhstani patriots (not "national" and not "jingo" patriots at that time).

Meanwhile production (which is predominantly raw material-extractive and confined almost exclusively to Russia) has gone into a slump, and life has for some reason or other been doggedly reluctant to resemble that of Kuwait. A process aptly christened by a Russian journalist accredited in Kazakhstan—"mass diplomatization"—intensified, on the other hand. We were recognized by many countries and with great pleasure we exchanged embassies with them and decided that we were performing quite a serious role in world politics. **It was at that time that there came to lodge in many minds the naive certainty that it was sufficient for Kazakhstan to achieve if only some successes on the shining path of democratization, and the republic would immediately be engulfed in foreign investments and, most important, we would come to be a force to be reckoned with in the capitals of world politics. In short, prosperity!**

It was approximately such a conversation I had two years ago with a senior official of the president's staff. Having placed in the middle of the table an ashtray, he would alternately move up to it a matchbox, a pack of cigarettes, and a box of paperclips. "We conclude an agreement with America, we give up the missiles, investments will come from the West (the pack of Marlboro is moved in the direction of the ashtray), we settle all questions with China and the Far East 'tigers,' capital will flow from there (the box of paperclips 'revives'). And Russia... it has nowhere to go, as its products are uncompetitive on sales markets other than ours" (the paperclips, given a light flick of the finger, slide toward the ashtray).

That was the "foreign economic concept"....

Today my partner is no longer working on the president's staff, but an "exceptional airiness of thought" persists in many politicians (both in public service and not). Let us say for fairness' sake: Until the republic had abandoned the status of nuclear power, such hopes seemed not without foundation. But it is a tremendous distance from a fear of ill-considered actions to equal partnership. True, "against the security" of promises to make Kazakhstan a nuclear-free zone certain economic and political advance payments were received.

But only that. Yes, the republic acquired guarantees of its security from the nuclear superpowers. But as of today this is virtually the sole actual achievement of the sovereign state in four years of vigorous foreign policy activity.

Does what has been said mean that we acted precipitately, dumping our nuclear "baggage"? Some people seriously believe so. Mikhail Isinaliyev, ambassador at large of the Foreign Ministry, for example, who not that long since wrote a lengthy article in YURIDICHESKAYA GAZETA. Complaining that "certain circles" in Russia were encroaching on the territorial integrity of the independent Kazakhstani state, Mr. Isinaliyev summed up: "In this case we should be giving thought, perhaps, before it is too late, to whether we should be accelerating compliance with the international treaties that have been signed on the removal and destruction of the nuclear weapons" and, perhaps, even to "closing the border with Russia" and entrusting its security to forces of countries of the far abroad. The diplomat avoided saying which countries precisely, it is true.

Whatever the case, what is done, is done. And the country's leadership took these steps, what is more, not because of a "lack of patriotism" but in conformity with the actual political and economic situation. It is this that some of our inordinately "patriotic" politicians should understand, having determined for themselves the upper plank of the "level of the pretensions," as the psychologists say. But no! Talk about the "threat to the territorial integrity" of Kazakhstan (on the part of Russia primarily) continues to wander from newspaper to newspaper.

Yes, several hotheads prepared to bet on the "Anschluss" of Northeast Kazakhstan could be found in Moscow,

perhaps. But are the home-grown "fighters against separatism" not taking some people's personal viewpoint for the official position of the Russian leadership?

There are, alas, sufficient gentlemen Manilovs here with us. Having come to believe in Kazakhstan's "particular role" in world politics, they are talking in all seriousness about the "strategic preference" that the United States should give us over Russia. Yes, there is, truly, somewhat of a cooling, as they say, toward Moscow on Washington's part (particularly in the context of the Chechen events). Yes, a similar picture is showing through in Russia's relations with the European Community also. But the Russian Federation remains, first, a nuclear power and, second, the actual inheritor of the lion's share of the military and economic potential of the USSR. And, to be honest, it is astonishing to read in an official publication (the newspaper of the Cabinet of Ministers!) such lines as the following: "None other than Washington could render Kazakhstan effective assistance in the mobilization of international financial aid for stabilization of the republic's economy at the macrolevel. Kazakhstan also is entitled to hope for the more profound involvement of the U.S. private sector in its economy...." Even more amazing is the signature beneath this publication... of Kaszymzhomart Tokayev, minister of foreign affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan. It is hardly likely that he could be deluded as to his country's "particular role" in international affairs. As also to the fact that the rescue of drowning persons is a job for themselves. That is, the "more profound involvement" of American capital in our economy will depend first and foremost on our own efforts to create a precise legal basis for the activity of Western investors. Nor was the minister embarrassed in confessing on republic television recently that "Kazakhstan does not as yet figure on the list of countries with a favorable investment climate." But in this case why should the Americans (or the West as a whole) be in any hurry with financial infusions? After all, it is well known that they do not give money "for beautiful eyes" there. In any event, we should not be counting particularly either on "Kazakhstan's unique geographical position" or on the wealth of its mineral resources or grain fields. It is sufficient to recall, for example, that last year Russia—traditionally the principal consumer of Kazakhstan's grain—got by without purchasing any, practically.

The main thing that we need now is the adequacy of the perception of ourselves in the surrounding world. For which Kazakhstan in one case is "the place of the habitation of 6 million compatriots," in another, "the space between Russia and China." Whether we become in the future some third case will depend not so much on our pretensions as on actual economic development.

Rescue Planned for Troubled Metals Giant

LD0703195995 Almaty Kazakh Radio Network in Russian 1500 GMT 7 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] President Nursultan Nazarbayev held a meeting today on issues of getting the Karaganda metallurgical industrial complex out of its grave state of crisis. Prime Minister Akezhan Qazhygeldin, his deputy Vitaliy Mette, and Petr (Nefedov), the head of the Karaganda regional administration, as well as a number of ministers took part in the meeting. They heard a report on the issue by Anatoliy (Botov), the director general of the industrial complex, who has held this post only since the end of last year.

During the discussions on methods to improve the situation at the enterprise, which is a leading Kazakh industrial plant, it was noted that its current inactivity and poor state were due largely to the severance of traditional economic links as a result of the breakup of the USSR, to the many-fold rises in prices of fuel and raw materials, and to the nonpayments that have affected the republic deeply. Suffice it to say that the metallurgy workers owe their partners debts of more than 13 billion tenge, and the debts its consumers have incurred for output from the factory are close to 7 billion [currency not specified].

At the end of the discussions, the Cabinet of Ministers was set the task of producing and implementing a package of measures to get the Karaganda factory out of its dead-end in the shortest possible time.

Causes of Continuing Oil Scandal Analyzed

954F1657A Almaty KARAVAN in Russian No 9, 3 Mar 95 p 8

[Article by Yevgeniy Kosenko: "Tell Me Who Your Partner Is...."]

[FBIS Translated Text] **The latest scandal surrounding Kazakhstan oil can hardly be expected to cause an international sensation. And it is not so much the fact that all participants prefer to maintain "a happy face in a sorry business," as much as it is the regularity of what took place. Such incidents have long become a kind of distinctive national hobby for our republic. Suffice it to recall the multi-million counterclaims on the part of Mangistaumunaygaz and United World Trade at the outset of 1993, annulment of the contract with Bidermann International in July 1994, and the hasty curtailment of cooperation with Elf Aquitaine.**

It is significant that the enumerated events, which in no way present a complete picture of Kazakhstan's "misfires" along the oil "trail," were no surprise to any major oil company in the world. Moreover, from all appearances the Kazakhstan Government was ready for them as well. Preparing for its transaction with Bidermann, the republic leadership thoroughly studied expert-review materials indicating the entirely dubious reputation of this firm, but readily took the risk all the same. Such tactics plunged into confusion the majority of reputable oil industrialists, who in turn analyzed the situation and reached the quite remarkable conclusion that cooperation with Kazakhstan's oil industry is built in accordance with the trust principle. In what way were branches of the Smagulov type so tempting for republic residents? It was the fact that you could get tremendous amounts of real income with a minimum of effort. A similar approach was used on the state level in the sphere of oil policy. In November 1992, Mr. Marabayev, then deputy head of the Mangistau Oblast administration, reported triumphantly that he had found a certain partner thanks to whom "we will get 40 percent of the oil production without putting any funds into development of the oil fields there."

The principle of "get without giving" operated flawlessly, and only chance prevented local people from concluding a contract for more than a quarter of a century with Oman Oil Company (the partner Mangistau leaders considered their ideal).

Now that Oman is playing first fiddle in the scandal with Chevron, Kazakhstan prefers not to advertise its longstanding friendly ties with this firm, affording Chevron itself the opportunity to clear up the ticklish situation that has come about. This author has had repeated occasion to contact representatives of the oil concerns who unanimously lament the problems of operating in our republic. One of the main problems cited was the powerful lobbying by high-ranking officials of the interests of "their own" clients at the expense of other firms, and the incompetence—unprecedented by Western standards—of Kazakhstan officials in selecting dubious partners.

But is this simply a matter of incompetence? Or are we once again seeing dominance of the principle, "My pocket is dearer to me"? The sweet fairy tale of limitless reserves of free oil brings great dividends exclusively to its authors. As far as republic interests are concerned, the benefit of such activity continues to remain close to zero. All of this cannot go on forever, however. Sooner or later the world community will either have to "cross off" Kazakhstan as an oil power or firmly require that the government radically change its attitude towards the problem of "black gold."

Verk on Kuanyshalin's 'Delicate Questions'

954F1654A Almaty KARAVAN in Russian No 9, 3 Mar 95 p 6

[Commentary by Viktor Verk: "'Conquering' Europe Is Not the Same as Writing to KARAVAN! Or, Why Is It That Deputies Love Government Messenger Delivery So Much?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **Yes, there still are truth-seekers in the land of Kazakhstan! Our newspaper's popularity and circulation make them restless—they resort to any tricks to use KARAVAN for self-promotion. First deputy Shekeyev inundated us with his endless complaints (everything very proper, on formal parliament stationery, sent by the government messenger service). Now Mr. Shekeyev's colleague—Zhasaral Kuanyshalin—has decided to follow in his footsteps.**

After the publication of our material "National-Patriots 'Conquer' Europe" (KARAVAN, 3 February 1995), the people's elected representative took a long time to collect his wits, and finally, more than three weeks later, sent to the editors (on deputy stationery, of course) a surprisingly restrained letter, in which he expresses his intent to "sort out a number of delicate issues." Well, Mr. Kuanyshalin, we respect your right to ask questions, and therefore I (on behalf of the KARAVAN editors and myself personally) am ready to answer. Onward then.... **"What does the rubric 'At First Hand' mean in this case?"** you ask. "Since it is my report, then the 'first hand' from which it is obtained also should be mine, of course. I assume that this is what the readers thought too (!). However, I personally have not made my report available to any newspaper. Moreover, I still do not know who did it against my will, thus appropriating not only my "hand" but also my copyright (!)" For Allah's sake, esteemed Zhake! Of all people, you, a parliament member, should be versed in a conversation subject before staring it. Nobody encroached on your copyright. You may personally ascertain this by coming to the editorial offices and reading your own signature under our copy of your report. And it is precisely because it is signed by you that we published it in the newspaper under the rubric "At First Hand" (from the horse's mouth, if you wish!). Or is it in fact not **your** report and **it was not you** who made in Brussels the statements quoted by KARAVAN? In this case, share the secret: **Who?** And what is the point of sending with the letter another, your own copy, which matches ours word for word? As to who gave it to us.... If you, a parliament member, do not know the text of the law "On the Press".... It says that the editors have the right to not reveal the source from which information has been obtained. Not only journalists but even most readers already know this. It is unlikely that any of them could seriously assume that you yourself would want to reproduce in more than 300,000 copies contentions such as: **"And Kazakhstan is an undivided ethnic territory of only the Kazakh nation. All its other inhabitants, regardless of the time they have lived here, are diasporas of other nations, which have their ethnic... states outside Kazakhstan..., where their languages rightfully are state languages"** (quoted from KARAVAN). I doubt that you, Mr. Kuanyshalin, are right as an historian, let alone a politician and a human being. It follows that, for instance, my father, who has given 40 years to Kazakhstan's geology, explored tens of mineral deposits (which, by the way, are exploited to this day to the benefit of all of us—Kazakhs and non-Kazakhs), has not earned the right to state status for the language that he considered native and in which he wanted to educate his children and grandchildren? I can imagine how he would "rejoice," had he lived to January 1993, to see how, at the whim of 200-plus of your predecessors—the previous Supreme Soviet's deputies—the majority of Kazakhstan's population (including his own son) **found themselves de jure in a position of "second-class citizens"**! Oh, yes, but he is, after all, one of those who "en masse colonized the Kazakh land" under the plausible pretext of "industrialization"! And, like all "colonizers," he rushed about the Central Kazakhstan steppes, shivered from cold in a tent in winter and tormented by heat in summer "not for Kazakhs but for himself"! You would agree that this is precisely the meaning, which I find blasphemous, that follows from the entire "logic" of your opus! I can cite tens more of such quotes from you, but I will not do it. We do not have either space to spare nor the desire to once again immerse in **this** our readers, whom I do respect. Unlike you. Because it is hard to explain your request to publish the report in its entirety (which is apparently the reason you sent us the letter). And finally, as a member of KARAVAN's editorial board, I officially state that KARAVAN is not going avail you of such a great opportunity to advertise yourself free of charge. And the point is not only the editors' reluctance to propagate your very arguable (to put it mildly!) views, but also elementary logic. Judge for yourself—when journalists write about parliamentary debates, it does not occur to anyone to demand of us to first publish in full the meeting's transcript and only then comment on particular statements of deputies. This is regarding your **"right to communicate with the reader audience directly, without mediation of any... "reviewers."** It would be another matter if you brought your report to us **yourself**. Then, as the saying goes, you are your own master: You agree to editorial cuts if you wish, or you are free to take it to another newspaper. And of course under any circumstances we retain the right to editorial comment to any material or situation. Civilized contact with the press is not to your liking, however. Perhaps because we are, as you put it, "the Kazakhstan ilk of Great-Russia chauvinists." **Or perhaps because, in the final count, you have nothing in a way of counterargument.** Or perhaps it is just simply more convenient to communicate through... government messengers.

P.S. In the article "National-Patriots 'Conquer' Europe," Mr. Kuanyshalin's speech was quoted to an extremely mild extent. We did not inform our readers, for instance, of such opinion of his as: The national referendum on the questions of private ownership of land, bilinguality, and the nature of statehood will be followed by **"great bloodshed of inter-ethnic and civil war"** (!) Some prognosis, is it not, dear reader? The question is: Did KARAVAN have the moral right to distribute such "revelations"? The answer, I think, is clear: **God save us from such "prophets"—both in our land and others"!**

Sultanov on SNEK Conversion to Party

954F1683A Almaty PANORAMA in Russian No 9, 4 Mar 95 p 8

[Interview with K.S. Sultanov, chairman of the Union of People's Unity of Kazakhstan Party, by N.M.; place and date not given: "The SNEK Thus Far Looks for the Support of 10-15 Percent of the Population"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Immediately following the conclusion of the congress, the chairman of the newly formed party granted PANORAMA an exclusive interview.

[N.M.] Kuanysh Sultanovich, what brought about the need for the conversion of the SNEK [Union of People's Unity of Kazakhstan] movement into a party?

[Sultanov] A movement lacks many of the norms that pertain to political parties. Specifically, the formation of a party presupposes the existence of more precise discipline, a program, and political goals. In addition, our legislation will in the future, evidently, assume the participation in elections and other aspects of public life of political parties.

The two years that the union has been in existence were necessary also for a study of the approaches to the present situation of a multiparty society and were very useful for gaining experience.

[N.M.] By what kind of time is the adoption of laws regulating the country's political life possible?

[Sultanov] The present law on public movements was adopted in Soviet times under the CPSU. We now have to adopt a new law on political parties, and such a draft is being drawn up. It is hard to speak precisely about the timeframe of its adoption: It is known that parliament has worked intensively and has adopted important, complex laws as of late. And no less important ones—on public service, the Cabinet of Ministers, and the Supreme Council—lie ahead.

[N.M.] You said in your report that it is essential in composing the structure of the party to take advantage of our people's mentality—to employ the format of the Central Committee and the oblast party committees?

[Sultanov] Yes. After all, the Communist Party was the ruling party, and it had immense experience of work with the masses. And it is no sin for any present party either, therefore, to borrow individual procedures and elements of the power party.

[N.M.] That is, the SNEK aims to become the ruling party?

[Sultanov] It is too early to speak about this at this time. There should today be different reference points: If our party can influence 10-15 percent of the population, this will be a big success.

[N.M.] There are many ideologists in the Central Committee. Who will determine the economic platform?

[Sultanov] Mention may be made in the Central Committee of Kenzhegali Sagadiyev, doctor of economic sciences, academician, and president of the National Academy of Sciences, and Nurgali Mamyrov, dean of the National Economy Academy. I believe, incidentally, that the government is represented quite modestly in our Central Committee—two liberal arts ministers and several deputy ministers.

[N.M.] I have to ask about Mr. S. Abdrakhmanov's letter. Your comment in this connection?

[Sultanov] This is his concern, his position. I cannot agree that the entire SNEK leadership was bad. It had various people, himself included.

[N.M.] Could your reelection as chairman of the new party's Central Committee be seen as the creation of a backup exit should you leave parliament or in case it is dissolved?

[Sultanov] I consider my reelection not a backup exit but an extra load. But inasmuch as I have been in this movement right from the start, I cannot abandon it half-way. And no one has presented complaints such as to induce me to drop this cause. I must strive to ensure that the party become viable, at least. I have not been elected forever, after all—you can see for yourself what potential strong leaders have been assembled in the Central Committee itself.

Kyrgyzstan

Akayev Welcomes Visit by Czech Foreign Minister

LD0703191495 Bishkek Kyrgyz Radio First Program Network in Russian 1200 GMT 7 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] President Askar Akayev of Kyrgyzstan received an official Czech delegation led by Foreign Minister Jozef Zieleniec at Government House today. Here is a recording:

[Begin Akayev recording] In the 1930s there were Czechs and Slovaks working in our country, and they set up an interior [as heard] that had great influence on developing the industry, science, and culture of the time. They played an eminent role in the formation of Kyrgyzstan. All of us, of course, are grateful. We all very much wanted our traditional ties of friendship, economic cooperation, and the cultural exchanges between our countries to maintained somehow after the Soviet Union, the socialist system, collapsed.

Now we have revived the remarkable old traditions that we used to have. Therefore, we are very glad, Mr. Minister. It was my wish that a high-level delegation should come from the Czech Republic, and that, as I mentioned to dear Mr. Ambassador, we should begin expanding and deepening the cooperation between our countries again. I am very glad that our wishes have been heard in the Czech Republic, and today I am glad to welcome such a high delegation led by the minister of foreign affairs.

Well, I have heard a great deal from afar about your constructive activity. I have read many kind words written by economists studying reforms in the post-socialist world, saying that you were one of those few economists who guessed in what direction the reform of the socialist planned-command economy would be carried out, and you have earned high praise. It makes me doubly glad.

I believe your visit will mark the beginning of a dynamic phase in the development of relations between our countries. [end recording] [passage omitted]

Minister Calls for Restoration of Ties

LD0703135195 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1115 GMT 7 Mar 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Boris Maynayev]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Bishkek, 7 Mar (ITAR-TASS)—The restoration of traditional ties between Kyrgyzstan and the Czech Republic is the purpose of a one-day official visit to Kyrgyzstan by Czech Minister for Foreign Affairs Jozef Zielenic. During his working day he met with [Kyrgyz] President Askar Akayev and Prime Minister Apas Dzhumagulov. The sides noted their mutual interest in the deepening of economic and political ties between the two countries.

"The market transformations in Kyrgyzstan, privatization, and the course of reforms assure us of the need for restoring the two countries' ties," Zielenic said. "We found that both the prime minister and the president understand this. The Kyrgyz leadership has shown interest in the Czech machine- and car-building industries, textiles, rail car-building, electrical devices, and pharmacology. We intend to prepare legal foundations for further cooperation. This depends on agreements on protecting investments and on state guarantees for investments. Both countries need a trade and economic agreement". [passage omitted]

Central Election Commission Confirms Deputies' Mandates

LD0703180895 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1418 GMT 7 Mar 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] BISHKEK, Mar 7 (Interfax)—The Central Election Commission [CEC] in Kyrgyzstan has confirmed the mandates of 76 deputies of the country's newly-elected parliament.

CEC officials told Interfax on Tuesday [7 March] that 22 deputies have become members of the 35-seat Legislative Assembly (upper house) and 54 members of the 70-seat Chamber of People's Representatives (lower house) after two rounds of voting on February 5 and 19.

Earlier, the commission said it had registered 89 deputies but later withdrew the registration of a number of deputies because of complaints of vote-rigging by their rivals, a CEC official said.

However, he said that most of the grievances were groundless and the remaining deputies' mandates would be confirmed by Thursday to help ensure a quorum needed to open the first session of parliament.

The date will be set by a presidential decree if there is a quorum, Presidential Spokesman Kamil Bayalinov said.

Industrial, Agricultural Output Down

LD0803112995 Bishkek AALAM in Kyrgyz No 7, March 95 p1

[Unattributed report: "The Situation Is Tough"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The republic has already faced very negative economic features in the first months of 1995. Moreover, the economic indices fell sharply in comparison with January last year. In January 1995, 121 enterprises were at a standstill in the republic, of which 21 were in Bishkek, 13 were in Issyk-Kul, 15 in Dzhalalabad, 10 in Naryn, 26 in Osh, 10 in Talas, and 20 in Chuy.

Nor has there been any praiseworthy work in agriculture. As compared to last year, meat output fell by 4,300 tonnes, milk by 8,200 tonnes, while egg production fell by 14,800. According to economists the inflation rate should not exceed three percent per month, but unfortunately the inflation rate reached 7.1 percent last month.

Tajikistan

UN Observers Chief To Meet Islamic Movement Leader

LD0803093895 (Clandestine) Voice of Free Tajikistan in Tajik 0335 GMT 8 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] General Hasan Abbas, head of the UN military observers in Tajikistan, is to arrive in Taleqan in the Islamic State of Afghanistan on 10 March in order to meet Professor Abdullah Nuri Saidov, the leader of the Islamic Movement of Tajikistan. Official sources of the Islamic Movement of Tajikistan say that this is the first official meeting by the head of the UN military observers with the leader of the jihad movement of Tajikistan. It is envisaged that the conversation will focus mainly on violations of the cease-fire, the reaction of the Dushanbe regime to the peace-seeking actions of the Islamic Movement of Tajikistan, and internal pressure and lack of security in Tajikistan.

One of the serious issues to be considered is the withdrawal of the Dushanbe regime's forces from Darvaz and the handover of the region that was under their control to the mojahedin. It should be said that, when the cease-fire agreement was signed, (Kholdorobod) Pass was a region under the control of the Islamic Movement of Tajikistan but, contrary to the agreement, the regime dispatched forces to Darvaz and caused the situation in the region to become tense. This took place despite the fact that the second paragraph of this agreement bans the entry of any forces into the other side's region while the cease-fire is in operation.

Opposition's Cease-Fire Extension Accepted

LD0703183195 Dushanbe Radio Tajikistan Network in Russian 1000 GMT 7 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Tajik opposition leaders have extended the term of the agreement on a cessation of hostilities on the country's borders for another 50 days. The Government of the Republic of Tajikistan issued a statement in this connection. It was made public by Zafar Saidov, head of the Foreign Ministry's information department:

[Begin Saidov recording] The Government of Tajikistan empowered me to make the following statement:

In view of the fact that the information departments of foreign states are disseminating the statement by the Tajik opposition leaders extending the term of the 18 September last year agreement on a temporary cease-fire and other hostilities both inside the country and on the Tajik-Afghan border for another 50 days, I have to say that the stand taken by the leadership of the Republic of Tajikistan on the future of the above agreement was made clear as long ago as 25 January this year in a message from President Emomali Rakhmonov to UN Secretary-General Butrus Butrus-Ghali. The message said that the republic's government was prepared to do all it could to continue the Tajik talks and that it did not see any reasonable alternative to a peaceful settlement of the Tajik internal conflict. This is the principled stand taken by the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan.

In this context it was stated that the inter-Tajik agreement on a temporary cease-fire is a starting point for continuing the negotiations and that it is seen as an exceptionally important document by Tajikistan's leadership.

At that time the president of the country stated that the agreement could be extended for any term, without any additional conditions. This position, which the president set down in his message, remains in force. [end recording]

Refusal of Moscow Talks 'Frees Hands' of Gunmen

MM0703151695 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Mar 95 p 1

[Article by Aleksandr Pelts: "How Will Ramadan End? The Armed Tajik Opposition Has Refused To Hold Another Round of Talks in Moscow"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Islamic world is observing one of its main festivals—Ramadan. It is also being celebrated in Tajikistan. Speaking on national television in this regard, President Emomali Rakhmanov of the republic emphasized that for the people now "...there is no more important boon than a world of unity and prosperity." Calls for the Tajiks' unity have also been heard in Tajikistan's main cathedral mosques.

But will these prayers be heard by those who have now been waging an armed struggle against the present power for over two years? Recent events attest that there is little hope of this.

At the end of February this year one of the leaders of the Tajik armed opposition stated his refusal to hold another round of the inter-Tajik dialogue in Moscow. (Let us recall that the fourth official meeting of delegations from the opposition and the authorities was to have been held here). We are seeing a clear attempt by the opposition to exert pressure and a reluctance to "play an away game."

In connection with that statement UN Deputy Secretary General Aldo Ayelo [name as transliterated] flew urgently from Dushanbe to Islamabad to continue consultations on an inter-Tajik settlement.

The political means of resolving the problem have not been exhausted. But the obviously increased activeness of gunmen in internal regions of Tajikistan and on the Tajik-Afghan border is alarming. Not a week passes without another armed provocation. Thus, a few days ago unknown bandits shot two policemen with an assault rifle at virtually point-blank range. This happened on one of Dushanbe's lively avenues.

Last Sunday Russian border guards (the Khorog Border Detachment) engaged in a combat clash with another group of border violators, who continued crossing the Pyandzh even after warning shots. The result was that two violators were killed, while the rest were arrested and handed over to the local law-enforcement organs.

These and other provocations confirm that the opposition is ready for another offensive. The opposition's refusal to hold another round of the inter-Tajik dialogue "frees" the hands of the most aggressive groupings. They are prepared to start combat operations even now.

On the whole, the situation in the republic remains extremely explosive. Since the start of 1995 more than 10 Russian servicemen in Tajikistan have died at the hands of unidentified criminals. Unfortunately, the republic's investigative organs have not yet cleared up any of these criminal cases.

Turkmenistan

Czech Foreign Minister Welcomes Economic Agreement

LD0603223995 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1750 GMT 6 Mar 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Anna Kurbanova]

[FBIS Translated Text] Ashgabat, 6 Mar—Extending to the maximum economic, trade, and scientific and technical links with Turkmenistan is in the interests of the Czech Republic, Foreign Minister Josef Zieleniec stated at a news conference on the results of his visit to Ashgabat. Experts are unanimous that the agreement signed today on trade and economic cooperation between the Czech Republic and Turkmenistan is a graphic illustration of this. The agreement was the first official document on Czech-Turkmen business relations.

The Czech Republic, its foreign minister noted, sees good prospects in establishing a mutually advantageous trade turnover with Turkmenistan, which is rich in the raw materials that Czech industry so needs. Turkmen cotton and gas will be supplied to the Czech Republic in exchange for traditional Czech goods: The output of the machine-building industry, locomotives, vehicles, textiles, footwear, and other consumer goods.

Zieleniec expressed his country's interest in building a Turkmenistan-Iran-Turkey-Europe transcontinental gas pipeline.

Representatives of Czech business circles who took part in the talks in Ashgabat expressed their readiness to set up cooperative links in the production of building materials, chemical products, and the establishment of a joint venture to assemble "Avia" cars.

International Funding for Aral Projects Detailed

LD0703193595 Ashgabat TURKMEN PRESS in Russian 1409 GMT 6 Mar 95

[Article: "Heads of the States Surrounding the Aral Sea Agree To Cooperate Closely on Solving the Region's Problems and Call on the World Community To Support Their Efforts"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The heads of the five states of the region surrounding the Aral Sea basin met in Tashauz on 3 March to develop a common strategy for tackling the problems of improving the region's ecological environment. The main result of the summit was a striking demonstration of the mutual aspiration of the heads of Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan to continue tackling various matters of regional cooperation jointly, on both a bilateral and multilateral basis.

The agenda for the Tashauz meeting included six basic issues, the most topical of which was the creation of funds for the International Save the Aral Fund. At the moment, only 15 percent of the originally agreed sum has reached the account of the Fund's executive directorate. Turkmenistan and Tajikistan have offered to use their entrance fees to implement national projects for solving the Aral problem. However, international organizations and donor- countries are only ready to give gratis grants (about 39 million dollars) if the five founders pay in 100 percent of their entrance fees. Apart from this, foreign donors intend to invest money only in regional projects.

In this connection, at the meeting it was decided to set up the Aral Ecobank which will accumulate funds for implementing joint projects. This naturally does not rule out the possibility of conducting national programs to save the Aral.

The Interstate Council and International Save the Aral Fund have fulfilled one of their principal tasks, as the heads of the Asian states noted: The attention of the world community has been drawn to the problem of the Aral Sea and the surrounding region.

The Paris conference of donor-countries for the Aral Sea held under the aegis of the World Bank in June 1994 was excellent proof of this. Besides the gratis grants mentioned above for start of the pre-investment works and for a feasibility study on the first phase of the Program of Specific Actions to Save the Aral, the World Bank is prepared to give an additional two million dollars to support the new interstate organizations and also fund the second stage of the program, although it is true that this will be on condition that the money is repaid. The European Union is supporting the project for reviving the Aral Sea, allocating 5.5 million dollars to fund technical assistance via the TACIS program. The Italian company Aquater is to start providing this assistance from 1 February this year. Substantial aid is coming through UN channels. Israel has expressed a wish join the International Fund with an entrance fee of up to three million dollars.

The head of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev, was re-elected president of the International Save the Aral Fund. The deputy chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers of Turkmenistan, Matkarim Razhabov, was made chairman of the Executive Committee of the Interstate Council.

The heads of state agreed to hold the next summit on 18-20 September in Nukus, where an international conference on the Aral is to be held under UN auspices at that time, with major international organizations and leading countries participating.

Armenia

Azerbaijan Accused of 'Full-Scale Warfare'

LD0703175895 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1744 GMT 7 Mar 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Tigran Liloyan]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Yerevan March 7 TASS—Armenian Defence Ministry accused Azerbaijan of "proceeding from the tactics of borderline provocations to a full-scale warfare" on Tuesday [7 March].

According to the Ministry's press service, situation at the Armenian-Azerbaijanian border was tense on Monday.

Azerbaijanian artillery, tanks and gunmen shot on the villages of Movses, Aigepar, Nerkin and Karmirakhpyur in the Taush district in north-eastern Armenia from 12:00 to 16:40 GMT on Monday. Armenia took retaliatory measures. One Armenian serviceman was killed and four others were wounded.

Tensions have been running high at other stretches of the Armenian-Azerbaijanian border, too. According to Armenian Defence Ministry, borderline villages situated in eastern and north-eastern Armenia drew fire from Azeri machine guns of large calibre and other firearms on Monday evening and night.

For instance, the village of Sarigyukh (the Inzhevan district) drew fire from 16:30 to 17:00 GMT on Monday; the village of Vagan (the Krasnoselsky district) - from 18:30 to 00:35 GMT; the villages of Berdavan and dovekh (the Noemberyan district) - from 20:00 to 00:00 GMT. There were no loses, the Armenian party did not open retaliatory fire, Armenian Defence Ministry emphasized.

Ter-Petrosyan, Aliyev Agree To Observe Cease-Fire

NC0703201795 Yerevan Armenia's Radio First Program Network in Armenian 1900 GMT 7 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] I begin the newscast with a report just received from the republic's presidential press service: A telephone conversation took place today between President Levon Ter-Petrosyan and Azerbaijani President Geydar Aliyev during which the recent frequent cease-fire violations by the Azerbaijani armed formations in the border areas of Tavush region were discussed. Agreement was reached during the conversation on implementing the cease-fire agreement through direct contacts between the defense ministers of the two countries.

Edict Provides for Survivors of 1915 Genocide

LD0703230495 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1630 GMT 7 Mar 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Tigran Liloyan]

[FBIS Translated Text] Yerevan 7 Mar—An edict of Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrosyan, published today, makes provision for a number of measures for state support for persons who survived the genocide of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire in 1915. In accordance with the document, Armenians who survived the genocide, who are not citizens of Armenia and who are now living in the diaspora will receive a special permit to reside in the republic. This category includes Armenians who were born before 1915 in western Armenia and in Ottoman Turkey. They will be presented with a special Armenian passport and will not be charged the corresponding fee.

The president has instructed the republic's government to draw up a register of Armenian citizens who survived the genocide. Social protection measures will be envisaged for them.

The president's edict has been adopted in the context of preparations for functions dedicated to the 80th anniversary of the genocide, which will be marked in April. An international academic conference, the opening of a museum of the history of the genocide and the publishing of books will be timed to coincide with that date.

Azerbaijan

UN Help Sought on Armenian Cease-Fire Violations

LD0803090695 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 0800 GMT 8 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] In view of the Armenian armed forces' gross violation of the cease-fire, Azerbaijan has appealed to the UN Security Council to call on Yerevan to immediately stop military operations and continue talks, Azerbaijan Foreign Minister Gasan Gasanov told the agency KHABAR-SERVICE.

Baku Accuses Armenia of Cease-Fire Violations

LD0703194795 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1848 GMT 7 Mar 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Baku, Mar 7 (INTERFAX)—The Azerbaijani Defense Ministry has blamed Armenia for breaching the bilateral ceasefire agreement.

In its statement published in Baku Tuesday, the ministry said Armenian units had been intensively shelling the northwestern districts of Azerbaijan during the past days. In particular, the village Ali-Beili in the Tauz district and Azerbaijani positions around came under artillery fire on March 6 which left three Azerbaijani servicemen wounded and one civilian killed. Last Monday, shelling resumed in the afternoon to end by Tuesday [7 March] morning, the ministry said.

The Azerbaijani ministry reported all violations of the ceasefire to the CIS headquarters for coordinating military cooperation. In particular, the Azerbaijani representative in the headquarters stated that Azerbaijani artillery will suppress the enemy's firing emplacements in the bordering Berdsky and Idzhevan districts of Armenia, if the Armenian troops did not stop shelling.

Prior to this, the Armenian Defense Ministry reported Azerbaijani attacks on Armenian positions near the village Aigepar in the Taush district over the last weekend. It emphasized that the attacks were supported by armored vehicles and shelling the villages Moves and Aigepar.

According to the Armenian Defense Ministry press office, "the offensive attempt was repelled, the Armenian troops launched a counterattack and the Azerbaijanis had to retreat to their previous positions." As a result, two Armenian servicemen were killed and 20 wounded, including four Aigepar residents.

U.S. OSCE Official Visits Karabakh

LD0703184395 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1702 GMT 7 Mar 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Tigran Liloyan]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Yerevan March 7 TASS—U.S. Representative in the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group for Nagorno-Karabakh, Joe Pressel, ended his visit to the region today.

Pressel visited Baku, Stepanakert and Yerevan for talks with the leaders of Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia.

The talks of the American diplomat were confidential.

This was the first visit of the OSCE Minsk Group delegate to the conflict region since the Budapest summit of leaders of OSCE states.

The U.S. wants peace efforts of the OSCE Minsk conference to continue, Pressel said, adding that it is important to reach at least small changes which would facilitate a political agreement on settlement in Karabakh.

Sources reported from Stepanakert that the Karabakh leadership reaffirmed willingness to consolidate a ceasefire for further negotiation with Azerbaijan.

Stepanakert says any settlement programmes should give equal attention to interests of conflicting parties.

President of the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave Robert Kocharyan expressed hope that mediators would generate for a meeting of the OSCE Minsk Group ahead in Stockholm a format of talks sensitive to the region's situation and acceptable for all parties in the conflict.

Gasanov Views Pipeline With Kazakh Envoy

NC0703152395 Baku Azerbaycan Radio Televiziyasi Television Network in Azeri 1250 GMT 7 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Gasan Gasanov received Kazakhstan's Ambassador to Baku Ibrahim Amangaliyev today. The ambassador handed a letter to Gasan Gasanov from Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev addressed to Azerbaijani President Geydar Aliyev in connection with the laying of the pipeline. [not further explained] He said that a meeting at expert level is planned in Almaty between 9-10 March to discuss this issue.

Ibrahim Amangaliyev also handed over a Kazakh-sponsored draft agreement on the consolidation of mutual security in Asia. Gasan Gasanov noted that Azerbaijan will soon make its views known on these two proposals.

Matters relating to the development of friendly and all-around cooperation between the two countries were also discussed during the meeting.

Elchibey Views Future of Aliyev Government

954F1676A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 9, 1 Mar 95 p 11

["Exclusive" interview with A. Elchibey, ex-president of Azerbaijan, by correspondent Elmira Akhundova; place and date not given: "This Dreamer Elchibey"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Nakhichevan-Ordubad-Keleki-Baku—**When the situation around the village of Keleki, where A. Elchibey, the ex-president of Azerbaijan, resides, had become inflamed to the limit and had begun to reek of great bloodshed, the National Assembly decided to send to Nakhichevan a group of deputies and professionals to attempt to find a way out of the crisis on the spot. I flew to the autonomous republic together with the deputies. The meetings and contacts with the population of the alpine villages of Ordubadskiy Rayon, which is located in the vicinity of Keleki, persuaded us of at least two facts: First, there truly are many weapons among the local inhabitants. Second, Elchibey is loved here, people are proud of him, and at the critical moment all would to a man rise to his defense.**

While the deputies were socializing with the people of Keleki, I managed to get an interview with A. Elchibey.

[Akhundova] Abulfaz-bey, what is this business of presidential edicts that you are supposed to be continuing to issue?

[Elchibey] I have signed just one or two such edicts since the events of June 1993. They concerned the appointment of people to my administrative staff, which is located in Keleki. In my appeals and letters to officials I do, indeed, sometimes sign off as president of Azerbaijan.

[Akhundova] So you continue to consider yourself head of state?

[Elchibey] I was forcibly removed from power as a result of an armed coup and am prepared to prove this in any international court.

[Akhundova] Whence the inference that you also question the legitimacy of the present leadership of the republic?

[Elchibey] Yes, I consider it illegal.

[Akhundova] How, then, in this case is the "Keleki-official Baku" confrontation to be resolved?

[Elchibey] There is no confrontation.

[Akhundova] But one republic cannot have two presidents.

[Elchibey] Who said that there are two? Power is de facto in the hands of Geydar Aliyev. I, however, consider myself president de jure. I do not have my own army here and I am not contemplating an armed coup. I simply want my people finally to understand the rudiments of democracy. Today they have understood that Suret Guseynov was a common rebel and tomorrow they will understand that Geydar Aliyev was elected president as a result of a rebellion. I will in the future bring suit against the people who perpetrated the coup d'etat. That is, we will struggle within the framework of the law. I am opposed to violence in any form.

[Akhundova] But Ayaz Mutalibov also considers himself the legitimate president, maintaining that the People's Front came to power as a result of an armed coup.

[Elchibey] This is a very interesting question. Truly, all three presidents consider themselves the legitimate leaders of the republic.

[Akhundova] It is still said about you that you came to power following the use of force, that is why you were treated with violence also.

[Elchibey] There is, you know, a certain grain of truth in what A. Mutalibov says. The people rose up, protesting the policy that he was pursuing, and forced him to resign. That is, force truly was employed. But Mutalibov's resignation had nothing to do with me. After A. Mutalibov, the country was headed by Ya. Mamedov, and I, on the other hand, proposed that presidential elections not be held until the situation in Azerbaijan had stabilized. Unfortunately, parliament passed a different decision. When the nomination of presidential candidates began, I saw on this list a person who had no moral right to lay claim to the office of head of state. Lest I jeopardize the People's Front, I was forced to run as a candidate. But the elections were truly democratic. Without juggling or pressure.

[Akhundova] Representatives of the republic's law enforcement authorities maintain that up to 1,000 firearms have been accumulated in Keleki and the surrounding villages.

[Elchibey] This is not true.

[Akhundova] What is true?

[Elchibey] There are people who are close to me, friends, relatives, finally, who are providing for my safety. Yes, they are armed. I am having to defend myself because I have many enemies, and there have already been two assassination attempts against me. I know how I am viewed—both in Russia and in Iran.

[Akhundova] But you would like to settle in law the question of your security?

[Elchibey] Undoubtedly. It was agreed with the parliamentary commission that I would present to the National Assembly a list of people whom I trust. I have been waiting for a decision on this matter for a long time.

[Akhundova] You want to return to Baku?

[Elchibey] Yes, I am drawn in that direction.

[Akhundova] Nonetheless, what are your immediate plans?

[Elchibey] If there is a positive decision on the question of the legal status of my security, I will go to Baku and will at the end of March take part in the Azerbaijan People's Front congress.

[Akhundova] You told the delegates that you intend to have presidential authority returned to you by political means. How?

[Elchibey] There are several scenarios. First, Aliyev returns to the position of chairman of the Supreme Council, and I once again occupy the office of president. Restoration of the status quo, that is. If this scenario is not supported by the people or encounters resistance on the part of the present authorities, we can employ the second option: We both resign and hold early presidential elections. True, more than by the question of the presidency I am worried currently by the problem of truly free democratic elections to parliament in Azerbaijan. It is essential to form, finally, a legitimate legislative body that could confront the dictatorship of the executive and serve as a guarantor of stability in society. This is the most important problem today. The second cherished goal, to which I intend to devote the rest of my life, is the reunification of Northern and Southern Azerbaijan. All the monarchies—Russian and Persian—tore the single body of the nation and the one land into two parts.

[Akhundova] This idea seems premature and even dangerous to many people. And we risk damaging relations with Iran, our closest neighbor, conclusively.

[Elchibey] The truth is not premature. And to desire freedom for one's people—what is reprehensible about this?

[Akhundova] What is your view of the CIS?

[Elchibey] Extremely negative. There is no Commonwealth. It is a pure fiction. Of the more than 200 agreements, only one or two are working. Azerbaijan has derived no benefit from membership of the CIS, and the damage is obvious.

Aliyev To Mark WWII Anniversaries in Europe

NC0703163495 Baku Azerbaycan Radio Televiziyasi Television Network in Azeri 1250 GMT 7 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Azerbaijani President Geydar Aliyev received Russian Ambassador to Azerbaijan Valter Shonia today.

[Begin recording] [off-screen reporter] The ambassador conveyed Russian President Boris Yeltsin's official invitation to Geydar Aliyev to participate in the Moscow celebrations marking the 50 anniversary of the victory over Fascism. He noted that the Azerbaijani people also made a matchless contribution to the historic victory over the German occupiers, and in difficult days this victory brings our peoples even closer together.

Azerbaijani President Geydar Aliyev thanked the ambassador for the official invitation and accepted it with pleasure. The president noted that an exchange of views were held at the CIS heads of state meeting in Almaty on 10 February on marking the anniversary of the victory. It was decided that the CIS heads of state would gather in Moscow on 9 May. The Azerbaijani president also will take part in the Moscow celebrations.

Geydar Aliyev also noted that heads of state of OSCE countries, including the Azerbaijani president, have been invited to London to mark the 50th anniversary of the victory over Fascism between 6 and 7 May.

The Azerbaijani president has also received an invitation to take part in the celebrations to be held in Paris on 8 May. Thus, the Azerbaijani president will participate in the celebrations in London on 6 May, in Paris on 8 May, and in Moscow on 9 May.

Geydar Aliyev also noted that the 9 May holiday also will be marked in Azerbaijan, which made an incomparable contribution to the historic victory in 1945. A special committee has been created and a series of events have been planned. [end recording]

Georgia

Government Warns Against Provoking Conflicts

LD0703200995 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1642 GMT 7 Mar 95

[From the "Presidential Bulletin" feature: compiled by Nikolay Zherebsov, Andrey Petrovskiy, edited by Vladimir Shishlin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Eduard Shevardnadze's press service has said that "the government will continue to take resolute measures against those who provoke conflicts and create a threat to security in the country."

The press service published its statement in Tbilisi in connection with the recent threats of the parliamentarian Boris Kakubava, who is a member of the banned National Liberation Front, to start terrorist acts against Russian troops stationed in Georgia.

The statement says that a legal action has already been brought against Kakubava for his involvement in the events of January 13, when radicals tried to launch an "armed march on Abkhazia."

"The Georgian leadership warns that any attempts to upset peace in the country or call good relations with Russia and other states into question are doomed to failure," the statement stresses. "Illegal actions will be stopped and punished for in accordance with the law."

Decision To Reopen Russian-Georgian Border Attacked

LD0703190295 Tbilisi CONTACT INFORMATION AGENCY in Russian 1600 GMT 7 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Tbilisi—The Supreme Council and the Council of Ministers of the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia today circulated a statement condemning the February resolution by the Russian State Duma on reopening the Russian-Georgian border along the Psou River, allegedly for purposes of overcoming an acute foodstuffs crisis in Abkhazia.

The statement stresses that the reopening of the border may lead to a fresh escalation of the conflict in Abkhazia as this will enable bandit formations of all kinds to infiltrate the territory of sovereign Georgia.

The statement also says that the territory, currently controlled by the [Abkhaz] separatists, will inevitably turn into a seat of violence and genocide of the Georgian population.

Yakushev on Deteriorating Situation in Abkhazia

LD0803110395 Tbilisi IPRINDA in Russian 1000 GMT 8 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Tbilisi [no date as received]—The press center of the Georgian Ministry of Defense reports that on 7 March Prime Minister Otar Patsatsia and Defense Minister Vardiko Nadibaidze had a meeting in Senaki [western Georgia] with Lieutenant General Vasiliy Yakushev, the commander of the peacekeeping forces deployed in the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict zone. The meeting was held behind closed doors.

After the meeting Lt. Gen. Yakushev said that since 1 March the situation in the so-called security zone has deteriorated. Incidents involving bandits and gangster attacks have increased. However, the peacekeepers' command is not taking radical steps in this connection because it believes that what is happening in Gali Rayon and Abkhazia in general is an internal affair of Georgia, and all offenses should be dealt with by the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Speaking about the return of refugees, Yakushev named two factors thwarting this process: The ill-thought-out and harsh position of the Abkhaz government, which is linking the refugee problem to the resolution of the issue of Abkhazia's status, as well as the unsatisfactory work of the quadripartite commission, which, according to Yakushev, has rendered the Moscow and Geneva meetings ineffective.

Security, Police Chiefs Sacked in Rustavi

LD0803114895 Tbilisi IPRINDA in Russian 1000 GMT 8 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Tbilisi [no date as received]—The power ministers attended the evening session of the Georgian Parliament on 7 March.

Levan Mamaladze, the personal representative of the head of state in Kvemo Kartli Province spoke about the incident that took place a few days ago [3 March] in Rustavi. He said that active measures to establish order in the region taken by the appropriate authorities were not to the liking of certain forces. In particular, he noted, the local authorities had started establishing order on the roads, checking Rescue Corps [Mkhedrioni] personnel and police, drug-testing, and also listing the weapons and ammunition belonging to the Rescue Corps.

Mamaladze also reported that immediately after the Rustavi incident the prosecutor of Rustavi and the Rustavi chiefs of the police and Security Service had been relieved of their duties.

Estonia

Luik: 'Complicated' Relations With Russia

WS0803124595 Tallinn ETA in English 1443 GMT 7 Mar 95

["News Release"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The relations between Estonia and Russia were complicated in 1992-95, said Foreign Minister Juri Luik at a press conference on Tuesday. The relations were badly influenced by the long-drawn withdrawal of Russian troops and events in Chechnya. Juri Luik said he believed the positive tendencies which appeared in December 1994 can be continued. He expressed particular hopes for solving the border issue in 1995 saying that the present government had given a good start for it.

Outgoing Foreign Minister: 'Movement to the Left'

WS0803095795 Tallinn BNS in English 1600 GMT 7 Mar 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tallinn, Mar 07, BNS—Estonia's outgoing Foreign Minister Juri Luik in his comments Tuesday [7 March] said the results of Sunday's general elections indicated "movement to the left."

But he added that as it obviously was impossible to move further on to the right from the point where Prime Minister Mart Laar's right-wing government had been standing, moving to the left was the only possibility.

"The answer to the question of how much (the country will swing to the left) now depends on the setup of the new government," Luik said.

Commenting on responses by the international media to the outcome of the elections, Luik said observers were offering no universal interpretation.

"It seems that the international public is not quite sure how to assess the election results. Several major news agencies regard the outcome as a swing to the left, while many others call it a shift toward centrist principles. It's difficult to bring out any single and clear trend," Luik said.

But all commentators are citing the election-winning parties pledging no changes in Estonia's foreign policy line, he added.

"The victorious parties have emphasized that, for instance, as to moving in the direction of the European Union and NATO, Estonia's foreign policy will remain unchanged," the minister said.

KMU: No Decision on Possible Coalition Partners

WS0703155795 Tallinn BNS in English 1300 GMT 7 Mar 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tallinn, Mar 07, BNS—A council meeting of the Coalition Party and Rural Union (KMU) alliance that won 41 of the parliament's 101 seats in Sunday's general elections decided Monday not to move any proposals to potential coalition partners yet.

The council of the KMU has so far adopted no decision as to coalition talks, council member Andrus Varik told BNS on Tuesday [7 March].

"The councils of parties belonging to the electoral union will adopt their positions on the issue in the next few days and it will be considered only after that with whom to hold talks," he said.

The winning alliance's two senior parties, the Coalition Party of former prime minister Tiit Vahi and the Rural People's Party of former Supreme Council (parliament) chairman Arnold Ruutel, were scheduled to convene later on Tuesday.

Two junior members—the Rural Union and the Farmer's Assembly—had scheduled their meetings for Wednesday.

Vahur Glaase, the KMU's chief of pre-election campaign, said the alliance had received no proposals by Tuesday from other parties or blocs on starting talks on government formation. He added that neither had his alliance made such a proposal to others.

Now it's the president's turn, he said. "All depends on when he (the president) calls the first meeting of the parliament and whom he appoints to form the new government."

According to the country's constitution, the president must call the new parliament together in ten days after election results are announced. After that, the president has 14 days to nominate a prime minister candidate.

Coalition Party Chairman Tiit Vahi, named by the Coalition Party and Rural Union alliance as its candidate for the post of prime minister, has mentioned the center-left Center Party, the liberal right-wing Reform Party and the Right Wingers as those his alliance considers as potential partners in a government coalition.

Varik, a leading member of the senior rural partners in Vahi's alliance, said on Tuesday the number of potential partners was not limited to those three.

He said the door remained open to everybody coming with a cooperation proposal.

One of the farm parties in the alliance—the Farmer's Assembly—already has ruled out working together with Siima Kallas' Reform Party. "We will fight against that as much as possible," said Eldur Parder, chairman of the Farmer's Assembly.

"The Reform Party's idea is to choke the farm sector."

"There is no way we could be for working closely with bankers," he said, referring to the support the Reform Party enjoys from the financial sector.

Parder said his farm party was ready for cooperation with the Center Party and the Right Wingers.

The remarks by the farm party leader also indicated mistrust toward his own senior alliance partners from the technocrat and industrialist-dominated Coalition Party.

"The Coalition Party, of course, would like to cooperate with bankers," he said. "But we are determined to struggle categorically against that."

Beside the Rural People's Party, the Farmer's Assembly and the Rural Union, the Coalition Party-led electoral alliance includes the Pensioners' and Families' League.

Reform Party Sets 'Conditions' for Coalition Role

WS0703155395 Tallinn BNS in English 1300 GMT 7 Mar 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tallinn, Mar 07, BNS—The Reform Party of central bank governor Siim Kallas, which placed second in Sunday's general elections, has said that "on certain conditions" it would enter a government coalition with the poll's winners, the allied Coalition Party and Rural Union (KMU).

But Reform Party leaders in remarks Tuesday also said they expected any proposal from the KMU to include an offer of at least five ministerial portfolios.

They said no formal proposal as to launching coalition talks had come from KMU by Tuesday morning.

Valve Kirsipuu, deputy chair of the Reform Party, told BNS on Tuesday that five ministerial offices would be a fair share based on the election outcome. But Kirsipuu declined to name the portfolios her party was vying for.

According to unofficial election results, the KMU gained 41 seats in the 101-member legislature, with the Reform Party second with 19.

Confirming the Reform Party's earlier position which rules out any coalition with Edgar Savisaar's Center Party, Kirsipuu said talks between the Reform Party and KMU could start only on the condition that KMU refrain from inviting Savisaar as possible partner.

"The Center Party has made promises which the Reform Party cannot accept," Kirsipuu said.

BNS has been told by reliable sources that the same condition has been moved by the Center Party, which would reject any suggestion of talks involving the Reform Party.

The Reform Party in public statements has never ruled out joining forces with KMU to form a center-right government. But Kirsipuu in an earlier interview with BNS said it would be difficult to work together in one coalition with some parts of KMU. She said that was due to some things these groups under KMU had promised to their voters. Setting up a coalition with them would mean at least partly assuming responsibility for fulfilling those promises, Kirsipuu said.

Lithuania

Brazauskas: Communist Party Need Not Apologize

LD0703155095 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1418 GMT 7 Mar 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] VILNIUS, Mar 7 (Interfax) - Lithuanian President Algirdas Brazauskas expressed his disagreement with the belief that the Communist Party of Lithuania must apologize for the crimes committed against the Lithuanian people during the Soviet occupation.

Brazauskas told national TV on Monday evening that it is not the party as a whole, but individual leaders that must be punished for the crimes.

He also said that in 1989, the Lithuanian Communist Party branched out from the Soviet Communist Party, and qualified the policy pursued in Lithuania during the Communist regime as genocide.

Brazauskas said that if repentance is to be general, apologies must be presented by all of the more than 200,000 former Communists "many of whom have become members of other parties and keep silent about their Communist past."

He urged the Lithuanian citizens to take an active part in local elections scheduled for March 25. "Local governments must be shaped by the will of the majority, not by a small group," stated Brazauskas.

Opposition Leaders Refuse To Continue Talks With Premier

LD0603181295 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1650 GMT 6 Mar 95

[From the "Presidential Bulletin" feature: compiled by Nikolay Zherebtsov, Andrey Petrovskiy, edited by Vladimir Shishlin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Leaders of seven (out of eight) opposition political parties in parliament did not accept the invitation of Prime Minister Adolfas Slezevicius and last Friday [3 March] did not arrive for a meeting with the prime minister.

Slezevicius invited the leaders of the opposition parties to inform them of the results of his talks with Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and discuss other problems of domestic and foreign policies.

The government's press service expressed regret concerning the opposition's unwillingness to conduct a dialogue, including concerning the talks with the European Union. As the main task of the planned meeting, Slezevicius favored the search for a consensus on the problems, whose solution will influence the advancement of the process of integration of Lithuania into the European Union.

Leaders of the opposition parties, who dodged meeting with the prime minister, proposed that President Algirdas Brazauskas "start regular official consultations with the Lithuanian democratic parties represented in parliament, including the foreign minister."

Lukoil Decides Against Financing Oil Terminal

WS0803082395 Tallinn BNS in English 0956 GMT 7 Mar 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Vilnius, Mar 06, BNS—The Russian oil giant Lukoil has decided not to take part in financing the construction of an oil export-import terminal on the Lithuanian seashore.

Bronislovas Vainora, director of Lithuania's Mazeikiai oil refinery, made the announcement at a press conference Monday [6 March].

Vainora said he met last week with Vagit Aligperov, the Russian company's president, who declared that Lukoil is not interested in the Lithuanian oil terminal project.

"I suppose that everything possible has been done," Vainora said. In his opinion, there is no point in continuing talks with Lukoil.

Asked about the prospects of the terminal's financing, Vainora said he and the U.S. company Fluor Daniel intend to present their proposals regarding the problem to the Lithuanian government. But, he noted, it still too early to speak about any specific plans.

Vainora said he held talks with Fluor Daniel on Monday. The company's representatives were also scheduled to meet with Energy Minister Algimantas Stasiukynas.

During Vainora's trip to Moscow last week, he met with representatives of several oil companies, including Neft Moskva, Conex and Mobil, to discuss long-term oil export through the future Lithuanian terminal. However, there is no company in Russia to sign such a long-term contract, he noted.

Possibilities to sell Mazeikiai shares to Russian oil suppliers were discussed during Vainora's meeting with Lukoil officials. He said the Russian company intends to participate in a contest for the right to acquire 40 percent of Mazeikiai.

Last week, Vainora also visited the Kaliningrad region for meetings with representatives of several oil companies.

Restoral Urged of Moscow Ostankino TV Broadcasts

LD0803092595 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0805 GMT 8 Mar 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vladas Burbulis]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Vilnius March 8 TASS—"Return those which brighten our bleak life at least for a brief time" is the headline in the DIENA (DAY) newspaper of a review of numerous letters from Lithuanian TV viewers insisting on restoring telecasts from Moscow's Ostankino TV company.

The newspaper states that most of them are ready to pay taxes for telecasts of the Moscow TV channel, "since they are popular, interesting and substantive".

DIENA quotes statements by letters' authors, "suggesting that a republic-wide poll concerning broadcasts from Moscow should be held during elections to local self-government bodies" (eds: they will be held on March 25).

According to the newspaper, "Lithuanian people are missing calm on TV screens, want greater spiritual warmth and interesting programmes".

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